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Abstract 
 
Early research investigating digital activism in relation to the 2011 Arab uprisings intended 
to determine whether digital media played a significant role in consolidating the 
revolutionary opposition. As a result, this literature essentially focuses on the exact 
moment of the January 2011 protests and often fails at considering the evolution of digital 
activism and social media consumption over time. Alternatively, this work goes beyond 
the context of the January 2011 events and investigates how participative media have been 
used over the course of the political crisis that led the 2011 Egyptian and Tunisian 
revolutions to the 2013 military coup d’état. By doing so, it elaborates the debate on digital 
activism and assesses how social media has affected public deliberation over the long run 
and as political leaders attempted to regain legitimacy in the aftermath of the uprisings. In 
doing so, this research contributes to the evaluation of what extent these emerging forms of 
political action, which Bennett and Segerberg conceptualise as connective action (2012) 
are sustainable and likely to materialise into institutional politics.  
 
In order to map the post-revolutionary debate across a range of digital media, this study 
draws on a large data set extracted from different social platforms, including blogs, search 
engines and e-consultation project. Data visualisation tools and traditional discourse 
analysis are jointly applied to analyse this data set and identify how various political 
actors, such as party leaders, bloggers or random social media users debated online over 
the course of the 2011-2013 political crisis. In addition, this work includes a set of face-to-
face interviews conducted on the field with Egyptian journalists and political activists 
actively engaged in the post-revolutionary debate.  
 
By analysing the long-term effects of digital activism in Tunisia and Egypt, this research 
proposes to challenge the assumption, according to which digital media, as a manifestation 
of technological development acts as a factor of democratisation.  
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1. Introduction chapter: Technology and democracy in the Middle East 
What is the difference between a protest and a revolution and under what conditions can a 
revolution lead to sustainable political change today? One inevitably comes to reflect on 
those questions when investigating the case of the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Arguably, these events may be interpreted as revolutions for they marked the end of 
Mubarak’s and Ben Ali’s rules, creating an opportunity for pluralism by stimulating public 
deliberations in the early stage of the revolutionary process. One may also interpret the 
2011 events as the manifestation of a social (Elseewi, 2011) and technological revolution 
(Castells, 2012), since they introduced a new range of political actors and a new set of 
communicative practices in public debate.  
 
Yet, it could also be argued that the uprisings did not entirely succeed in overthrowing the 
leading political elites over the course of the political transition (Stein, 2012; Puchot, 
2012). Despite the fact that protests stimulated innovative forms of political engagement, 
illiteracy, corruption, and the polarisation of the political debate considerably challenged 
the democratisation process in the Middle East and North Africa [MENA] region. In 
addition, the predominance of the long-established ruling elites on the political scene 
proved to be a significant obstacle to the revolution over the years that followed the 2011 
protests.   
 
For this reason, the case of the 2011 uprisings shall introduce a reflection on whether 
emerging forms of political action, such as digital activism, can compete with and/or 
contribute to institutional politics. Yet in order to draw this reflection, one should consider 
whether digital activism succeeded in consolidating a powerful opposition after the 2011 
events over the course of the post-revolutionary phase.  
 
On 3 July 2013, the military coup d’état led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sissi two years 
after the revolutionary uprisings, thanks to which Mubarak’s military regime had been 
removed in Egypt introduced a new perspective on the Arab Spring. Over the two years 
that preceded the event, as Tunisia and Egypt initiated their political transition, the 
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narratives surrounding the Arab uprisings constantly fluctuated between great hopes for 
democratisation and great scepticism.  
 
On one hand, the first democratic elections held in Tunisia for the Constituent Assembly 
(2011) and the presidential race conducted in Egypt (2012) in the aftermath of the 
revolution suggested that the 2011 protests had succeeded in introducing democratic 
change. Over the months following the 2011 events, researchers demonstrated that the 
Arab Spring had initiated a new range of innovative practices through which young 
Tunisians and Egyptians experienced different forms of political engagement. Street art 
and digital media activism provided an arena for deliberation (Gerbaudo, 2012), thanks to 
which citizens initially gained a greater sense of national belonging (Breuer, 2012) and a 
certain feeling of empowerment in shaping the post-revolutionary debate (Elseewi, 2011).  
 
This led many to believe that the social changes operating in the MENA region will ensure 
the freedom of expression and pluralism required to stimulate democratic development. In 
this regard, early studies appeared to be rather optimistic, when considering the role played 
by digital technologies in facilitating this democratisation process (Howard and Hussein, 
2013). News media coverage (Cottle, 2011; Hirst, 2012), along with foreign governments 
(Christensen, 2011) further contributed to convey this techno-utopianism of the Arab-
Spring, which relied on a very Eurocentric perception of the relationship between 
democracy and technological development.  
  
On the other hand, the success of the traditionalist party Ennahdha in Tunisia (2011) and 
the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (2012) raised more scepticism among the 
left-wing and liberal pro-revolutionary youth. With the success of Islamist parties across 
the region, commentators became progressively more aware of the fact that democracy in 
the Middle East would not necessarily conform to the Western neoliberal model. Over 
time, the cyber-utopian perspective on the Arab Spring alternated with what Christian 
Fuchs (2012) has identified as a more pessimistic vision of digital activism as a source of 
social insecurity.  
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As Fuchs (2012) and Hirst (2012) demonstrate, each of these approaches (cyber-utopian 
and techno-pessimistic) are revealing of the fact that the Arab Spring is commonly 
addressed from the spectrum of a certain technological determinism. This phenomenon 
may also be understood as a manifestation of Marx’s fetishism of commodities (1867), as 
the technological parameter responds to the desire to objectify the complex sociocultural 
dynamics at stake in the democratisation process (Hirst, 2012: 6; Fuchs, 2012: 387).    
 
As a result, the literature on the Arab Spring often intends to confirm or demystify the 
significance of this technological parameter, instead of assessing the evolution of 
technology usage over time. Earlier studies offer a very limited perspective on the series of 
events that followed the revolutions and often prove to be biased by certain sets of hopes 
and expectations in debating what makes a democratic society.  
 
This research responds to the need to understand digital activism and the Arab Spring from 
a more critical and less dichotomous angle. Unlike most of the studies conducted in the 
early stage of the revolution, this work investigates how digital activism evolved between 
2011 and 2014, as a broader range of socio-political actors became active online and in the 
public sphere. By doing so, it evaluates the function of digital media at different stages of 
the revolutionary crisis and shows how technology contributed to serve different 
ideological agendas, producing a highly fluid revolutionary discourse.   
 
By reflecting on the long-term evolution of the political and technological revolutions that 
occurred in Tunisia and Egypt between 2011 and 2014, I intend to overcome the debate 
between cyber-utopianism and techno-pessimism. Most importantly, I will explore how 
participative media serve different instances of discourse and how they may ultimately 
benefit well-established institutional powers, while helping new opposition movements to 
emerge.  
 
In doing so, my research will provide empirical evidence to assess what Bennett and 
Segerberg (2012) or Tufekci (2014) commonly identified as the lack of sustainability of 
such forms of connective action. It will outline the reasons why digital activism fails at 
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relying on a consistent ideological framework over the long run and determine to what 
extent this phenomenon may explain the failure of the Egyptian revolution, three years 
after the uprisings.  
 
Simultaneously, my research will draw on the Tunisian and Egyptian cases to reflect on the 
power struggles that experts are currently observing in the field of media studies between 
prosumers (Merrin: 2008), states and corporations (Jenkins, 2006; Van Dijck, 2013). By 
considering how digital media has been applied on the local/individual as well as on the 
institutional scale, this study illustrates how this tool progressively introduced a new 
mainstream communicative framework, and contributes to conceptualise the way cultural 
leadership and dominant discourses take shape in the digital age.  
 
1.1. A holistic approach to connectivity: discourse and counter-
discourse in periods of revolutions 
For this purpose, I will refer to the emerging concept of connectivity recently formulated in 
new media studies. I will show how this concept can be applied to understand how digital 
technologies have affected the circulation of discourse and power in the context of the 
Tunisian and Egyptian post-revolutionary debate. This theoretical framework will allow 
me to compare the way discourses and power circulate in the digital age as opposed to 
other media environments and determine whether digital media are likely to generate deep 
and consistent ideological change.  
 
In order to determine whether connectivity alters sustainable forms of political 
engagement, I will examine how this concept – which has been discussed in the context of 
today’s technological revolution – can be conceptualised in relation to a broader range of 
political and philosophical revolutions. I will develop a more holistic model of 
connectivity and compare this paradigm to the process through which revolutions operate a 
transition from counter-power to well established institutional discourse.  
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As I will argue, analogies can be made between connectivity and other manifestations of 
political and technological change in history during which discourse, power and identities 
tend to become fluid. These are times when emerging ideologies and social practices 
considerably challenge the prevailing doxa and when the dominant discursive and 
institutional frameworks are very likely to be renegotiated.  
 
In my theoretical development (chapter 2), I propose visualising this phenomenon as part 
of a model which I will refer to as the discursive cycle. This model provides a conceptual 
framework for examining how connectivity and revolutions in general instigate the process 
through which counter-discourses progressively reach the masses before consolidating a 
new institutional power. One may also describe this phenomenon as the turning point, 
during which emerging practices progressively grow into the new mainstream. As 
emerging discourses and social practices gain in popularity, they institute deep ideological 
changes in society, bringing marginalised voices to the centre of the public sphere and 
potentially establishing a new elite in power. This model partly explains how revolutions 
traditionally operate on the discursive, ideological and cultural level.  
 
Figure 1: Circulation of discourse in the discursive cycle 
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For this reason, I will rely on this model to determine what characterises a successful 
revolution leading to sustainable ideological change. Moreover, I will rely on this holistic 
concept to determine how the technological parameter – digital media – affects this 
circulation of discourse.  
 
On the basis of this model, I will refer to the term mainstream to express the transition that 
the revolution – as it was relayed online - operated from emergent counter-discourse to 
institutional politics. Analogically, in my work, this term also relates to the evolution that 
the Internet operates from emergent to mainstream media. To some extent, I employ this 
term as it is commonly used in the literature, to designate the mass media hegemony. 
However, in most cases, I describe digital media as a new mainstream: an emergent media 
that has rapidly reached the masses and that is being capitalised similarly to traditional 
mass media. In this regard, the term slightly differs from the way it is usually applied and 
specifically refers to my model of a discursive cycle. Indeed, whereas this term is often 
applied to distinguish the old from the new media, I argue that the Internet is progressively 
endorsing the same characteristics of traditional mass media, when it comes to frame 
dominant media narratives and hegemonic discourse.   
 
1.2. Introducing the connectivity literature 
In order to set the bases of my theoretical framework, I will first outline how the 
connectivity paradigm has recently been defined across media studies and will comment 
on how this concept can be interpreted in relation to my discursive cycle model.  
 
The term “connectivity” is commonly defined as the characteristic, or order, or degree of 
being connected 1.  The strictly technical, computational sense, it designates the ability of a 
computer, program, device, or system to connect with one or more others 2. However, in 
the larger sense, it can be argued that connectivity also expresses the idea of interrelation, 
                                                1 Oxford English Dictionary, 1972 2 Cambridge Dictionary  3 http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/01/2015/arrested-war-after-diffused-war 2 Cambridge Dictionary  
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intricacy, network and conjunction. In the collection Digital World: connectivity, creativity 
and rights, edited by Gillian Youngs (2013), Youngs first employs this concept to describe 
the evolution of Internet consumption from its early stage (interconnectivity), to the web 
2.0 mass consumption connectivity.  
 
According to Youngs (2013) connectivity as a paradigm is not incidental to the appearance 
of computer-based communication –as the strictly technical definition of this term would 
suggest. In fact, it is only when communication technologies start to suffuse all aspects of 
society that this notion becomes relevant to media studies: 
the Internet has expanded beyond its knowledge society characteristics to host 
what might loosely be termed all of life, or more precisely engagements and 
activities, actual and potential, linked to most facets of political economy, 
society and culture. (…) it can be argued that as the panoply of forms of access 
(most recently smartphone and tablet) and applications grows, this becomes 
ever more complex. The continuing evolution of Internet into the mass sphere 
as a tool of ordinary people and everyday lives provides a new context for 
considering forms of online and inequalities. (Youngs, 2013: 2) 
The transition of digital media usage from emergent practice to prevailing communication 
channels annihilates the distinction between old and new media.  
 
Additionally, understanding how the Internet might shape power relationships and identify 
which agencies may benefit from it requires conceiving online-based interactions as part of 
a complex system. Whereas earlier research on Internet consumption tends to approach 
individual users and organisations (governments or corporations) as distinct and separate, 
connectivity involves a widening of focus, conceiving the impact of the digital on the large 
as well as the small scale. Applying such a system-based approach implies visualising 
individual users and power institutions as two interdependent entities: 
We have witnessed layered and integrated forms of networked reality, from 
email through web interactivity through social multimedia connectivity. So 
while we must still look to the focal points of industrial, financial and 
knowledge-based capitalism – powerful states, corporations and institutions – 
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to map technological might and driving forces, we also have a new focus going 
well beyond such entities. (Young, 2013:3) 
Inevitably, jointly investigating individuals’ and institutions’ discourses as they circulate 
through the same medium tends to invalidate the debate between cyber-optimists and 
cyber-sceptics (Oates, 2008). Scholars, who initially saw in digital technologies an 
alternative space for creative subcultures to blossom are now concerned about the way 
user-generated content might benefit the digital industry (Van Dijck , 2013). Alternatively, 
researchers originally interested in public policy, institutional discourses and mass media 
news framing come to examine how grass-roots political claims and collaboratively shaped 
narratives affect the agenda setting (Cottle, 2006). These changes in perspective have 
introduced a rather temperate and subtler critique of the way the Internet may challenge or 
further establish cultural imperialism. This incidentally explains why some of the social 
scientists working in this field since the early 2000s have recently reviewed their 
arguments (Jenkins, 2008; Turkle, 2012).  
 
As I will demonstrate in my theoretical chapter, due to the overwhelming expansion of 
digital media to all of life (Youngs, 2013:2), researchers are formulating a more complex 
interpretation of the way power circulates between individuals, governments and 
corporations. While celebrating the empowering nature of the participatory culture 
(Jenkins, 2006), they acknowledge the fact that today’s emerging social and cultural 
practices serve more institutional interests (Jenkins, 2008) and contribute to the rise of 
informational capitalism (Dean, 2008).  
 
Admittedly, media scholars have recently employed the term “connectivity” in relatively 
different contexts and to study distinctive aspects of digital media usage. For instance, José 
Van Dijck (2013) exclusively addresses connectivity in relation to networking applications 
and social platforms. Her theory nevertheless relies on the idea that digital media colonise 
all aspects of social life. Consequently, she claims that our perception of digital ICTs as an 
empowering technology should be reviewed, so as to identify the dominant power 
structures lying behind this industry:  
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Social media, (…) form a new online layer through which people organize 
their lives. Today, this layer of platforms influences human interaction on an 
individual and community level, as well as on a larger societal level, while the 
worlds of online and offline are increasingly interpenetrating. Originally, the 
need for connectedness is what drove many users to these sites. When Web 2.0 
first marshaled the development of so-called social media, in the early years of 
the new millennium, participatory culture was the buzzword that connoted the 
Web’s potential to nurture connections, build communities, and advance 
democracy (Van Dijck, 2013: 4) 
In that respect, although her study of connectivity is limited to social media, it fits with 
Youngs’ (2013) approach in exploring the micro and macro levels of digital media usage 
simultaneously.  
 
In addition, Youngs emphasises the fact that, under the connectivity paradigm, the 
distinction between online and offline media becomes obsolete, as traditional mass media 
have all converged towards the digital:  
[The interactions between technology, social and communications factors are] 
in part a matter of the growing fusion of online and offline in social senses as 
interactions and processes across them become increasingly enmeshed. Binary 
notions of the separateness of the two spheres are being eroded as different 
aspects of the same social activities (…) take place not in one or the other, but 
in both.”(Young, 2013:5) 
Overall, the connectivity paradigm is revealing of the fact that it is no longer possible to 
distinguish the different spheres of influence of digital media, or to differentiate traditional 
(mainstream) from new media. Internet can no longer be regarded as emergent, since it has 
fully incorporated the mainstream. As a result, it has become extremely challenging to 
determine who exercises control over media narratives and which agencies ultimately 
benefit from user-generated content.  
 
1.3. Connectivity: the transition from emerging to mainstream 
As the instances of discourses are no longer distinctive, and while researchers are 
witnessing the rapid evolution from the emerging to the mainstream, connectivity has also 
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been described as a period of diffusion, unpredictability and uncertainty (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin, 2010). This is precisely what Hoskins and O’Loughlin have observed in their 
examination of how new media has affected the mediatization of war. Conducting a 
retrospective of the theoretical frameworks that have characterised the mediatization of 
war in the twenty-first century, Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2015) introduce the concept of 
“Arrested War”, which ultimately succeeds their earlier theory on “Diffused War” 
(Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010).  
 
In accordance with the connectivity paradigm, their earlier concept Diffused War 
illustrates the fact that media narratives have become unpredictable, as they are now 
sporadically produced by diffuse agencies. This phenomenon has been reflected in media 
studies, generating a multitude of concepts that have often failed to produce a replicable 
model to explain the overwhelming feeling of uncertainty generated by such media 
environment: 
By the turn of the millennium, mass internet penetration and the post-9/11 war 
on terror signalled a (…) phase, that we called the emergence of Diffused 
War.  Content seemed to emerge from nowhere, effects had no causes, and 
uncertainty reigned. This was a wild west moment in which much of the media 
ecology felt ‘out there’, beyond; the centre could not hold. (…) In the Diffused 
War phase we saw a melting pot of new concepts as scholars tried to get a grip 
on apparently novel and confusing phenomena. (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 
2015)3 
Yet this Diffused War phase in which power and agencies have been competing in a fluid 
and constantly versatile symbolic space has come to an end. Instead, we are now 
witnessing the return of a mainstream media hegemony. Despite users’ contribution to the 
accumulation of content that has progressively been capitalised on by the digital industry 
(search engines, social media platforms, web-based applications), political institutions and 
mainstream media channels have now recovered control over news framing: 
But today, (…) [user]-generated content and its chaotic dynamics ‘out there’ 
have been absorbed and appropriated. (…) The mainstream has enveloped the 
                                                3 http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/01/2015/arrested-war-after-diffused-war 
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extreme. It has regained its powers of gatekeeping, of verification, of defining 
agendas. Any content that is acclaimed as alternative, oppositional or outside, 
only acquires significant value when acknowledged and remediated by the 
mainstream. Virality and spreadability, key concepts of phase two of the ‘new 
media ecology’, are not part of a sustainable, user-generated phenomenon, but 
are ultimately arrested by the mainstream. (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015)4 
In Hoskins and O’Loughlin’s terms (2015), the evolution from Diffused War to Arrested 
War exemplifies the fact that under the connectivity paradigm digital media has operated a 
transition from emerging to mainstream media. Beyond the mediatization of war, the 
connectivity paradigm is very similar to the concept of Diffused War in denominating this 
particular moment in time, when discourse becomes fluid and when the instances of 
discourses can hardly be identified.  
  
                                                4 http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/01/2015/arrested-war-after-diffused-war 
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1.4. Connectivity and the sustainability issue 
From a different perspective, Bennett and Segerberg (2012) also contribute to 
conceptualise connectivity as a process through which discourses – and political action – 
become fluid and unpredictable. By comparing online-based activist networks to more 
traditional political organisations, they argue that today’s connective action is no longer 
restricted to one specific institutional framework and is therefore appealing to a broader 
range of members. Most importantly, thanks to participative media, individuals are now 
able to personalise the political message, by constantly reshaping it. This particular feature 
of connective action makes it more inclusive and therefore more appealing than traditional 
political structures, which rely on a predefined ideological discourse. However, this is 
precisely what makes emerging forms of political action (connective action) very likely to 
be unsustainable and unable to achieve success in long-term political projects. In this 
regard, Bennett and Segerberg (2012) anticipate a crucial issue, when considering how 
connectivity will affect political engagement in future: 
It is from the perspective particular to connective action that it becomes fruitful 
to return to the insistent concerns threaded through the general debate about 
digitally networked dissent: the question whether such action can be politically 
effective and sustained. (…) These concerns need to be addressed even if the 
contours of political action may be shifting: sustainability and effect are 
fundamental to assessing any collective action in the context of popular 
democracy. Given the nature of connective action, then, it is imperative to 
develop a means of thinking meaningfully about the capacities of sustainability 
and effectiveness in specifically networked action, and moreover, to apply this 
in examining how connective action plays out in different contexts and 
conditions. (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011: 36) 
 
By highlighting the issue of sustainability and effect, Bennett and Segerberg (2011) 
inevitably bring us to contemplate how the arguments raised by such diffuse and organic 
movements might be incorporated by political institutions. Assessing sustainability and 
effect does not only require the observation of how activist networks spontaneously evolve 
over time. Most importantly, it involves focusing on the relationship between connective 
networks and the institutions that ensure representative democracy. In order to fully 
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explore the question of sustainability and effect, one should examine the circumstances in 
which those two different types of political actors may face ideological conflicts or share 
common interests. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, building up theory on connectivity 
requires considering all these parameters and applying a multidimensional approach to 
study how such flexible media narratives evolve over time.  
 
In fact, the question of sustainability is implicit to the entire debate on connectivity. 
Overall connectivity characterises a time of uncertainty during which the boundaries 
between new and old media – as well as between emerging and mainstream media – are 
vanishing. Furthermore, across the literature, connectivity is also described as a process 
through which discourses, hence power, become fluid and versatile. In the absence of a 
fixed ideological framework, discourses potentially remain very superficial and are no 
longer sustained by a clear political identity. As a result, what is originally formulated as a 
counter-discourse may very soon be distorted, so as to serve the leading political forces 
that, unlike activist networks rely on well-established institutional structures. 
 
According to late media and cultural studies, this paradigmatic shift specifically applies to 
the technological revolution that was introduced by digital media over the last two 
decades. However, by referring to the model of discursive cycle I developed earlier, I 
would like to suggest that every revolution – whether technological or political – comes 
with a phase during which discourses become more fluid, in order to facilitate the 
transition of power. On the basis of this emerging connectivity literature, I will formulate a 
more holistic interpretation of the discursive and ideological tensions that characterise such 
revolutions.  
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1.5. Connectivity: how revolutions turn counter-discourse into 
institutional discourse 
Every revolution introduces a new discursive cycle. Consequently, all revolutions face 
their own critical turning point, which is comparable to what social scientists are currently 
witnessing with the manifestation of the connectivity paradigm. This moment is 
systematically characterised by high tensions over power, often generating confusion about 
the meaning as well as the authorship of discourse. It occurs when emergent – or 
revolutionary – discourses gain legitimacy and tend to become standardised. 
Simultaneously, with the multiplicity of actors progressively involved in the revolutionary 
debate, this turning point is also when revolutionary claims are more likely to be distorted.  
 
The reason why this process simultaneously translates into power struggles and identity 
crisis is that it adorns power institutions with an entirely new vocabulary and ideological 
framework. Since identities are precisely dependent on ideological discourses, they are 
inevitably thrown into confusion. On one hand, revolutionaries witness the fact that their 
emergent counter-discourse increasingly gains inertia. By acquiring recognition, it loses its 
flexibility to become another well-established and commonly shared consensus. 
Consequently, the pioneers of the revolution are very soon divided between those primarily 
attached to the foundation of the new ideology and those who remain essentially driven by 
the process of revolutionary resistance itself.  
 
While the first group starts implementing the structure of a new dictatorship, the latter 
embraces a perpetual anarchist momentum, which survives and transcends political theory. 
In fact, whereas the essence of a revolutionary dictatorship essentially lies in theory (i.e. in 
the institutional and discursive frameworks that sustain power), the substance of anarchist 
resistance is embedded in practice. This idea was originally formulated by Foucault and 
Deleuze (1977) in their discussion on intellectuals and power, in which Foucault elaborates 
on what he perceives as a critique of discourse. As such, it allows us to distinguish critical 
theory from institutional discourse, as Foucault defines it in his work The Order of 
Discourse (1971).    
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In this correspondence, Foucault and Deleuze define counter-discourse as a set of social 
practices through which marginalised groups constantly contest the leadership of power 
organisations. As such, it specifically emanates from the same communities of individuals, 
whom institutionalised discourses are intended to rule:      
(…) if the fight is directed against power, then all those on whom power is 
exercised to their detriment, all who find it intolerable, can begin the struggle 
on their own terrain and on the basis of their proper activity (or passivity). In 
engaging in a struggle that concerns their own interests, whose objectives they 
clearly understand and whose methods only they can determine, they enter into 
a revolutionary process. (Foucault and Deleuze, 1977: 216) 
Interestingly enough, Deleuze and Foucault insist on describing counter-discourse as a 
social practice because they distinguish it from the role of intellectuals in outlining power 
struggles and deconstructing the prevailing doxa. Admittedly, intellectuals might produce 
critical forms of theory. Yet counter-discourse is primarily the result of everyday practices, 
through which dominated groups raise their voices to challenge social constructs: 
The point is that writing a theory must somehow be linked with activism in 
order to be subversive. At the same time, we recognize that theory can pose a 
challenge to the status quo and, as such, can have profound political 
importance: Theory is political to the extent that it can blast apart totalizing 
hegemonic discourses which, at their most insidious, manage to include 
revolutionary viewpoints. A counter-discourse, however, is always political 
(…) In the end, one must, in the most uncomplicated sense, act. (Moussa and 
Scapp, 1996: 92)  
Whereas power is crystallised into theory – as fixed form of discourse - counter-power 
consists in a fluid process. As such, it aims at remaining fluid, in order to keep questioning 
the nascent social constructs through which new relationships of domination take shape.  
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1.6. The revolutionary process: negotiating the meaning of discourse 
Hannah Arendt’s work On the Revolution (1963) contributes to conceptualise the cyclical 
evolution from discourse to counter-discourse, approaching it from the perspective of wars 
and revolutions. By analysing how discourses of warfare and revolution succeeded each 
other over the twentieth century, Arendt outlines the fact that institutional power and 
counter-power both relied on the same ideological vocabulary. In doing so, she 
demonstrates that many revolutionary ideals – such as the concept of freedom – remained 
very flexible over time, so as to be used to legitimate the leading political discourse as well 
as the justification of war:   
It is important to remember that the idea of freedom was introduced into the· 
debate of the war question after it had become quite obvious that we had 
reached a stage of technical development where the means of destruction were 
such as to exclude their rational use. In other words, freedom has appeared in 
this debate like a deus ex machina to justify what on rational grounds has 
become unjustifiable. (Arendt, 1963:14) 
Freedom, in this sense, has always acted as a fluid component of discourse. As much as it 
remains a revolutionary leitmotiv, it is recurrently used to consolidate a new institutional 
order, sometimes accounting for new relations of domination. As a result the revolutionary 
cause of freedom is systematically succeeded by freedom as a justification of war – or vice 
versa - in the circulation of discourses:   
(…) it has become almost a matter of course that the end of war is revolution, 
and that the only cause which possibly could justify it is the revolutionary 
cause of freedom. (Arendt, 1963: 17) 
As I will show in this research, Arendt’s reflection most certainly illustrates the fact that 
the ideological vocabulary of the revolution has been constantly redefined in post-
revolutionary Egypt. Most importantly, it outlines how this phenomenon may have 
benefitted the counter-revolution, “for counter-revolution (…) has always remained bound 
to revolution as reaction is bound to action.” (Arendt, 1963: 18).  
 
Her work also reminds us that the prevailing ideological vocabulary systematically 
becomes more fluid whenever different instances of discourse are competing for power. 
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This may however become more problematic in the age of semantic web, as hashtags, tags 
and search keywords amplify the dynamics through which the meaning of a term is 
negotiated. Indeed, as Bennett and Segerberg (2012) would suggest, the quicker the 
evolution of social networks, the more fluid the components of discourse are likely to 
become.  
 
1.7. Unsustainable revolutionary discourse in Tunisia and Egypt 
As I conceptualise it in relation to my discursive cycle model, fluid discourses contribute 
to ensure the regeneration or renewal of power, as long as they facilitate the success of 
revolutionary process. Indeed, every revolution in history brings a period of uncertainty, 
during which discourse and identities inevitably become more fluid. At this stage, the 
revolutionary agenda is being negotiated among revolutionary thinkers, activists, political 
institutions and many other stakeholders, before gaining legitimacy and potentially 
defeating the regime in power. With digital media however, this process appears to be 
accelerated and/or emphasised, which is very likely to affect the cycle of discourse. On one 
hand, connectivity – as it has been conceptualised by late media studies – enables more 
individuals to shape emerging discourses and allows marginalised political groups to 
spread their message more efficiently. On the other hand, over the long run, those 
emerging political voices are very easily misinterpreted or strategically hijacked.  
 
In the context of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, I will argue that the transition from 
emerging to mainstream arose too quickly for sustainable ideological change to occur. 
Digital media certainly contributed to render the revolutionary discourse highly fluid, 
making it accessible to a broad range of social and political actors. However, as I will 
show, this also explains why the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions failed at producing a 
consistent institutional framework and why they very soon became hijacked by the leading 
political groups. Over the revolutionary crisis, the meaning of the terms “pro-
revolutionary”, “freedom” or “democracy” was constantly redefined, producing every time 
a new narrative of the revolution, which would only benefit well-established political 
institutions.  
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Although early studies have considered the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings as a 
successful trigger of political transition (Breuer, 2012; Castells, 2012; Howard and 
Hussein, 2013), I will argue that the revolutions remained superficial. Whereas digital 
media might have accelerated the traditional circulation of discourse, it prevented 
revolutionaries from developing a reliable ideological structure for their counter-discourse. 
In this regard, my research further elaborates on the sustainability issue anticipated by 
Bennett and Segerberg (2012) and more recently addressed by Tufekci (2014).  
 
In order to map the circulation of discourse in post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt, my 
research will address to the following questions: 
 
 
1. Did the symbolic and technological tools designed by pro-revolutionaries 
benefit the leading political forces over the months that followed the 2011 
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt?  
 
This particular research question intends to reconsider the assumption, 
according to which digital technologies acted as a factor of 
democratisation. Further, it brings us to consider the hypothesis that the 
political crisis following the 2011 events reveals a vulnerability intrinsic to 
emergent forms of political activism.  
 
2. To what extent was the 2011-2013 post-revolutionary debate 
representative of the way emerging counter-discourses progressively gain 
legitimacy in periods of revolution?  
 
Exploring this question actually requires assessing to what extent the 
Tunisian and Egyptian case studies relate to the model of a discursive 
cycle, through which counter-discourse turns into the new institutional 
discourse. In other words, it introduces a reflection on the way 
connectivity affects the balance between power and counter-power. 
 
3. What was the role of social media and digital activism in enhancing the 
fluidity of the revolutionary discourse over the months that followed the 
2011 revolutions?  
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The third of my research questions shall bring me to address the 
sustainability issue and determine whether fluid counter-discourse can be 
as successful over time as on the long run. 
 
These three research questions will lead me to examine to what extent the revolutionary 
discourse shaped by different political actors across social media deviated from its original 
purpose over the three years that followed the uprisings. This will allow me to determine 
whether social media activism has facilitated the progressive alienation of the revolution, 
by preventing the revolutionary discourse from relying on a sustainable ideological 
framework.  
 
In addition, by elaborating on my second research question, I will determine whether 
digital media may affect the circulation of discourse and show how enhanced connectivity 
may jeopardise the process through which new ideology comes to power. Finally, I will 
rely on a set of empirical evidences resulting from data visualisation, discourse analysis 
and qualitative interviews to show how the ideological vocabulary surrounding the 
revolution proves to be fluid. I will demonstrate that the meaning of revolutionary 
keywords such as “equity”, “social dignity” or “freedom” has constantly evolved in the 
course of the political events that punctuated the post-revolutionary debate.  
 
1.8. Introducing my methodology 
In order to map the evolution of the revolutionary discourse over time, I rely on a 
methodological approach developed by Scollon and Scollon (2004), which involves 
different qualitative methods and a multimodal data set. This approach, called nexus 
analysis, combines discursive or semiotic analysis with ethnographic studies in both virtual 
and naturalistic settings. Most importantly, it is specifically designed to study how digital 
technologies may impact on power relationships over time and to identify those changes in 
the ways in which institutional discourses or media narratives evolve. My nexus analysis 
relies on four empirical strands, in which I apply distinctive methods to study a range of 
social platforms, at different stages of the post-revolutionary crisis (2011-2014). In the first 
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empirical strand I develop a discursive analysis of a sample of blog articles posted by pro-
revolutionary activists between 2011 and 2013 in Tunisia and Egypt.  
 
In the second empirical strand, I apply data visualisation tools (Google Trends and R-
Shief) to outline the way official leaders and party representatives have been campaigning 
on social media (Twitter) over the course of the 2012 presidential campaign (Egypt).   
 
For the third empirical strand, I conduct a thematic analysis on a sample of comments 
posted on the Dostour Sharek e-consultation platform designed by the Constituent 
Assembly to report on the 2012 constitutional referendum (Egypt).  
 
Finally, in the fourth empirical strand I will comment a set of qualitative interviews and 
informal conversations I conducted with political activists, journalists and active social 
media users during a fieldwork conducted over three months in affiliation of the American 
University in Cairo.  
 
 By considering different social actors engaged in the post-revolutionary debate – from 
politicised bloggers to random social media users – my multimodal data set outlines the 
ways in which public deliberations operated across different social platforms between 2011 
and 2014. In doing so, it determines whether digital media inspired a sustainable form of 
political engagement and whether it successfully supported political actions, beyond the 
revolutionary protests.  
 
1.9. Introducing my theoretical framework 
Before elaborating on my methodological design, I will first set out the theoretical bases of 
this research and expand on the emerging literature on connectivity. For this purpose, I will 
refer to Hoskins and Tulloch’s (forthcoming) work on connectivity as well as to Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin (2010) concept of Diffused War. This will lead me to clarify the idea of 
connectivity as a phase of uncertainty during which discourses are fluid and diffused. I will 
then draw on Jenkins’ (2006) work of convergence and Castells’ work on network society 
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(2007) to illustrate the fact that power – as in the case of discourse – has become harder to 
identify under the connectivity paradigm.  
 
Secondly, I will further elaborate on my discursive cycle model. For this purpose, I will 
refer to Habermas’ work on the bourgeois public sphere (1962) and its critique by Nancy 
Fraser (1990) to recall how social theory has explained the circulation of discourse, prior to 
the invention of digital media. This will lead me to identify how successful counter-
discourses have gained legitimacy in the past and what traditionally characterises the 
process through which emerging ideologies and practices arise as the new mainstream.  
 
Finally, I will argue that a holistic perspective on connectivity helps in developing a more 
critical understanding of the role of social media in post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt. 
Defining connectivity as the transition from the emerging to the mainstream enables us to 
see beyond the division between techno-utopianism and cyber-pessimism. Most 
importantly, in the particular case of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, this allows me 
to overcome the debate on whether social media did play a significant role in the 2011 
uprisings.  
 
The real question that the literature on the Arab Spring has failed to address is who 
ultimately benefitted from the liberalisation of the political debate to which digital media 
contributed in the aftermath of the revolution. This would introduce a debate on how and 
by whom digital technology should be used, so as to stimulate the democratisation process. 
As Walter Benjamin (1936) suggests, technology per se does not act as a means of 
empowerment. Therefore, the function of digital media in the democratisation process can 
only be assessed in relation to the way such technologies have been applied during the 
course of the political transition that followed the uprisings. In addition, this question can 
only be answered by identifying the different agencies that contributed to shape the 
revolutionary discourse online.  
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2. Theoretical development, section 1: Introduction 
In this section of my literature review, I will elaborate on the concept of connectivity and 
comment on how media scholars have progressively shifted perspective when 
conceptualising power relationships in the digital age. In my introduction, I argued that the 
connectivity paradigm requires studying media consumption on multiple scales. With the 
expansion of digital media, many aspects of individuals’ personal and social life have 
merged, neutralising the division between the private and public spheres (Flichy, 2010). 
Media users have become both producers and consumers in today’s informational 
capitalism, which involves rethinking the way labour is traditionally classified (Fuchs, 
2010). As a result, it is now hardly possible to determine when and whether media 
narratives are collaboratively shaped within civil society or framed by power institutions.  
 
The connectivity literature precisely describes this phenomenon by qualifying power in the 
digital age as uncertain, fluid and unpredictable (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010; Bennett 
and Segerberg, 2012). In order to exemplify how this argument has been formulated in the 
field of media and cultural studies, I will now discuss to Castells’ work on network society 
(2007) and Jenkins’ theory of convergence (2006).  
 
Simultaneously, I will draw on Hoskins and O’Loughlin’s (2015) concept of Arrested War 
and submit that discourse is becoming more fluid as the result of the transition that the 
Internet has operated from emerging to mainstream media. This will lead me to examine 
whether media scholars have witnessed a similar phenomenon in the past, and whether 
minority and hegemonic voices have already merged to form a fluid discursive 
environment prior to digital media. In doing so, I will discuss whether connectivity is 
specific to the digital age or potentially applies to all technological and ideological 
revolutions through which the emerging turns into the mainstream. 
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2.1. Fluid powers under the connectivity paradigm  
In addition to the works of Bennett & Segreberg (2012), Van Dijck (2013), Youngs (2013) 
and Hoskins and Tulloch (forthcoming) that initiate the debate on connectivity, a broader 
set of theories could be considered as part of the same body of literature. Among others, 
theories such as Jenkins’ notion of convergence (2006) and Castells’ network society 
(2007) equally formulate the idea according to which the boundaries between scales and 
agencies are becoming harder to identify. Most importantly, by developing a global 
(system-based) understanding of power in the digital age, Jenkins (2006) and Castells 
(2007) both demonstrate how intricate relationships of domination have become and how 
counter-discourse can easily shift into the sphere of corporate or institutional power.   
 
In his work, Manuel Castells (2007) comments on how participative media progressively 
distorted the gatekeeping process through which news was traditionally framed, by 
enabling individuals to directly shape and produce media narratives. This ultimately 
produced what Castells refers to as the sphere of “mass self-communication”, in which 
information was more transparent and dominant discourses became more open to being 
challenged. On the other hand, however, Castells (2007) demonstrates that the emergence 
of mass-self communication enhanced the visibility of global markets and created more 
opportunities for institutions to spread their narratives and establish their economic 
leadership. With media convergence, participative and traditional mass media have 
merged, which renders the distinction between grass-roots and institutional powers 
unclear.  
 
This network society not only benefits not only global markets but also traditional political 
institutions eager to remain in control of their media image and of the way their political 
message is delivered. Therefore, according to Castells (2007), media convergence has led 
to a convergence of power. The main characteristic of the network society lies in the fact 
that discourse and counter-discourse are both multimodal: they coexist in the same 
connective space. Castells’ theory introduces a reflection on the tensions occurring 
between these two spheres of power.  
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On one hand, dominant institutions are formed by specific networks constantly interacting 
with and within each other, under the supervision of the state, which acts as the ultimate 
institutionalised power. On the other hand, networks of social change commonly interact 
on the individual level to relay alternative narratives and minority voices, which the 
institutions in power fail to represent. By doing so, they compete for leadership over the 
dominant media narratives. Indeed, Castells relies on the Foucauldian assumption, 
according to which power struggles primarily manifest themselves through discourse: 
(…) the fundamental power struggle is the battle for the construction of 
meaning in the minds of the people. (…) For society, the key source of the 
social production of meaning is the process of socialized communication. 
(Castells, 2012: 5-6)  
And in the network society, institutions and social movements constantly extend their own 
networks, while connecting with one another as they compete for discursive leadership: 
(…) how do power networks connect with one another while preserving their 
sphere of action? I propose that they do so through a fundamental mechanism 
of power-making in the network society: switching power. This is the capacity 
to connect two or more different networks in the process of making power for 
each one of them in their respective fields. (Castells, 2012: 8) 
Consequently, along with Bennett’s theory of connective action, the network society 
theory assumes that networks remain highly versatile and might rely on unpredictable or 
provisional relationships. By doing so, it confirms the idea that the distinction between 
discourse and counter-discourse has become extremely hard to define, given the complex 
interplays that sporadically take place between various networks. 
 
2.2. From participatory culture to convergence 
One comes to the same conclusion when comparing Jenkins’ work on participatory culture 
(2006) to his work on convergence (2008). Whereas participatory culture celebrates the 
rise of a fully collaboratively shaped popular culture, his later work postulates that users 
are now competing with media corporations for cultural leadership. Media convergence is 
regarded as a sociological rather than a technological phenomenon, through which sub-
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cultures and the dominant cultural industry coexist and interfere with each other, often 
reaching the same audience. Most importantly, Jenkins suggests that the struggles arising 
between individual users and media corporations results from a growing marketization of 
digital communication networks:  
(…) perhaps industry leaders were acknowledging the importance of the role 
ordinary consumers can play not just in accepting convergence, but actually in 
driving the process. (Jenkins, 2008: 8).  
In other words, Jenkins does not develop his theory of convergence as a substitute for 
participatory culture. On the contrary this convergence of cultural leadership – which we 
might also interpret as a convergence of discourses – is to be understood as the 
continuation of his participatory culture paradigm. Traditional mass media only 
incorporated the virtual space in order to keep reaching a large audience, which 
paradoxically highlights the fact that participative communication channels have attracted 
a critical mass of users.  Ironically, the participatory framework became a victim of its own 
success.  
 
Referring to Pool’s (1983) original definition of media convergence, Jenkins particularly 
insists on the idea of media convergence as being first and foremost the manifestation of a 
transition. In this regard, the real question that one should considered when approaching 
this phenomenon is not so much which political voices or economic interests are ultimately 
benefiting from this technologically convergent environment. Rather, we should examine 
how sometimes-divergent media discourse – and here I mean discourse versus counter-
discourses – might collide or blend in:  
(…) I find myself reexamining some of the core questions Pool raised – about 
how we maintain the potential of participatory culture in the wake of growing 
media concentration, about whether the changes brought about by convergence 
open new opportunities for expression or expend the power big media.  
(Jenkins, 2008: 11) 
By conceiving this polarisation of media discourses in the digital age, Jenkins bridges the 
gap between two opposite schools of thought that might categorised as cyber-optimism 
versus cyber-pessimism (Oates, 2008). The claims for power have become as convergent 
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as the technology itself, which inevitably renders power highly fluid and versatile.  This 
argument paves the way for connectivity theory, in showing how fluid discourse is 
becoming with the expansion of digital media.  
 
Indeed, it suggests that discourse – as the instrument of power – remains in motion and 
follows a cyclical evolutionary path, through which it comes to serve shifting political 
agendas. Moreover, it is revealing of a turning point in the way social sciences have 
approached Internet consumption since the early 2000s. Whereas the Internet in its early 
stages was essentially regarded as an alternative to traditional mass media, Castells (2007) 
and Jenkins (2008) note that it progressively incorporates features of the mainstream (mass 
media hegemony).  
 
2.3. Witnessing the transition from emergent to mainstream  
Among scholars, the Web is no longer conceptualised as a means of empowerment, which 
potentially challenges cultural imperialism (Turkle, 1995; Rushkoff, 2003; Jenkins, 2006). 
Instead, the Internet is perceived as the conjunction of old (top-down) and new (bottom-
up) communication flows. Consequently, media scholars have become more interested in 
analysing how individuals, corporations and governments jointly benefit from media 
convergence and how they respectively compete for legitimacy. In doing so, they tend to 
be more critical with regards to the assumption that digital media help contesting dominant 
discourses (Van Dick, 2013). Yet this evolution is only representative of the fact that 
digital media are progressively merging with the mainstream.  
 
As the graph below suggests, the tensions that may occur between different instances of 
discourse only become visible, when new agencies gain cultural leadership. Connectivity, 
acts as a turning point in the way media narratives are produced online. Initially, individual 
users enjoyed greater freedom in the process of producing, sharing, rating and filtering 
information (Jenkins, 2006). With social media and mobile phone applications, the Internet 
became more user-friendly and appealing to a broader range of users (Flichy, 2010). Yet 
although user-generated content is now more accessible and diversified, it is formatted and 
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commercialised on the basis of hidden algorithms determined by a new generation of 
media corporations (Van Dijck, 2013).  
 
As Hoskins and O’Loughlin suggest in postulating a transition from Diffused War (2010) 
to Arrested War (2015), news is now framed similarly to the way it was produced by 
mainstream news editors. Connectivity manifests itself as a sign of this transition. Indeed, 
to a large extent, connectivity is comparable to the moment when the two sides of a set of 
scales reach the perfect equilibrium, before one side outweighs the other.  
 
Figure 2: Digital media and connectivity theory over time 
 
 
Provided that connectivity can be explained as the process through which emerging 
communicative practices reach the masses, we might easily argue that this phenomenon 
has already occurred in previous media environments. As a matter of fact, media scholars 
have witnessed and described similar discursive tensions when studying traditional one-to-
many mass media communication.  
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2.4. Fluid discourses and power struggles in earlier media 
environments 
Over the twentieth century, it can be argued that media experts have always been divided 
between a theory of agency and a theory of hegemony. Every form of mass media proved 
to inspire both hegemonic and more creative forms of discourses, at different stages of its 
evolution. While Marxist thinkers contested the rise of a “culture industry” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1944), reception studies demonstrated that TV audiences actively participate 
in shaping the meaning of media narratives (Hall, 1973; Dayan and Katz, 1994). When 
considering to what extent broadcast media had led to a globalised society, researchers 
(Appadurai, 1996) witnessed the same tensions over cultural leadership as those that might 
occur today under the connectivity paradigm. Nelly Stromquist (2002), for instance, 
describes these tensions as independent from the relationship between technology and 
globalisation. Although media narratives circulate on a new scale, power struggles keep 
operating in the same old fashion: 
(…) the debate centers on whether the phenomenon of globalization is old or 
new. In my view, the current globalization is a process that builds up on 
previous relations of social and economic asymmetry. (…) Some technological 
tools are not only new but constantly changing. They are affecting production, 
information, consumption, and culture in unprecedented ways (…). Power has 
existed since time immemorial; the configuration and use of power under the 
contemporary globalization is new because it touches the entire world and even 
defines it. (Stromquist, 2002: 2) 
As I will argue, this observation equally applies to the debate on connectivity. Like 
broadcast media, digital media have introduced a new layer of complexity to the process 
through which discourse takes shape. However, power struggles have remained the same 
and keep determining discourse as the instrument of power in the very same way.  
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Figure 3: Theory of Hegemony and Agency across media and cultural studies 
  
 
On one hand, traditional mass media have been applied to disseminate and further establish 
dominant ideologies. Walter Benjamin is among the first to have contested this aspect of 
communication technologies in his essay The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical 
Reproduction (1936). Along with the work of Adorno and Horkheimer (1947), his critique 
is revealing of how state-owned media contributed to the nationalist propaganda in 
twentieth century Europe, offering a highly skeptical perspective on how such technologies 
affect creative and politically subversive forms of expression. A later tradition of Marxist 
critique, which includes (among others) the work of Noam Chomsky (1988) has also 
demonstrated how privately-owned broadcast media established a dominant culture, 
progressively instituting a globalized society.  
 
On the other hand, however, reception studies have also underlined the fact that the 
members of a mass media audience negotiate meaning through a hermeneutic process and 
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in relation to their own social and cultural environments. This theory of agency resonates 
with Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1945; 1955) two-step flow of communication as well as with 
their work on interpersonal influence. By demonstrating how campaigns and media 
narratives can produce different interpretations depending on the networks among which 
they are debated, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1945; 1955) foresee the significance of social 
networks in the reception process. As they identify this crucial parameter long before the 
invention of digital media, they demonstrate that audiences remain relatively autonomous 
in their perception of media narratives.  
 
Likewise, the work of Dayan (2000), Hall (1973), Jenkins (1992), and Appadurai (1996) 
suggests that audiences were already very much involved in the construction of dominant 
media narratives, prior to the invention of digital media. This tradition of media studies 
contemplates on how subjectivities are intertwined with media narratives and explores the 
extent to which individuals and minorities may challenge or negotiate those narratives 
creatively. For instance, in developing his theory of the “presque-public”  (2000) Dayan 
investigates the extent to which television audiences perceive themselves as belonging to a 
public. For this purpose, he examines whether ceremonial events5 broadcasted live on 
national television generate an individualistic or rather a collective process of reception. 
 
In his 1973 essay on Encoding/Decoding In Television Discourse Stuart Hall argues that 
television audiences are indirectly involved in the production of TV discourses. Most 
importantly, he claims that production and reception co-determine media narratives, since 
the institutional instance of TV broadcasting is meant to survey and anticipate audiences’ 
demands: 
The consumption or reception of the television message is thus also itself a 
'moment' of the production process in its larger sense, though the latter is 
'predominant' because it is the 'point of departure for the realization' of the 
message. Production and reception of the television message are not, therefore, 
identical, but they are related: they are differentiated moments within the 
                                                5 This terminology applies to what Katz and Dayan (1994) categorise as ceremonial television. It refers to the 
mediatization of political, cultural or sports events as well as historical commemorations broadcast live on 
national television. 
  
 
 
31 
totality formed by the social relations of the communicative process as a 
whole. (Hall, 1993: 93) 
 
In other words, it can be argued that consumers and power institutions jointly contributed 
to shape media discourses in the age of traditional mass media.  
 
In fact, this argument resonates very well with the work of Appadurai (1996). In his essay 
on global ethnoscapes, Appadurai proposes that mass media technologies disrupt the 
balance of imaginary spaces, according to which local and national identities are 
constructed. Despite the fact that national identities may be threatened by the global 
mediascape, he claims that marginalised cultural perspectives survive in the process of 
reception. These acts of resistance constitutes what Appadurai refers to as the “ethnoscape” 
(1996: 32) a set of peripheral subcultures that act as diasporic public spheres:  
An important fact of the world we live in today is that many persons on the 
globe live in such imagined worlds (and not just in imagined communities) and 
thus are able to contest and sometimes even subvert the imagined worlds of the 
official mind and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them. By 
ethnoscape, I mean the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world 
in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and 
other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the 
world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto 
unprecedented degree. (Appadurai, 1996: 32) 
For that matter, he argues that any struggles over discourse – or more specifically, 
imaginary spaces – in the “new global cultural economy has to be seen as a complex, 
overlapping, disjunctive order” (Appadurai, 1996: 32). Globalised communication “cannot 
any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models (…) Nor is it 
susceptible to simple models (…) of consumers and producers (…).” (Ibid).  
 
Overall, this literature most certainly suggests that, as much as this may seem a 
particularity of the digital age, discourses and counter-discourses – have often coexisted in 
the same media environment. Traditional mass media has inspired creative ways to subvert 
or challenge dominant narratives, before media users were directly involved in the 
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production of media content. Most importantly, reception studies demonstrated that 
minorities were already able to reshape and personalise the prevailing discourse, prior to 
the invention of digital media. This suggests that discourse, to a certain extent, has always 
been fluid and that media narratives have always been the object of tensions occurring 
between dominant and emerging forms of discourse. In this regard, I agree with Stromquist 
(2002) that it would be irrelevant to debate whether a specific medium is more likely to 
serve hegemonic or more peripheral instances of discourse. Instead, I propose that every 
media revolution introduces a cycle through which those different instances of discourse 
compete for power.  
 
For this reason, I would like to extend the debate on connectivity and determine whether 
this concept is not somehow the manifestation of a phenomenon that characterises every 
technological or ideological revolution. To some extent, what has been said on 
connectivity equally applies to many cases of technological and ideological revolution 
across history. Like connectivity, every revolution introduces a phase of uncertainty, 
during which the instances of discourses can hardly be identified. Over the course of the 
revolutionary process, struggles between power institutions and revolutionaries lead to the 
constant redefinition of ideological vocabularies, which generates a fluid discursive 
environment. This is precisely what Hannah Arendt (1963) demonstrates when analysing 
how the concept of freedom has adopted different meanings over the succession of wars 
and revolutions that punctuated the twentieth century.  
 
And yet ultimately, by spreading the revolutionary ideology, revolutions progressively 
institute a new prevailing order. In doing so, they establish the emerging counter-discourse 
as the new mainstream. In spite of the fact that they bring a new elite into power and 
substantially change the structure of society, they generate new relationships of domination 
and rely on a new range of power institutions, which will be challenged by the next 
revolutionary uprising.  
 
Therefore, just as connectivity can be visualised as part of a cyclical process through which 
the emerging media arise as the mainstream, revolutions ensure the renewal of the 
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dominant discourse, by converting counter-power into power. This phenomenon may also 
be illustrated as a cycle, which I will refer to as the cycle of discourse (or discursive cycle) 
and which provides us with a holistic model with which to assess whether or not 
connectivity leads to sustainable forms of power.   
 
2.5. Conclusion to Section 1: towards a holistic concept of 
connectivity 
The emerging connectivity literature suggests that digital media has reached a critical point 
in its evolution. Initially regarded as an environment in which critical minority voices and 
creative subcultures would blossom; it is now seen as likely to serve dominant as well as 
emergent discourses. Media scholars are progressively becoming increasingly critical as 
they are witnessing the way this communication technology potentially serves multiple and 
sometimes diverging political or economic agendas. 
 
At the same time, this phenomenon is revealing of the fact that corporate and institutional 
powers are regaining influence over participative media. As such, it can also be interpreted 
as the rise of a new mainstream. It is worth comparing the connectivity paradigm to earlier 
forms of media revolutions in order to understand whether the tensions operating between 
discourse and counter-discourse are substantially different in the digital age.  
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3. Theoretical development, section 2: discourse and counter-discourse in 
periods of revolution 
The way connectivity has recently been conceptualised appears to point to the fact that 
media scholars are currently witnessing a new media revolution. However, it may not be 
sufficient to explain how this revolution is different from previous technological 
revolutions in history. In order to assess whether connectivity introduces a paradigmatic 
shift, we need to discuss this concept in relation to the way discourse and power circulate, 
aside from any specific media environment. For this purpose, I propose to build on and 
contribute to connectivity theory by drawing a parallel with the way emerging forms of 
discourse become institutionalised over the revolutionary process. 
 
As Deleuze and Foucault (1977: 216) suggest counter-discourses are commonly 
formulated on two different levels. Whereas intellectuals produce critical theory, political 
activists enact this theory in everyday practices. In this regard, one could easily argue that 
every revolutionary discourse faces the challenge of bringing critical theory into the 
political sphere and turning the revolutionary ideology into practice. In other words, 
revolutionary counter-discourses rely on a critical theory intended to contest the dominant 
discourse, as well as on political activism, which is meant to substitute it for the 
revolutionary ideology (Moussa and Scapp, 1996: 92). 
 
For that matter, revolutionaries are often divided between those primarily driven by the 
process of opposing power and those who intend to gain legitimacy in the political sphere. 
While the former seek to contest any form of hegemonic discourse, the latter contributes to 
institutionalise the revolutionary ideology, turning it into a new hegemony.  
 
This is how, between the eighteenth and the twentieth century, anarchism progressively 
took shape as the libertarian wing of socialism. While communism began to grow as a 
predominant political institution, anarchists started questioning the dogmatism that 
emanated from the revolutionary ideology. In doing so, they kept acting as a counter-
discourse, while communism became another well-established institutional power.  To 
exemplify this phenomenon, we can refer to what the founding father of anarchism, Pierre 
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Joseph Proudhon, wrote to Karl Marx in 1846: “Let us not become the leaders of a new 
religion (...) even were it to be the religion of logic and reason" (Proudhon, 1846). 
 
In Russia, after they contributed to the October and February 1917 revolution, anarchist 
movements joined the opposition against the Bolsheviks and fought a new kind of 
totalitarian power which paradoxically arose thanks to the revolution. Later on in the 
twentieth century, anarchists considerably contributed significantly to the resistance 
against Stalinism in the context of the Spanish revolution and constituted a strong 
opposition movement against fascism during World War II. 
 
This perfectly illustrates the fact that every revolutionary discourse reaches a critical stage 
in its evolution when it ceases to act as a counter-discourse to potentially substitute itself 
for the dominant ideology. In order to operate this transition, it needs to be progressively 
institutionalised and must rely on a new set of moral values and social constructs that will 
constitute its ideological framework. This transition is situated at the lower pole of the 
discursive cycle and can be considered as an essential condition for the revolutionary 
discourse to be sustainable and for the revolution to be successful. 
 
Figure 4: Divisions between revolutionaries in the lower pole of the discursive cycle 
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I will elaborate on this idea in the next section of this chapter by referring to what 
Habermas (1962) and Fraser (1990) conceptualise as a successful counter-power. Before 
doing so, however, I will briefly discuss how the distinction described above between 
anarchists and political revolutionaries applies to the case of the digital revolution.  
 
3.1. The discursive cycle from the perspective of the digital 
revolution 
Although the digital age is commonly interpreted as a technological rather than a political 
revolution, it was considerably inspired by the libertarianism of the 1960s.  In his work 
The Internet Imaginaire, Patrice Flichy (2011) shows how the counterculture of the 1960s 
led computer engineers to imagine a virtual utopia in which they could design and 
experience a more horizontal social structure.  It is in this libertarian environment that the 
pioneers of the Web collaboratively conceived the Arpanet project and envisioned a 
cooperative database, which would help in designing a form of collective intelligence 
(Hiltz and Turoff, 1978).  
 
In his book on Stewart Brand and digital utopianism, Fred Turner (2008) corrobrates the 
idea that the emergent cyber-culture was considerably influenced by the counterculture of 
the nineteen-sixties. In addition, he emphasises the fact that, like any ideological or 
philosophical revolution, this technological revolution was initiated by a small highly-
educated elite, driven by the idea of a more egalitarian communicative space, which would 
enable them to disseminate and share their knowledge.  
 
With the liberalisation and marketization of the Internet, however, this community divided 
into two groups. On one hand, these ideals inspired a generation of young entrepreneurs 
who, while subscribing to the principle of a horizontal communicative space with free 
access to information, capitalised on the Internet. By developing a series of online services 
and platforms incorporating user-generated content, they raised the popularity of the Web 
and established its profitability as a two-sided market. This ultimately contributed to the 
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provision of more user-friendly applications, facilitating access to Internet functionalities. 
Yet at the same time it contributed to the rise of what Emma Murphy (2009) and Jodi Dean 
(2009) describe as the age of “informational” or “communicative” capitalism.   
 
On the other hand, the libertarian ideal of what Flichy calls as “the Internet imaginaire” 
(2011) survived among the hacking community (Curran and Gibson, 2012). In order to 
draw an analogy with the relation between anarchists and political revolutionaries, I would 
argue that hackers represent this former category of activists, thanks to whom the 
revolutionary agenda resists the institutionalisation process. Similarly to the way anarchists 
tend to draw away from revolutionary politics, hacking is a form of counter-discourse 
enacted in practice, which remains independent from any ideological framework. One of 
the main characteristics of today’s hacking networks is precisely their lack of affiliation to 
any political institution. While some of the pioneers of the Internet gave rise to a new 
hegemony (Dean, 2009), hackers remained representative of what Murray Bookchin had 
witnessed in nineteen-seventies and described as a form of “Post-scarcity anarchism” 
(1986): 
(...) the period in which we live closely resembles the revolutionary 
Enlightenment that swept through France in the eighteenth century (...) The 
typical institutionalized forms of public dissatisfaction—in our own day, they 
are orderly elections, demonstration and mass meetings—tend to give way to 
direct action by crowds. This shift from predictable, highly organized protests 
within the institutionalized framework of the existing society to sporadic, 
spontaneous, near insurrectionary assaults from outside (and even against) 
socially acceptable forms reflects a profound change in popular psychology. 
The "rioter" has begun to break, however partially and intuitively, with those 
deep-seated norms of behaviour, which traditionally weld the "masses" 
(Bookchin, 1986: 72).  
 
Understanding the digital revolution in relation to other cases of ideological revolutions in 
history is crucial in order to determine whether and how the circulation of discourse – 
hence power – is fundamentally changing. As former revolutions, this technological 
revolution initially relied on some form of libertarian movement, which manifested itself 
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as the creative spirit of Flichy’s internet imaginaire (2007). And similarly to the way 
revolutions have substituted one dominant power for another, the digital operated a 
transition from emergent to mainstream media, ensuring the success of a new generation of 
entrepreneurs.  
 
This transition, which has been conceptualised as the connectivity paradigm, also led to a 
division between politically engaged hackers and successful computer scientists, who 
contributed to and benefitted from the rise of communicative capitalism. From this 
perspective, connectivity can also be considered as a period during which the most creative 
and politically engaged users come to rethink their relationship to the media. In this sense, 
connectivity is also and most importantly characterised by the redefinition of one’s identity 
with regards to contesting versus embracing the new mainstream.  
 
3.2. The discursive cycle from the perspective of the bourgeois 
public sphere  
These analogies certainly help in understanding connectivity in relation to the way 
discourses have always circulated in a period of revolution. In addition, they show how 
emerging counter-discourses may become institutionalised or remain fluid in today’s 
media environment. However, in order to really determine what makes a sustainable 
counter-discourse and a successful revolution, I now turn to my model of discursive cycle, 
drawing on the ways Habermas (1962) and Fraser (1990) have envisioned a successful 
counter-discourse, when conceptualising the public sphere.  
 
Habermas’ public sphere represents a first attempt at mapping the discursive cycle, by 
investigating how counter-power is progressively incorporated into institutional discourse 
through the revolutionary process. Accordingly, the Habermasian public sphere – as well 
as its critique - becomes highly relevant when it comes to determining the sustainability of 
revolutionary discourses.  
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Different approaches to the concept of public sphere have each addressed the question of 
how critical public opinion emerges among elites or minorities and have examined how it 
circulates across and between these different social groups (Calhoun et al. 1992). As such, 
they account for different instances of discourse and remind us that democratic debate 
relies on a complex interplay of both official and rather marginalised voices.  
 
Habermas is among the first social thinkers to have explored how ideas initially formulated 
in the margins of civil society gain legitimisation to progressively become the foundations 
of a new political structure. This aspect of Habermas’ conceptualisation of the public 
sphere is, in my opinion, its biggest contribution to social theory, as it highlights a 
phenomenon, which constantly recurs across time and space. For that matter, I would 
argue that his work should primarily be applied as a model to understand the evolution of 
emergent discourse in various contexts. 
 
3.3. Intellectual leadership in the bourgeois public sphere 
In highlighting the distinctions between the bourgeois and the virtual public spheres, 
researchers remind us that the former is naturally regulated by some form of intellectual 
leadership. As demonstrated by Nancy Fraser in her critique of the liberal public sphere 
(1990), Habermas conceptualises the emergence of a deliberative culture as an elitist 
process through which bourgeois intellectual leaders held the privilege of expressing their 
views publicly. The nascent public discourses of salons and coffee houses as well as the 
arguments emanating from the press and literature were exclusively formulated by a small 
educated elite able to argue rationally and experiment with democratic deliberation:  
In relation to the mass of the rural population and the common "people" in the 
towns, of course, the public "at large" that was being formed diffusely outside 
the early institutions of the public was still extremely small. Elementary 
education, where it existed, was inferior. The proportion of illiterates, at least 
in Great Britain, even exceeded that of the preceding Elizabethan epoch. [...] 
The masses were not only largely illiterate but also so pauperized that they 
could not even pay for literature. [...] Nevertheless, with the emergence of the 
diffuse public formed in the course of the commercialization of cultural 
production, a new social category arose. (Habermas, 1962: 37-38)  
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This parameter might explain why one might easily draw an analogy between the context 
in which the bourgeois public sphere was formed and the conditions, in which the 2011 
uprisings arose in the MENA region (Mahlouly, 2014). It also accounts for the fact that the 
innovative forms of political engagement that manifested themselves during the 2011 Arab 
uprisings are very often interpreted on the basis of Habermas’ theory (Al Maghlouth et al. 
2015: 13).  
 
Due to digital divide and illiteracy, the young educated middle class that constituted a 
significant part of the revolutionary movement in 2011 benefitted from a similar form of 
intellectual leadership. Indeed, according to Breuer (2012) and Iskander (2011) digital 
technologies specifically contributed to the “politicization and mobilization of the young 
urban middle class and elites” (Breuer 2012: 28).  
 
Similar to the situation in eighteenth century Europe observed by Habermas (1962), only a 
minority of the local population actively used social media on the eve of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings. According to the UN database, just 36.8% of the population in Tunisia and 
26.7% in Egypt6 were Internet users in 2010. In addition, the Arab Social Media Report 
published by the Dubai School of Governance (Mourtada and Salem, 2011) indicates that 
the average for Facebook penetration in the Arab region at the end of 2010 was only 
6.77%. This suggests that pro-revolutionaries actively using social media in Tunisia and 
Egypt constituted a restricted community who benefitted from the economic and 
intellectual resources required to disseminate their political message.  
 
Therefore simply applying Habermas’ (1962) model to explain pro-revolutionary activism 
in Tunisia and Egypt fails to take into account a broader range of political activity 
emanating from the working class and aside from social media. Most importantly, whereas 
the bourgeois public sphere may be applied to explain cyber-activism over the years that 
led to the revolutionary uprisings, it does not account for the way social media relayed 
public debate after the revolution. Indeed, Internet and social media penetration continued 
                                                6 United Nations (2013) UN Data country profile, United Nations Statistics Division, 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx? 
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to increase considerably over the months that followed the uprisings (Salem and Mourtada: 
2011):  
The first three months of 2011 saw what can only be termed a substantial shift 
in the Arab world’s usage of social media towards online social and civil 
mobilization online (…) the number of Facebook users has risen significantly 
in most Arab countries, most notably so in the countries where protests have 
taken place. (Salem and Mourtada, 2011: 2-4) 
As a result, a broader range of citizens gained access to the political debate that 
revolutionary activists initiated on social media, which entirely changed the sociological 
landscape of this emerging public sphere.  
 
The bourgeois public sphere is still highly relevant, however, since it describes how a 
minority of revolutionary thinkers who benefit from some form of intellectual leadership 
initiate a counter-discourse. In other words, to refer back to the terminology used by 
Deleuze and Foucault (1977), Habermas (1962) specifically outlines the process through 
which intellectuals produce a critical theory, which will need to be enacted in political 
practice to unleash the revolutionary process. For this reason, I argue that his theory 
accounts for the first quarter of the discursive cycle. At this stage of the cycle, the pioneers 
of the revolution produce the theoretical framework which will become the backbone of 
their counter-discourse (cf. Figure 5).  
 
3.4. Beyond the bourgeois public sphere: bringing critical theory into 
practice  
Yet when it comes to understanding how civil society contributes to shape this counter-
discourse and becomes involved in the revolutionary process, I turn now to Fraser’s 
critique of the bourgeois public sphere (1990). One of the most recurrent criticisms of 
Habermas’ model relates to what Fraser (1985) describes as an artificial distinction 
between the restricted sphere of politics - in which the intellectual bourgeoisie supposedly 
frames public opinion – and other components of civil society, such as the private sphere 
of the nuclear family. In her critique of Habermas’ theory of communicative action (1984), 
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Fraser (1985) claims that individuals who remain unrepresented in the formal public 
sphere are an integral part of the material, economic and political reproduction of modern 
societies. For example, whereas Habermas would classify the female minority into the 
apolitical private sphere, she argues that marginalised social groups are equally crucial to 
the elaboration of public opinion: 
(…) the roles of worker and consumer link the (official) private economy and 
the private family, while the roles of citizen and (later) client link the public 
state and the public opinion institutions. Thus Habermas provides an extremely 
sophisticated account of the relations between public and private institutions in 
classical capitalist societies. At the same time, however, his account has some 
weaknesses. (…) Consider first, the relations between (official) private 
economy and private family as mediated by the roles of worker and consumer. 
These roles, I submit are gendered roles. And the links they forge between 
family (official) economy are adumbrated as much in the medium of gender 
identity as in the medium of money. (Fraser, 1985: 113) 
However, Fraser argues that one of the benefits of Habermas’ model lies in the fact that it 
potentially reveals relationships of domination in the formation of the public sphere. 
 
For instance, she demonstrates that the male-dominated public sphere only exists in 
opposition to the private sphere of the nuclear family as a manifestation of male 
dominance and female subordination in classic capitalist societies. However, 
acknowledging such forms of power relationships enables the overcoming of the normative 
distinction between private (symbolic) and public (material), while underlining to what 
extent these two spheres actually interfere with each other. Therefore, in Fraser’s work, 
gender becomes a specific angle to study relationships of domination and understand how 
they might determine the elaboration of public opinion.  
 
From a feminist approach, Fraser not only shows that the separation between private 
(symbolic) and public (material) spheres is constructed. Most importantly, she 
demonstrates that, as a social construct, this binary conception compartmentalises genders, 
artificially excluding women from the normative definition of a male-dominated political 
sphere: 
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Once the gender-blindness of Habermas’ model is overcome, however, all 
these connections come into view. It then becomes clear that feminine and 
masculine gender identity run like pink and blue threads through the areas of 
paid work, state administration, and citizenship as well as through the domain 
of familial and sexual relations. (Fraser, 1985: 117)  
Yet although some social groups might be excluded from what we regard as the official 
space for public deliberation, these minority voices always find alternative mediums and 
public arenas through which they spread an alternative discourse. By doing so, they 
ultimately consolidate a counter-public (or counter-discourse), which undeniably 
contributes to perform the critical function of the public sphere.  
(…) there were a variety of ways of accessing public life and a multiplicity of 
public arenas. The view that women were excluded from the public sphere 
turns out to be ideological; it rests on a class and gender-biased notion of 
publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeois public’s claim to be 
the public. (Fraser, 1990: 61) 
Fraser’s critique can be applied to consider a much broader range of social practices from 
the perspective of the Habermasian public sphere and to postulate that public opinion 
rather consists in the symbiotic interactions between the intellectual elite and less 
privileged social groups that may be subjected to a greater degree to relationships of 
domination.  
 
Figure 5: From Intellectual Leadership to Political Practice  
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Most importantly, Fraser’s (1990) work outlines how critical theory becomes enacted in 
practice in the second quarter of the discursive cycle. Not only does her model incorporate 
minority voices in the process through which the public sphere is shaped, but it also 
assumes that those unofficial (non-institutionalised) minorities act as the critical agents of 
the public sphere. In this regard, whereas Habermas would situate discourse and counter-
discourse within the same sphere of influence, Fraser initiates a reflection on how power 
institutions – such as the male-dominated capitalist structure – can be (and have been) 
challenged by other components of the civil society:  
(…) not only were there always a plurality of competing publics but the 
relations between bourgeois publics and other publics were always conflictual. 
Virtually from the beginning, counterpublics contested the exclusionary norms 
of the bourgeois public, elaborating alternative styles of political behavior and 
alternative norms of public speech. (Fraser, 1990: 61) 
Her theory draws a distinction between the process through which hegemonic discourses 
are constructed by power institutions and the way counter-discourses progressively 
deconstruct the institutionally-framed doxa. By rethinking the circulation of discourse 
beyond the distinction between private and public spheres, Fraser suggests that counter-
discourses are not only produced by elites of revolutionary thinkers. In fact, they also take 
shape among minorities, who may not have access or be fairly represented in the bourgeois 
public sphere. This illustrates how critical theory becomes enacted in political practice and 
how an emerging counter-discourse progressively gains legitimacy and popularity amongst 
the masses. As such, it evidences how this emerging counter-discourse evolves towards the 
mainstream, from theory to practice and from the elites to the masses.  
 
In the second quarter of the discursive cycle, the emerging counter-discourse reaches its 
audience and gives rise to a counter-public, thanks to which it will progressively gain 
legitimacy outside from the institutional sphere of politics. This is how Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin (2006) account for the natural procedure through which emerging discourses 
become legitimate, when considering whether the Internet contributes to a process of 
radicalisation. In their view (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2006), as per Fraser’s theory 
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(1990), legitimate counter powers take shape when non-governmental actors identify 
themselves with the emerging ideology, consolidate a public and undertake a competition 
for power.  
 
This hypothesis – previously formulated by Warner (2002) and Barnett (2003) further 
illustrates the fact that together, Habermas’ (1962) and Fraser’s (1990) theories provide a 
reliable framework to visualise how critical theory materialises over the first half of the 
discursive cycle. Once it is considered as a legitimate political or ideological argument, 
such a counter-discourse is more likely to be formally debated and represented in the 
sphere of institutional politics. In this regard, it will progressively rely on its own 
institutional framework and should no longer be considered as a counter-discourse. Here is 
precisely where one can see the discursive cycle taking shape, as some aspects of a former 
counter-discourse might now contribute to establish a (new) elite in power. 
 
Yet, like many others (Dean, 2003; Cardon, 2010; Flichy, 2010) Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
(2006) suggest that the normative public sphere is no longer representative of the way 
discourse and counter-discourse circulate in the digital age. When it comes to determine 
how digital media might disturb this legitimisation process, Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
anticipate Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) argument, claiming that the new media ecology 
makes publics less predictable. As the prevailing discourse becomes more diffuse, publics 
appear to be more flexible and versatile, which affects the process through which counter-
discourses may gain legitimacy under the conditions of the normative public sphere.  
 
3.5. Rethinking the public sphere under the connectivity paradigm 
Likewise, Cardon (2010), Flichy (2010) and Dean (2003) identify different features of 
digital media that might affect the consolidation of a critical public sphere. From different 
perspectives, their works suggest that digital media renders the public sphere too chaotic 
and that public opinion has become too flexible to produce a sustainable critical discourse.   
 
In his essay Le Sacre de l’amateur (2010), Flichy argues that, thanks to digital media, 
amateurs have gained the authorship of the public sphere. Whereas experts and 
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professionals were traditionally considered the only reliable reference on any questions 
relating to sciences, art, culture and politics digital media provided random amateurs with 
the opportunity to contribute to public knowledge.  
 
Unlike the Habermasian public sphere, today’s public opinion is no longer shaped by an 
intellectual elite and does not rely on any form of intellectual leadership. As a result, public 
deliberations are less likely to articulate rational and critical arguments. Most importantly, 
these diffused publics of amateurs tend to interact exclusively amongst each other, within 
communities that already share similar ideological views (Flichy, 2010: 56). As a result, 
citizens become less likely to challenge their perspective and develop a casual and sporadic 
form of political engagement driven by personal interest. Individuals partially contribute to 
larger social movements, without being involved in the entire political process. 
Simultaneously, political organisations appear to be less exclusive, which leads citizens to 
constantly rethink their political affiliation in relation to their personal interest. 
  
Other researchers like Cardon (2010) or Dean (2003) argue that, beyond the fact that 
digital media fail at producing a critical public opinion, it contributes to legitimate the 
dominant discourse by producing an illusion of public sphere. According to Dean (2003), 
the Internet introduces a form of communicative capitalism, which maintains citizens in 
the position of potential consumers. In her views, democratic governance today is highly 
dependent on a consumption-driven entertainment culture (2003: 102) and relies on the 
assumption that communication technologies enhance participative democracy. As 
illustrated by my model of discursive cycle, Dean describes the Habermasian public sphere 
as a “decentralized model of sovereignty”, emanating from the people, (2003: 104) that 
provides legitimacy for social institutions and authorities.  
 
Yet in the context of communicative capitalism public opinion is very much driven by 
consumerism. Therefore, it tends to raise the legitimacy of the institutions in power 
without questioning or challenging them in a critical way:  
This is precisely my worry about the public sphere in communicative 
capitalism: the technologies, the concentrations of corporate power, the 
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demands of financial markets, the seductions of the society of the spectacle that 
rule in and as the name of the public have created conditions anathema to 
democratic governance. The subjectless flows are sovereign – and that is the 
problem. (Dean, 2003: 104)  
From this perspective, Dean describes the Internet as a specific kind of social infrastructure 
- a “zero institution” (Dean, 2003: 106) - to which different members can belong while 
assuming their individual identities. Collectivities and individualities are constantly 
confronting each other on a global scale, which makes consensus very hard to reach. In 
providing the feeling of belonging to a global and virtual space for deliberation, the 
Internet creates an illusion of freedom of speech and rational deliberation, which is 
sufficient to legitimate dominant ideologies.  
 
This leads to a “neodemocracy” (Dean, 2003: 108) in which the criteria of the normative 
public sphere are slightly transposed. In order to develop a critical and rational public 
sphere, opportunities for contestation should feed a sustainable critique of the dominant 
political climate and lead to a fully democratic consensus. However, in the case of 
neodemocracies, the process of deliberation is limited to the stage of contestation. 
Consequently, even if information tends to be more transparent, this new form of publicity 
fails at stimulating an impartial political debate and maintains the hegemony of global 
corporations. Unlike the normative public sphere, the publicity of neodemocracies is used 
to enhance the credibility of corporate powers and justify decisive action.  
 
3.6. Conclusion to Section 2: Anticipating the sustainability issue on 
the basis of Habermas public sphere 
These critiques (Dean, 2003; Cardon, 2010; Flichy, 2010) underline some of the reasons 
why counter-discourses are no longer sustainable under the connectivity paradigm. 
Overall, digital media seem to have extended consumerism to politics (Shah et al. 2007) 
and altered the quality of the public sphere. Despite the fact that a broader range of citizens 
have gained access to the public sphere, their contributions remain too sporadic, diffused 
and superficial to generate a substantial political opposition in the absence of any 
ideological framework. To illustrate this problematic in relation to my model of the 
  
 
 
48 
discursive cycle, we might say that counter-discourses are no longer sustainable because 
they do not manage to evolve into more institutional discourses.  
 
Here lies the paradox that characterises power under the connectivity paradigm. This 
phenomenon is critical because it may prevent the process, through which institutional 
powers renew themselves. Admittedly, the traditional circulation of discourse (cf. 
discursive cycle) and the way counter-discourse operates under the connectivity paradigm 
both result in the restoration of institutional power. This partly explains why, as I will 
discuss, the 2011 Arab uprisings may be considered as similar to other cases of revolutions 
in history: 
There is a risk that the Arab Spring meets the same fate as revolutions 
elsewhere have in the past. That is, they can often result in a greater continuity 
than change. The recent literature on political economy offers a convincing 
reason for such institutional persistence. (…) de jure reforms do not 
automatically result in effective change. This is because elites have remarkable 
ability to endure; they can reverse change or mould it in their favour. Even if 
old political players are replaced with new ones, this can lead simply to re-
configuration of political power leaving the basic economic structure unaltered. 
The challenge for the Arab world is no different (…) (Malki and Awadallah, 
2011: 2) 
However, whereas counter-discourses originally succeeded in overthrowing the prevailing 
order, today’s emerging discourses may, on the contrary, give more legitimacy to the 
leading political forces by producing an illusion of democratic debate. In fact, today’s 
emerging – or revolutionary - discourses are very likely to be manipulated or distorted for 
two reasons.  
 
On one hand, as I suggested earlier, they undertake a process of transition, which is 
inherent to every revolution: as a broader range of people become involved in the 
revolutionary debate, the ideological vocabulary of the revolution becomes intrinsically 
fluid. That is to say that some of the concepts that determine the founding principles of this 
counter-discourse – such as “freedom” or “revolution”- will evolve and may adopt a 
different meaning, over the course of transition from critical theory to political action. It is 
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also during this transition that divisions may occur between what I referred to earlier as 
political revolutionaries and anarchists. Overall, the evolution from emerging to 
mainstream and from theory to practice makes the revolutionary discourse flexible by 
nature.  
 
On the other hand, as Flichy’s (2010) critique suggests, the public sphere is no longer 
regulated by any form of intellectual leadership. The process through which 
revolutionaries consolidate a consistent critical theory remains superficial. The 
revolutionary discourse is instantly redefined and negotiated within the masses, before 
revolutionary thinkers might have the time to produce a sustainable ideological framework. 
Therefore, under the connectivity paradigm, the first half of the discursive cycle is affected 
to the extent that counter-discourses may easily be distorted to benefit well-established 
powers. Although the emerging reaches the mainstream, it remains nothing more than a 
trend that every individual interprets from his very own perspective. In this context, long-
established power institutions may easily adapt the emerging discourse to benefit their own 
interest.  
 
4. Theoretical development, section 3: Assessing the sustainability of 
counter-discourse in Tunisia and Egypt 
Following on from the argument I developed in the previous section of this chapter, I argue 
that although digital media have often been regarded as a factor of democratisation, they 
tend to reinforce the leading political voices and make the opposition weak. In fact, as 
much as Dean’s (2003) neodemocracies produce an illusion of public sphere, connectivity 
provides an illusion of democratisation. Connectivity intensifies the fluidity of the 
revolutionary discourse, which accelerates the evolution from emerging to mainstream but 
renders this discourse highly superficial.  
 
As my research demonstrates, this stands out from the evolution of the revolutionary 
discourse in Tunisia and most particularly in Egypt. As this was described to me by one of 
the participants when conducting qualitative interviews in Cairo, digital media undeniably 
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contributed to spread every political statement “like wildfire” (Samira, cf. interview 
transcripts: 31). As such, it most certainly facilitated the logistics behind the January 2011 
mobilisations, which led many to believe that the Rassemblement Constitutionnel 
Démocratique [RCD]7 and military regimes had been successfully overthrown along with 
Ben Ali’s and Mubarak’s administrations. However, while it might have accelerated the 
spread of the revolutionary message over the few months that preceded and followed the 
uprisings, it ultimately reinforced the dominant political institutions by effecting an 
alienation of the revolution.  
 
In Egypt, over the transition from the 2011 uprisings to the 2013 military coup, 
revolutionary slogans such as the famous “Aish, al Hourya, Adla Ijtima’ya” 8  were 
successively used by the different political movements that became involved in the post-
revolutionary debate. With the success of the Freedom and Justice Party in the 2011 
parliamentary elections and the victory of Mohammed Morsi in the first 2012 presidential 
race, it became clear that the Islamist opposition would be the first to benefit from the 
revolution9.  
 
This was not surprising, given the fact that Islamist movements had proved to be the most 
consistent political group within the opposition. Unlike young left-wing and liberal 
revolutionaries, the Muslim Brotherhood relied on an ideological framework and had 
developed a powerful institutional structure since its creation in 1928 (Hourani, 2002). In 
fact, if the revolutionary uprisings had been entirely driven by the Islamists and assuming 
that the Freedom and Justice Party had remained in power in 2013, the Muslim 
Brotherhood would have succeeded in establishing a new institutional discourse. 
                                                7 RCD stands for “Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratic” (in French) or “Democratic Constitutional 
Rally” (In English), which designate the party led by former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
prior to the revolution. 
 8 Bread, freedom, social justice 9 Following the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, the first parliamentary elections to the People’s Assembly of Egypt 
were held between November 2011 and January 2013. The party of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom 
and Justice party, won 37% of the seats. In addition, the Islamist Bloc coalition led by the Salafi parti al-Nour 
won 27% of the seats. With a large majority of seats in the People’s Assembly, conservative parties would 
have a considerable influence on the composition of the Constituent Assembly and the new constitution.  
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However, the coup d’état on 3rd July 2013 demonstrated that power had remained in the 
hands of the military. The counter-revolution had progressively reframed the memory of 
the revolution, instituting July 2013 as the historical date that marked the victory of the 
Egyptian people against the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
Although the political environment appeared to be less polarised in Tunisia, the Islamist 
opposition was also the first group to benefit from the revolutionary mobilisation, with the 
success of the moderate Islamist party Ennahdha in the election of the Constituent 
Assembly (October 2011). A significant ideological change was taking shape when the 
human-right activist and long-term opponent of Ben Ali, Moncef Marzouki, was elected 
president by the Constituent Assembly in December 2011.  
 
Yet here again, the Islamist opposition was defeated by a prominent figure of the former 
regime – in this case, Béji Caid Esbessi, whose party Nidaa Tunis won the majority of the 
seats in the 2014 presidential elections. And just like Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s new military 
regime in Egypt, the secular party Nidaa Tunis stood out as the only powerful alternative 
to traditionalist parties:    
Essebsi and his associates were quintessentially what Egyptians derided as 
“feloul” or the remnants of the old regime. (…) In Tunisia, just such a 
conservative-centrist party has emerged in Nidaa Tunis to challenge Ennahda 
and its roots are heavily in the old regime although it also boasts other 
supporters. (Goldberg, 2014) 
This is precisely the reason why Ellis Goldberg (2014) argues that the main difference 
between the Tunisian and Egyptian cases lies in the fact that the Tunisian ruling elite had 
remained in control of the administration over the whole political crisis. Whereas Egyptian 
military forces had been facing conflicts of interests with left-wing, liberal and Islamist 
revolutionaries between 2011 and 2013, the Tunisian ruling elite had remained in power, 
acting as a moderator between the different political groups. From this perspective, 
Goldberg (2014) formulates a highly questionable and controversial argument in claiming 
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that these leading political institutions may be more beneficial to the democratisation 
process than a potentially successful revolution: 
Democratization succeeded in Tunisia because the old elite was neither 
excluded nor subjected to the threat of political or administrative 
marginalization. The old elite, not revolutionaries or Islamists, proved to be the 
pivotal actor. (…) The idea that democracy is the last station on the 
revolutionary road remains seductive and it informs a certain idealized 
understanding of U.S. history and the process of 
democratization. Representative democracy itself, however, is less likely the 
successful conclusion of revolution and more likely the premature end of its 
utopian hopes and dreams. Only if nothing changes, can everything change. 
(Goldberg, 2014) 
Although Goldberg celebrates the fact that the uprisings did not lead to any consistent 
ideological change, his analysis contributes to evidence the failure of the revolutionary 
process under the connectivity paradigm.   
 
Most importantly, it highlights the fact that in order to develop a critical understanding of 
the 2011-2014 political crisis in Tunisia and Egypt, one needs to identify to what extent 
our perspective may be biased by a Eurocentric perspective on democracy and 
democratisation.  
 
4.1. Democracy and technology: the Eurocentric perspective 
This question is particularly relevant when it comes to determining the role of digital 
technologies in the revolutionary process, for this debate unleashes a set of assumptions on 
the correlation between democracy and technological development. Across the literature, 
experts demonstrate to what extent the media and political narratives surrounding the Arab 
Spring repeatedly conveyed the idea that social media would stimulate political and 
economic liberalisation in the Arab world (Christensen, 2011; Cottle, 2011; Hirst, 2012). 
Admittedly, a more skeptical and rather techno-pessimistic (Fuchs, 2012) narrative 
emerged as soon as the international community witnessed the success of the Islamist 
parties in the aftermath of the revolution. Yet from a cyber-utopian as well as from a 
techno-pessimistic perspective, the technological parameter has been given particular 
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attention. This is revealing of the fact that both democracy and technological development 
have been conceptualised in relation to the historical experience of the Enlightenment and 
the Industrial Revolution.  
 
Consequently, one needs to identify to what extent these concepts remain ethnocentric and 
determined by the way neoliberal democracies are shaping the memory of the past 
revolutions both political and technological. One also needs to acknowledge the fact that 
this particular perspective has recently helped justifying foreign military interventions in 
the Middle East. As such, it keeps impacting the position of the international community 
regarding issues of radicalisation and political instability in the region.  
 
In order to understand how the debate on democracy and technological development serves 
particular relationships of domination in the Middle East, it is worth referring to the 
Marxist critique of the Enlightenment. In their continuation of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason (2011), Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) demonstrate that the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment inspired an utilitarian form of knowledge. It substituted religious belief for 
another form of dogmatism, which draws on the assumption that reality can be described 
by a set of replicable scientific laws.  
 
As a result, it subjected science and technology to the need of ensuring reproducibility, as 
the post-enlightenment society became industrialised. In this regard, as much as scientific 
progress may be retrospectively regarded as constitutive of democracy and liberalisation, 
Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) argue that it contributes to homogenise the masses. In 
doing so, it defeats the original purpose of the Enlightenment, which is to set individuals 
free and empower them, by allowing them to explore their subjectivities: 
The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event as repetition, 
which enlightenment upholds against mythical imagination, is that of myth 
itself. (…) Each human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, 
different from all others, so that it could all the more surely be made the same. 
But because that self never quite fitted the mold, enlightenment throughout the 
liberalistic period has always sympathised with social coercion.  The unity of 
the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual and in the 
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scorn poured on the type of society which could make people into individuals. 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 8-9) 
This critique anticipates the fact that, in a neoliberal democracy, new relationships of 
domination may be justified in the name of scientific and technological progress. As such, 
it helps demystifying the idea according to which the Enlightenment – along with the 
Industrial Revolution - should be regarded as a model of technological and ideological 
revolution that succeeded in empowering individuals.  
 
4.2. Rethinking the relationship between democracy, technology and 
radicalisation 
Among others, Manuel Hinds (2003) develops a particular approach to the concept of 
connectivity, which entirely relies on the assumption, according to which technological 
innovation is a benefit for social, economic and political liberalisation. In this regard, his 
work is especially representative of the way one may perceive the relationship between 
technology and democracy from a neoliberal perspective. Yet although his conception of 
technological development is diametrically opposed to that of the Frankfurt School 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002), Hinds draws a relevant correlation between technological 
change and radicalisation.  
 
In his book The Triumph of flexible society: the connectivity revolution, he argues that new 
radical ideologies are emerging as a reaction to globalisation and technological change. By 
referring to Huntington’s (2002) Clash of Civilisations, Hinds asserts that the increasing 
radicalisation that became perceptible in the aftermath of September 2011, can be 
interpreted as a response to disruptive technological innovation: 
All these disturbing events are part of the same phenomenon: the disruptions 
caused by a new process of technological innovations that will change our lives 
as deeply as the Industrial Revolution did during the last two hundred years. 
This new revolution was set in motion by connectivity, the power to manage 
complex tasks from afar in real time, an ability that the combination of 
computers, telecommunications, and by fast means of transportation has made 
possible. (Hinds, 2003:16) 
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In his views, connectivity is comparable to the Industrial Revolution in providing a wide 
range of empowering communication techniques, while generating what he describes as a 
reactionary response to technological progress. Similarly to the technological innovations 
designed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, today’s connectivity initiates a new 
generation of conservative or radicalised movements that uphold a pessimistic perception 
of the industrialised world. According to Hinds, these radical ideologies would therefore 
fail at anticipating the sociological and economic benefits of the technological revolution 
they are witnessing: 
When thinking that the new economy (…) would be accepted by everyone as 
the conveyor of a better life, we forgot the experience that we had from the 
Industrial Revolution. (…) Industrial Revolution brought about democracy and 
human rights, which in turn made possible a society that, whatever its flaws, is 
more advanced in terms of freedom and social cohesion than any other society 
in history. (…) In fact, (…) Nazism and Communism (…) were products of the 
same Industrial Revolution that created democracy and human rights-they 
emerged as alternative ways to manage the industrial society that was rising 
from the ashes of the feudal and mercantilist societies of preindustrial times.  
(Hinds, 2003: 17) 
As he draws an analogy with the Industrial Revolution, Hinds perfectly illustrates to what 
extent one’s perception of freedom and democracy can be biased by a Eurocentric 
perspective on the past revolutions, both political and technological.  
 
By setting a distinction between technologically advanced and preindustrial societies in 
those terms, he supposes that technology systematically drives civilisations to a higher 
stage of evolution. Yet in this case his argument is only exemplified by referring to 
European history. For this reason, I would argue that his work shows how the memory of 
the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution has shaped an ethnocentric perception of 
technology, which might prevent social scientists from thinking critically about 
connectivity.  
 
Nevertheless, I shall raise the fact that, by investigating the relationship between 
technology and radicalisation, Hinds (2003) acknowledges a phenomenon, which is highly 
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relevant to this research, since it evidences my theory of a discursive cycle. As I came to 
witness the polarisation of the political debate in post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt, I 
became well aware of the fact that technological change is concomitant with a trend 
toward radicalisation. To some extent, this could be explained by the fact that 
technological development in general challenges the boundaries that determine one’s 
sociocultural environment. As a result, social groups express the need to reaffirm their 
cultural or ideological identity.  
 
Similarly, when it comes to conceptualising connectivity in relation to social media and 
digital activism, I will argue that fluid political action does not satisfy the need for a well-
established ideological framework and a sustainable political change. As a result, it hardly 
competes with radicalised or institutionalised political movements that maintain a well-
defined political identity. Radicalisation, in that sense may occur in reaction to 
technological change in the same way as connectivity paved the way to a new mainstream. 
These phenomena are comparable on the basis of my model of discursive cycle. 
 
Yet unlike Hinds’ (2003) theory, this argument relies on a more critical understanding of 
technological development. For that matter, it involves rethinking the model of the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution from a different angle. Besides it requires 
considering the relationship between technology and democracy in a broader range of 
political and sociocultural environments.  
 
4.3. Understanding the relationship between technology and 
democracy from the perspective of the field 
For this purpose, across the literature on the Arab Spring, a post-colonial critique has 
emerged, which echoes the theory formulated by the Frankfurt School. From a post-
colonial perspective, we inevitably come to consider to what extent imperialism, as much 
as capitalism, has relied on the argument of industrial and technological modernization. On 
that basis, this tradition helps in transcending the debate on whether digital media played a 
significant role in the revolutionary upheaval. Whereas other approaches would tend to 
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objectify technology, this critique proposes to assess how, by whom and to which purposes 
social media have been used (Lynch, 2011: 302). By doing so, it draws an emphasis on the 
political and economic interests likely to motivate this particular form of technological 
development and shows that digital media potentially acts as an instrument of resistance as 
well as a means for domination: 
“(…) internet is both a product of imperialist and capitalist logics and 
something that is simultaneously used by millions in the struggle to resist this 
logics.” (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011: 1344)  
Like the Marxist critique, this literature tends to focus on the power relationships at stake 
in technological development, instead of invoking technology like a deus ex machina to 
explain democratisation in the Middle East. Most specifically, from a post-colonial 
approach, questioning the technological argument enables us to emphasise other 
parameters that are often neglected, whilst they would help understanding the events from 
a less Eurocentric perspective.  
 
For that matter, as they provide an overview of the literature covering the Arab Spring, Al 
Maghlouth et al (2015) observe that this post-colonial critique regards the 2011 events as a 
demonstration of the Arab people’s self-determination:  
The orientalist notion of the inability of Arabs to govern themselves under 
democratic regimes is heavily contested, using the revolutions as evidence for 
political agency and self-determination. Generally, references to Said and 
others in this niche are set in the context of post-colonial resistance. (Al 
Maghlouth et al. 2015: 13) 
Whereas technological determinism might diminish the significance given to human and 
social parameters, this particular set of studies gives credit to the political actors, who 
succeeded in overthrowing Mubarak’s and Ben Ali’s governments (Bayat 2010; Benhabib, 
2011; Beinin, 2012). For instance, Allagui and Kuebler (2011) argue that the success of 
digital activism in promoting the 2011 protests is only revealing of a high level of social 
cohesion among members of civil society, which manifested itself both online and in the 
streets: 
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People (…) mobilized for two (…) reasons (…) The second reason (…) is the 
flow of networks to which people belong: networks of friends, family, work, 
school, and others of interest (such as the media). These networks create a 
space, or in Bowles terms (2006), territories for interaction and strong 
reciprocity based on an altruistic sharing behavior. The Arab movements 
proved the motivating power of social relations for social activism. The 
solidarity among members of networks challenged dictators, their online 
censors, and the offline police. (Allagui and Kuebler, 2011: 1436) 
But most importantly, this post-colonial critique helps resetting the discussion on 
technology and democracy in the particular context of the MENA region. As such, it 
highlights a broader range of factors likely to stimulate or interfere with the 
democratisation process, which helps rethinking the relationship between technology and 
democracy from the perspective of the field.  
 
For instance, a specific set of research considers digital activism in relation to other forms 
of political action, suggesting that social media and street activism proved to have a 
symbiotic relationship (Aouragh & Alexander 2011; Gerbaudo, 2012). Other studies 
examine how traditional mass media relayed the events originally reported via social 
media (Aouragh and Alexander 2011; Lynch, 2011).  
 
These works propose to understand digital activism in combination with other variables 
that might have determined the outcome of the 2011 protests (Lopes de Souza and Lipietz, 
2011; 2012). In that respect, they inevitably leads to a rethink of the assumption, according 
to which social media and technology per se generated significant social and political 
change, in a way that perfectly resonates with the historical experience of the 
Enlightenment. Therefore, similarly to Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique, they prompt the 
thought that one should not rely on an idealised memory of the Enlightenment to anticipate 
the challenges for democratisation in the Arab region. 
 
With this in mind, it is crucial to outline what distinguishes the Egyptian and Tunisian 
cases from other examples of political mobilisations involving activism in the early 2010s. 
In order to build theory on such forms of connective actions (Bennett and Segerber, 2012), 
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researchers have drawn comparisons between the Arab uprisings and the Indignados 
movement in Spain, the London riots, the 2011 protests in Greece and the Occupy Wall 
Street protest (Castells, 2012; Mason, 2012). In doing so, they have identified similarities 
between these events, sometimes arguing that local activist networks are connected on the 
transnational scale (Castells, 2012 ; Mason, 2012).  
 
The comparative approach may seem particularly appropriate when studying the Arab 
uprisings from the perspective of media studies or political sciences. However, it is crucial 
to acknowledge that pro-revolutionary cyber-activism in Tunisia and Egypt remains 
significantly different from the way digital activism operates in neoliberal democracies. 
Although cyber-activist networks are sporadically interconnected, their political 
environments bring them to develop different views on how social media should benefit 
the political debate.  
 
Here I intend to distinguish hacking and web-activism in societies where the cyberspace is 
an entirely liberalised market from digital activism in the Arab world. While the former 
contests the fact that private agencies are gaining control over the way information 
circulates online, the latter sees the Internet as an alternative to state censorship.  
 
On one hand, hacking networks in technologically literate countries (Coleman, 2011) are 
concerned about the traceability and commercialisation of users’ personal data. On the 
other hand, activism in the MENA region preceded the emergence of digital technologies 
and attempts to stimulate the liberalisation of discourse to fight against repressive regimes. 
In the first case, digital devices are both the cause and the object of political action (Curran 
and Gibson, 2012), whereas in the second case, online tools are only the vehicles of a 
much bigger political agenda. Seyla Benhabib (2011) clearly underlines these distinctions, 
when comparing different cases of protests and revolutionary upheaval around the world: 
(…) the Wisconsin protesters and the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries 
are battling for different goals: the first are resisting the further pacification and 
humiliation of a citizenry, nearly converted into docile and hopeless 
homebodies by the ravages of American and global financial capitalism visited 
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upon them in the last twenty years. Arab revolutionaries are struggling for 
democratic freedoms, a free public sphere, and joining the contemporary world 
after decades of lies, isolation and deception. (Benhabib , 2011: 1) 
In fact, the divergences between these two forms of mobilisation are fundamental. When 
online activism is meant to target web corporations, the prerogative for anonymity is 
essential, because it is regarded as a way to preserve Internet users’ privacy (Coleman, 
2011: 513). These particular types of activist networks are therefore more likely to remain 
fluid and avoid any political affiliation.  
 
As for cyber-activism in the democratising Middle East, users’ anonymity is not the end 
but the means of the struggle for freedom of expression. In this context, the initial purpose 
of anonymous political action is to circumvent repression and to enable minority voices to 
be heard in the public sphere. Yet the real challenge that members of the activist 
community are facing in the Arab world is to ultimately enable individual stakeholders to 
disclose their identity as they defend their personal views and uphold an alternative 
opinion. Their concern primarily lies in the issue of transparency, rather than privacy.  
 
In that sense, one could easily argue that pro-revolutionary activists in Tunisia and Egypt 
were initially more likely to consolidate a sustainable ideological framework. Most 
revolutionaries were politicised before becoming web-activists. In spite of the fact that the 
revolution ultimately failed at federating the opposition, Islamist, left-wing and liberal 
revolutionaries related to different yet specific ideological discourses. Each of these 
ideologies relied on a sufficiently consistent theory to ensure a sustainable political 
transition. In this regard, we need to examine whether digital technologies contributed to 
raise confusion and make those potentially successful counter-discourses more fluid and 
likely to be hijacked. For unlike what Benhabib predicted in 2011, the revolution was 
hijacked and this was not only due to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood:  
(…) many commentators (…) are convinced that these revolutions will be 
hijacked and transformed into theocracies. These are not only deeply partisan 
speculations, motivated by equally deep-seated cultural prejudice against 
Muslims and their capacity for self-governance. They are also deeply anti-
political speculations of weary elites, who have forgotten the civic republican 
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contentiousness out of which their own democracies once emerged. In Egypt as 
well as Tunisia, hard negotiations and confrontations will now start among the 
many groups who participated in the revolution. And the number of young men 
and women who are still guarding their public spheres in these countries, by 
showing up in numbers on the streets, shows that they are quite aware that 
respect for the past suffering and resistance of members of the older generation 
of Muslim Brothers, may “hijack” their revolution. (Benhabib , 2011: 2) 
Rethinking the technological parameter critically would precisely contribute to explain 
why the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions failed, although they involved consistent 
ideological views that could have been successfully confronted in a democratic debate. 
4.4. Conclusion to Section 2: beyond the Eurocentric perspective  
Assessing the role of digital activism in the 2011 Arab uprisings unleashed a set of 
assumptions on the relationship between democracy and technological development. These 
assumptions often reflect a rather Eurocentric understanding of the democratisation 
process, especially when they are founded on the model of the Enlightenment. As the 
Marxist critique of the Enlightenment would suggest, assuming a correlation between 
technological progress and democracy also stimulated the development of a neoliberal 
economy in industrialised countries. Such assumptions are therefore mostly representative 
of the way democracy is understood in Western neoliberal societies: 
For most Western observers, hopes for transformation on the back of the Arab 
Spring were squarely pinned on the model of Western democracies. But, as the 
Graeco-French philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis reminds us, this model—that 
of ‘liberal oligarchies’—can only offer reform of the old regime; not a deeply 
renewed society. (Lipietz and Lopes de Souza, 2012: 356) 
This phenomenon constitutes a considerable bias when it comes to discussing the 
relationship between technology and democracy in the Middle East. Only by 
acknowledging this can we develop a critical understanding of the role played by digital 
media in the post-revolutionary debate. This not only explains why so many studies 
initially described social media as a tool for revolutionary resistance. It also shows that 
reconsidering the Arab uprisings from a less ethnocentric perspective helps us to be more 
critical in relation to the way social media might scatter and dissolve emerging counter-
discourses in neoliberal democracies.  
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5. Methodology: A nexus analysis based on four empirical strands 
In order to map the evolution from emergent to institutionalised discourse, this research is 
based on the nexus analysis model of Scollon and Scollon (2004). This particular type of 
discourse analysis (DA) maps the transformation of a discourse over time and across 
different media environments. For this purpose, it involves a multimodal data set and 
requires the researcher to experience some of the social practices through which discourse 
is mediated. Combining the ethnographic approach with a multimodal DA enables us to 
understand how these practices may further establish or challenge the way power 
relationships take shape in each of the media environments considered. 
 
My nexus analysis relies on four empirical strands and four data sets that relate to different 
stages of the post-revolutionary debate in Tunisia and Egypt. These four empirical strands, 
which will be outlined in each of my four empirical chapters, also explore different 
deliberative practices likely to have shaped both emerging and institutionalised discourses.  
 
Table 1: Research Design 
  
  
NEXUS ANALYSIS  
(MULTIMODAL CDA DESIGNED TO MAP THE EVOLUTION OF DISCOURSE OVER TIME AND ACROSS MEDIA) 
VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY 
THREE DATA SETS 
FIELDWORK ETHNOGRAPHY 
ONE DATA SET 
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: 
ACTIVIST BLOGOSPHERE (TUNISIA AND 
EGYPT) 
FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEWS: 
EGYPTIAN ACTIVISTS, JOURNALISTS 
AND CITIZENS ENGAGED ON SOCIAL 
MEDIA 
DATA VISUALISATION AND 
COMPUTERISED CONTENT ANALYSIS: 
TWITTER DATASET 
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND 
THEMATIC ANALYSIS:SAMPLE FROM E-
CONSULTATION PLATFORM 
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Figure 6: Mapping the evolution of the post-revolutionary debate in time 
 
 
1. The first empirical strand covers the period between 2011 and 2013. This study 
consists of a critical discourse analysis (CDA) conducted on a sample from the 
Tunisian and Egyptian blogospheres. The data set essentially included bloggers 
already involved in the revolutionary opposition and actively sharing their political 
views online prior to the 2011 uprisings. The data set includes blog articles posted 
in three different languages (Arabic, English and French), which provides an 
overview of how activists reported the 2011-2013 political crisis depending on the 
audience they intended to reach (national audience, diaspora, foreign press or 
international community).  
 
Among the four empirical strands of this research, this discourse analysis is the 
only empirical chapter including data collected in Tunisia as well as in Egypt. 
Whereas the research originally intended to conduct an online ethnography in 
Tunisia, the virtual ethnography did not allow me to recruit as many participants as 
my fieldwork in Egypt. As I will argue when reflecting on the limitations of my 
research, this revealed that virtual ethnography is not always suitable in a context 
of political repression.  
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2. The second empirical strand covers the 2012 presidential campaign in Egypt. In 
order to see how participative media have been used in more institutionalised forms 
of politics; this study investigates how presidential candidates – as representatives 
of the leading parties and ideologies in competition – incorporated digital media 
into their campaigning strategy.  
 
Firstly, it assesses the visibility of the five leading candidates online and over the 
period of the presidential race, by using the following data visualisation tools: R-
Shief and Google Trends. These freely available applications are designed to 
analyse data collected from Twitter or Google respectively. They enable 
computerised content analysis and visualise the frequency of a term over large 
databases of tweets or Google searches.  
 
In addition, this empirical chapter explores how candidates with different 
ideological backgrounds have incorporated social media into their campaigning 
strategy. For this purpose, it examines a selection of tweets produced by the most 
visible and proactive Twitter users among the five presidential candidates. By 
making an inventory of the themes addressed in candidates’ tweets, this study leads 
me to discuss how the different political leaders included features of the 
revolutionary discourse into their campaigning strategy.  
 
3. The third corpus illustrates some aspects of the 2012 constitutional debate in Egypt, 
which took place as former president Mohammed Morsi submitted the first 
constitutional draft to a referendum after the elections. This empirical strand 
consists of both a thematic and critical discourse analysis of a sample of comments 
posted on the Dostour Sharek e-consultation platform. The Dostour Sharek project 
was designed on the occasion of the 2012 constitutional referendum to stimulate 
participation in the referendum and enable citizens to comment on new 
constitutional articles as they were drafted by the constituent assembly.   
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In addition to the sample of comments analysed, this empirical chapter outlines the 
findings of face-to-face interviews conducted with two stakeholders involved in the 
implementation of the Dostour Sharek project. Those interviews took place during 
the time of my fieldwork in Cairo and involved a different questionnaire to the one 
designed for the ethnography. This alternative questionnaire was intended to further 
investigate the way the e-participation project had been computed and 
administered. 
 
4. The fourth and final empirical study consists of a set of 14 qualitative interviews 
and 6 informal conversations conducted in the field with activists, political actors 
and citizens actively using social media. The fieldwork took place between 
September and November 2014 in affiliation with the American University in 
Cairo.  
 
The original research design also involved a set of telephone interviews with 
Tunisian activists and political actors engaged in a citizen-led initiative advocating 
open-data policy and transparency. This network of Tunisian citizens included 
different kinds of political actors active on social media and updated a public 
Facebook page on which users commented on political events on a regular basis. 
Following the activity of the group and interacting virtually with some of the 
participants led me to recruit Tunisian participants for telephone interviews. This 
allowed me to approach the Tunisian field, in spite of the fact that the financial 
resources allocated to this research did not enable me to conduct a second period of 
fieldwork in Tunisia. As I will discuss in this chapter, however, recruiting 
interviewees online proved to be highly challenging as in the context of my 
fieldwork. As a consequence, only a few interviews with Tunisian participants were 
recorded and transcribed.  
 
In this chapter, I will first introduce a reflection on how relativistic research and critical 
theory in particular is comparable to counter-discourse and how our ontological 
perspective as social scientists may relate to our relationship with power. I will discuss the 
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fact that a critical approach requires the researcher to embrace the subjective dimension of 
his or her research and often generates a process of introspection. This will lead me to 
reflect on my personal background and to comment on how it may have shaped my 
understanding of the field.  
 
I will then elaborate on Scollon and Scollon’s (2004) nexus analysis approach, defining it 
as particular type of critical discourse analysis (CDA). For this purpose, I will briefly refer 
to four theoretical assumptions that have considerably influenced discursive analyses and 
outline some of the characteristics of nexus analysis. I will comment on how computerised 
research methods such as large-scale textual analysis and data visualisation may contribute 
to DA or CDA. Finally, I will discuss the benefits of combining virtual and fieldwork 
ethnography.  
 
I will conclude this chapter by presenting each of my four empirical strands, exposing data 
samples and commenting on the ethical concerns encountered. 
 
5.1.  Shifting ontological framework: constructing or deconstructive a 
normative vision of the world 
Like critical thinkers and political activists, researchers may come to reconsider their 
position with regards to normative and hegemonic discourses when adopting a specific 
ontological approach. In fact, one could easily argue that science is comparable to political 
discourse in that it answers to the need of successively constructing and deconstructing the 
concepts designed to interpret our physical environment as well as our social reality.  
 
Ever since Ancient Greece, starting with the philosophical division between Plato and 
Aristotle, all the disciplines, traditions, myths and religions that claimed to understand our 
physical reality attempted at either modifying or demystifying the world. By using this 
terminology, I intend to differentiate utilitarian forms of science from what I would define 
as a rather introspective scientific approach. Admittedly, all theories ultimately aspire to 
having a strong impact on society. However, research relying on a positivist ontology 
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intend to identify replicable scientific laws, which are more likely to have a direct 
application in the world. Constructivists would argue that this ontological stance is 
utilitarian, in that it produces normative concepts, which reinforce the assumption that 
reality is objective, hence unique and exclusive. Therefore, this type of science potentially 
helps in consolidating dominant discourses. 
 
Alternatively, a relativistic ontological approach supposes that reality is pluralistic and 
subjective. In that respect it leads to more introspective forms of research, since it involves 
a reflection on how scientific discourses might challenge prevailing assumptions. Not only 
does it require from the researcher to identify how his or her perspective might determine 
the outcome of the study, but it also allows this perspective to contradict the dominant 
discourse. For that matter, it is more likely to resonate with emerging or alternative 
perceptions of reality, which makes this ontological stance potentially less instrumental to 
power. Such forms of critical and introspective science are therefore comparable to 
counter-discourse in that it tends to deconstruct normative concepts and gives credit to 
alternative perceptions of reality that may not conform with the prevailing doxa. 
 
From that perspective, a particular ontological and epistemological stance somehow 
reflects one’s relationship to power as well as one’s conception of the relation between 
knowledge and power. To some extent, all scientific approaches claim to modify the world. 
Yet interpretivism and critical theory in particular aspire at changing the world by 
demystifying it’s most common presumptions.   
 
Critical theorists are especially aware of their responsibility with regards to power and to 
the circulation of discourse. In this regard their relativism almost acts as a form of political 
resistance. An example of this phenomenon can be found in the way many scientists 
suddenly developed more relativistic theories over the second half of the twentieth century, 
almost as a response to the increasingly radicalised political environment.  
 
Aside from the fact that a Marxist critical theory emerged in the field of social sciences, 
natural sciences came to formulate the idea that the reality observed could be experienced 
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and described subjectively. Hypotheses such as Einstein’s theory of relativity or 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle arose when hard science had become subjected to war 
and industrialisation. In such a context, researchers were more likely to question whether 
their responsibility resided in demystifying or further establishing the ideological and 
technological tools that would be used in the struggle for power. 
 
This brief digression shall precisely illustrate the fact that scientific discourse circulates in 
a way that is very similar to political discourse and that our ontological approach is, to 
some extent, revealing of our relationship to power. In this research, I intend to contribute 
to the literature on connectivity and the Arab uprisings by developing a critical reflection 
on the relation between technology, power and democracy. This precisely involves a 
process of introspection, thanks to which I came to understand how my personal 
experience might have determined the outcome of this research.  
 
Identifying how my personal background would impact on my perception of the field was 
especially important, when conducting a nexus analysis (Scollon and Scollon, 2004). 
Unlike traditional DA, nexus analysis primarily focuses on the historical body of the 
participants and social actors involved in the research. Such an approach consists of an 
ethnographic study of discourse, which requires the researcher to be embedded in a 
network of social and discursive practices (the nexus of practice). Similarly to a participant 
observation, a nexus analyst identifies variables and maps the object of his or her study by 
engaging with social actors, within their own environment. He or she assesses to what 
extent the personal experience and preliminary assumptions of each agent interfere with 
the way discourses progressively take shape. By doing so, the researcher comes to 
formulate his or her own historical body, which accounts for the way his or her perspective 
might affect the nexus of practice:  
Whatever issue you study, you will become deeply involved with it. The first 
place to look for that issue is in your own life, your own actions, and your own 
value system. (Scollon and Scollon: 2004:154) 
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For this reason, I will now briefly comment on my personal background and examine how 
it might have influenced both my interpretation of the literature and my experience of the 
field.  
 
5.2. Research and Introspection: Historical body of the researcher 
I was born in Switzerland in a multicultural family, Swiss from my father and Moroccan 
from my mother. She was a Moroccan immigrant, who left her country during the reign of 
the King Hassan II after working as a nurse for various humanitarian organisations. 
Although she had studied in French schools, during the protectorate (1912-1956), she was 
part of the Moroccan left-wing intelligentsia in the late 1960s and personally suffered from 
the authoritarian regime.  
 
This, along with the fact that she was among the first generation of economically 
independent women in the country convinced her to complete her higher education in 
Switzerland, where she became a social worker and met my father. For many reasons, I 
believe her to be representative of the way the generation that witnessed the transition from 
colonialism to Arab nationalism came to conciliate different cultural identities. 
 
My grandfather had the opportunity to work as a translator and civil servant for French 
institutions and she was one of the first Moroccan children, who benefitted from the 
education system provided by the ruling elite. In that regard, she was part of a privileged 
minority that had access to education and gravitated within what was regarded as the 
sphere of power. Unlike the majority of young Moroccan women, she had been introduced 
very early to the set of behaviour patterns, beliefs and common knowledge shared by the 
members of the colonial hegemony.  
 
To a certain extent, this artificial cultural heritage raised her confidence, by giving her the 
feeling of partly belonging to what was regarded as the avant-gardist or modernist youth. 
On the other hand, she was considered as part of a minority by the surrounding colonial 
community and was unable to fully express or uphold her original cultural identity within 
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this particular environment. Simultaneously, she was expected to conform to Moroccan 
traditions and with regards to the Islamic values she had been taught at home. 
Consequently, she became well aware of the alienating effect of receiving a French 
education and being taught the ideals of the Enlightenment while witnessing multiple 
forms of imperialism as they manifested themselves in the Maghreb region.  
 
As she became politically engaged, she expressed as much criticism with regards to the 
authority of the French protectorate as to the monarchy. At the time of Arab nationalism, 
her generation continued to experience confrontations between tradition and modernity and 
had attempted to formulate libertarian ideals as different political and ideological 
discourses were competing for legitimacy.   
 
The reason why her story is relevant to my research lies in the way her experience as a 
political dissident and as an immigrant might have affected my understanding of the field. 
The way I came to experience my Arab identity as a second-generation immigrant from a 
mixed family is limited. However, I believe that this is precisely what led me to understand 
to what extent the Arab identity as such is ambivalent. 
 
On the basis of my background in Middle Eastern studies, I would argue that the term 
“Arab” - as it is commonly applied to designate the Arab region – is hardly definable and 
often misleading. Since the beginning of Pan-Arabism, the term has always been the 
constant object of a debate on what essentially determines the Arab identity. This term 
however applies to a multitude of minorities that continue to uphold their ethnic, religious 
or linguistic independence, which intensifies identity politics. Colonialism generated a 
crisis of identity to which both Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism attempted to respond 
and which the Arab people often came to conciliate multiple cultural heritages. This was 
most certainly emphasised by sectarianism, ethnic conflicts and economic migration 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. For those reasons, we could easily 
argue that the Arab identity itself remains inherently fluid: it resists any normative 
definition, while serving multiple institutional discourses.  
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Personally, I witnessed the way my mother came to navigate between different cultural 
repertoires to defend her identity, as a politically engaged Muslim woman opposed to the 
patriarchal and traditionalist environment in which she had been raised. On one hand, she 
was deeply attached to the notions of individual freedom and to some of the liberal ideals 
that she was taught at school and by the French colonial administration. On the other hand, 
she was keen to rediscover and advocate some of the socialist principles that accompanied 
the development of Arab nationalism, as Arab countries progressively recovered their 
independence between the 1950s and 1960s. I believe that these different discourses 
sometimes provided her with diverging understandings of the notion of development, 
freedom, social equity and democracy.  
 
When it comes to my own background, I would say that I came to question my identity as 
a second-generation immigrant. As a child, I became aware that we belonged to a 
community of immigrants by interacting with other members of the Arab diaspora and 
through the relationship I had with my relatives in our country of origin. But most 
importantly, I came to perceive a significant cultural shift in the educative approach of my 
parents as well as between the local practices and the traditional values or references 
shared by the members of the diaspora.  
 
It became essential for me to explain these differences, which motivated my interest in 
Middle Eastern studies. However, this proved to be a very artificial way to rediscover my 
culture, since I had not been entirely raised in an Arab and Islamic environment. My 
experience was symmetrically opposed to my mother's, I was hopelessly trying to recover 
a part of our identity that we both felt was missing.  
 
Yet her nostalgia was due to the fact that she had been driven to dismiss her origins, 
whereas I was spontaneously driven towards this culture to which I did not entirely belong. 
This is probably the reason why my background provided me with an extremely deep and 
empirical understanding of the struggles that occur on the individual and social scale, when 
it comes to define shifting identities and fluid discourses. More specifically, my 
perspective on the question of immigration as a result of colonisation has made me very 
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sensitive to the ideological conflicts that accompany these two phenomena. In this regard, 
it appears to be an extremely relevant tool to address the debate on the democratisation of 
the Arab world. 
  
As argued earlier, discussing to what extent the 2011 Arab uprisings were a step towards 
democratisation is extremely challenging, because it requires determining to what extent 
today’s conception of democracy is culturally determined. Such a reflection involves the 
ability to navigate between different cultural and ideological frameworks. For this reason, I 
believe that my potential contribution to the field lies precisely in the ability to understand 
how discourses become fluid when identities are shifting. My personal experience has led 
me to witness how those who rely on such flexible discourses remain vulnerable, despite 
their ability to resist a normative and unilateral conception of the world.   
 
5.3. Nexus Analysis: mapping the evolution of discourse over time 
Nexus analysis is comparable to traditional CDA in that it attempts to demystify power 
relationships by comparing different communicative practices. Scollon and Scollon (2004) 
develop this approach as part of their ethnographic study of Native Alaskan communities, 
in order to assess whether emails and instant messaging affect the way discourse circulates 
between the academic institution and the local population.  
 
Like Scollon and Scollon’s (2004) original study, every nexus analysis involves a 
multimodal data set and intends to determine how new communication devices may 
challenge institutional discourses. As they go through the process of collecting and 
analysing the data, researchers proceed to both a virtual and traditional ethnography, 
thanks to which they identify and experience a range of communicative practices. These 
constitute what Scollon and Scollon (2004) refer to as a nexus of practices. Mapping the 
nexus of practices explains how power relationships are materialised in everyday social 
interactions.  
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In their work, Scollon and Scollon (2004) analyse how emails and instant messaging 
modify interactions between students and university staff. They describe the university 
classroom, designed on the model of the panopticon, as a medium of institutional 
discourse. This particular setting, which establishes the authority of the teacher is 
substituted for a more straightforward form of interaction with online teaching. Scollon 
and Scollon (2004) develop their methodology in order to discuss this particular 
hypothesis.   
 
Nexus analysis is therefore highly appropriate when it comes to determining whether new 
media can transform the consolidation of institutional discourses. As such, it draws on 
many other discursive approaches and most particularly relies on CDA. For this reason, I 
will now briefly refer to some of the post-structuralist concepts that inspired CDA in order 
to set the methodological background of nexus analysis.  
 
5.4. From Critical Discourse Analysis to Nexus Analysis 
Among other discursive approaches, CDA aims at uncovering how discourse – as it is 
shaped by power institutions – establishes a prevailing ideology, while generating 
particular relationships of domination. A number of key thinkers from social sciences and 
linguistics such as Althusser, Bakhtin, Gramsci, Habermas and Volosinov have provided 
new theoretical grounds on which to apply this method. In addition, this tradition is 
significantly influenced by the work of Foucault (O’Halloran, 2003: 11). 
 
The purpose of CDA is also to reflect the performativity of language and show to what 
extent social action can be determined by discourse. Therefore, in accordance with 
Bourdieu’s sociological perspective on language (1991), CDA focuses on the social 
function of discourse. Accordingly, the context of a social interaction has a considerable 
impact on meaning and should be carefully considered by critical discourse analysts. This 
requires determining which common knowledge and sociocultural framework are 
reactivated by the instance of discourse. As such it aims to reveal some aspect of our social 
reality that may be mystified by discourse, as a vehicle for power. 
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When it comes to contextualising a speech, interaction or a text, Bloor and Bloor 
distinguish the “context of culture” (2007:52) (the sociological status of participants, their 
accent and cultural background) from the “context of situation” (2007:26) (the setting, 
topic and moment of the interaction as well as the medium through which it occurs). 
Additionally, the researcher needs to outline the institutional framework in which the 
discourse is produced as well as all the social practices that may reveal or reaffirm 
relationships of domination. This can be achieved by identifying the stances, ideological 
position and attitudes of the speakers or instances of discourse. 
 
Among the social theorists, who laid the basis for the development of CDA, I shall refer to 
Nietzsche (2008), Foucault (1971), Bourdieu (1991) and Bakhtin (1984), who respectively 
emphasise different aspects of the relationship between language and power. Not to 
mention the influence of Ferdinand de Saussure and the contribution of linguistic, 
semiology and semiotics, Nietzsche was among the first social thinkers to refer to language 
in order to demonstrate that social reality is subjectively constructed. In his Genealogy of 
Morality  (2008), he argues that language is historically and culturally determined and 
therefore essentially relies on social conventions. Yet science inevitably transposes the 
naturalistic world into language. This leads him to formulate a similar argument as the one 
advanced by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason (2011), according to which pretending at 
communicating a universal and positive truth through language meets the need to control 
the foundations of our social reality.  
 
Any form of dogmatic discourse, including the scientific one, denies relativity and acts as a 
claim for power. Consequently, knowledge, language and power are closely interrelated. 
One could argue that Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality already sets out the premises for 
CDA as it postulates that human knowledge and moral values are conditioned by a set of 
dogmatic discourses that hide the relative nature of our social reality. The only difference 
between Nietzsche’s genealogy and critical theory as it became constitutive of the Marxist, 
postcolonial or feminist critiques lies in the fact that it does not have any specific political 
purpose.  
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Indeed, unlike Foucault and Deleuze (1977) and other pioneers of CDA, Nietzsche does 
not insist on the need to contest power relationships as they manifest themselves in 
language: 
But is genealogy an ‘immanent critique’, as Owen suggests? Certainly, it is not 
an ‘immanent critique’ in the Hegelian, Marxist, or even Habermasian sense. 
The idea of an ‘immanent critique’ is specifically associated with critical 
theory, whose purpose is to philosophically articulate what ‘is there’ latently in 
order to enlighten social agents, thereby enabling them to understand their 
‘true’ condition. By contrast, for Nietzsche, there is nothing ‘there’ awaiting to 
be discovered; rather, the nature of every past event is decided by the concerns 
of the present moment and the actor who performs the genealogical analysis. 
(Sembou, 2011: 15) 
Foucault further elaborates on the relationship between knowledge, power and language as 
he develops the concept of discourse. This notion was mostly defined in his lecture The 
Order of Discourse (1971), in which he explores how power institutions, including 
academia, enact their domination through discourse and demonstrates that discourse is 
fully constitutive of any institutional framework. Yet in his views, demystifying power 
relationships should essentially contribute to question dominant ideologies and relay 
minority voices. With a critical approach to discourse, social theory is able to change the 
world by demystifying it and develops its own form of counter-discourse.  
 
Simultaneously to the question of how discourse relates to power, other social thinkers 
have investigated the process through which the social constructs that compose the 
prevailing discourse progressively take shape. In this regard, the work of Bourdieu (1991) 
has played a significant part in defining discourse as a social practice. As I will discuss, 
this question appears to be highly relevant when it comes to identifying the instance of 
discourse as well as the evolution of discourse over time, as it is the case in a nexus 
analysis. But most importantly, it helps in conceptualising discourse in the age of 
participative media, as a broader diversity of social actors is now likely to determine 
dominant narratives and as the production (co-construction) of those narratives is 
constantly ongoing.  
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To define discourse as a social practice rather than as a means for power, Bourdieu (1991) 
questions de Saussure’s famous assumption that the relationship between signifying and 
signifier is entirely arbitrary (Grenfell, 2010; Myles, 2013: 10). In his views, this 
relationship is in fact determined by our sociocultural environment, which suggests that 
discourse is essentially a practice through which social groups redefine themselves and 
perform their reality.  
 
According to Bourdieu, language may be considered as a symbolic power as it has been 
codified and institutionalized through grammar and thanks to education. However the way 
societies have progressively created meaning through language is a sociological 
phenomenon. This is also the reason why language – as a social practice as well as a means 
of symbolic power – is organic, and proves to be constantly changing and evolving.  
 
Bourdieu paves the way for nexus analysis, by suggesting that one should study the 
evolution of a discourse over time. Together, Foucault’s (1971) and Bourdieu’s (1991) 
theories lead to a conceptualisation of discourse as both an instrument of power and a 
constantly evolving social practice. Discourse is therefore always likely to change and 
benefit different social groups, which further exemplifies my model of the discursive 
cycle.  
 
In keeping with the notion of language as social practice is the idea that narratives are 
polyphonic and that the instance of discourse is sometimes plural and unclearly defined. 
This question was explored long before the emergence of participative media in the field of 
literary studies. Among others, Bakhtin (1984) largely contributed significantly to this 
literature by developing his theory of dialogism, which inspired the concept of 
intertextuality among postmodernist theorists. Dialogism and interetextuality in particular 
consider a text as part of a large history of texts previously written and therefore follows 
on from an entire body of discourses. This notion has inevitably become crucial to CDA, 
as it allows the researcher to demonstrate that certain aspects of a discourse are commonly 
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shared and may contribute to reactivate the social constructs that legitimate the prevailing 
doxa: 
Intertextuality is a discourse process, which is closely linked to the notions […] 
of recreation, reiteration and interpretation. Within CDA, intertextual analysis 
has two main functions: (1) it plays an important role in revealing writers’ and 
speakers’ strategies in reinforcing or reformulating ideas and beliefs; and (2) it 
can reveal traces of dominant ideology or evidence of ideological struggle and 
cultural changes. (Bloor and Boor, 2007: 54) 
Intertextual analysis also appears to be highly relevant in the age of digital media, given 
that discourse has now become even more polyphonic.  
 
Most importantly, Bakhtin’s interetextuality, along with Bourdieu’s definition of discourse 
as a social practice, suggests that one can identify the features of a dominant discourse, 
whenever the instance of discourse is plural and unclearly defined. In other words, despite 
the fact that CDA is commonly applied to analyse the way power institutions 
communicate, one may uncover dominant discourses by examining a broader range of 
social interactions: 
First, structure, form, function, and meaning are seen not as immanent features 
of discourse but as products of an ongoing process of producing and receiving 
discourse. Second, this process is not centered in the speech event or creation 
of a written text itself, but lies in its interface with at least one other utterance. 
(Briggs and Bauman, 1992: 146) 
This alternative approach may in fact be more revealing of the way power relationships are 
reactivated or challenged by all the actors involved in the process of shaping public 
opinion.  
 
Among other theorists across the fields of linguistics, sociology and literary studies, 
Nietzsche, Foucault, Bourdieu and Bakhtin respectively contributed to outline the founding 
principles of DA and CDA. Yet the reason why I choose to refer to their work in order to 
introduce nexus analysis is because they focus on the relationship between discourse and 
power as well as the potential evolution of discourse over time.  
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The triangulation between language, power and discourse as an ongoing social practice is 
crucial to analyse how the logics behind power relationships may change as the volume of 
social interactions increases. Articulating those concepts explains why CDA and nexus 
analysis are appropriate to understanding whether connectivity affects or accelerates the 
natural evolution of discourse and power relationships.  
 
As mentioned earlier, CDA and nexus analysis share many similarities. Like Foucault, 
Scollon & Scollon (2004) postulate that discursive interactions represent the structural unit 
of social powers and contribute to shape and establish the structure and internal regulations 
of our institutions. Yet whereas a Foucauldian approach would focus on the macro 
structure of discourse and power, a nexus analysis suggests that sociological phenomena 
can be explained by studying social interactions on the micro level. In fact, struggles over 
power manifest themselves as a network of discursive and semiotics patterns that can be 
observed on a smaller scale: 
A nexus analysis is a way to strategize unifying [unfolding moments of social 
interaction and a much broader socio-political-cultural analysis of the 
relationships among social groups and power interests]. We believe that the 
broader social issues are ultimately grounded in the micro-actions of social 
interactions and conversely, the most mundane of micro-actions are nexus 
through which the largest cycles of social organization and activity circulate. 
(Scollon & Scollon, 2004 : 8) 
In other words, nexus analysis introduces a bottom-up perspective to the understanding of 
discourse, which might be particularly appropriate to study new communicative behaviors 
in a digital environment.  
 
In addition to the fact that a nexus analysis intends to demystify power relationships, it 
draws on Bakhtin’s intertextuality, by conceptualizing discourse as polyphonic: 
A social action takes place as an intersection or nexus of some aggregate of 
discourses […] – the discourse in place, some social arrangement by which 
people come together in social groups (a meeting, a conversation, a chance 
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contact, a queue) – the interaction order, and the life experiences of individual 
social actors – the historical body. (Scollon and Scollon, 2004:  19) 
Furthermore, like Bourdieu, Scollon and Scollon (2004) suggest that discourse is a social 
practice: 
In order to develop the argument that discourse analysis is itself a form of 
social action, we need to show how discourse (in both the sense of language in 
use and the sense of the broader social discourses) is integrated within the 
actions of people in the ordinary conduct of their lives. (Scollon and Scollon, 
2004:15)  
In Scollon and Scollon’s terms, the Foucauldian discourse can be described as a nexus of 
practice. Like ethnographers, researchers should be fully involved in this nexus of practice 
to deconstruct its internal structure.  
 
Yet in order to remain critical with regards to discourse in the age of digital media, I 
believe that nexus analysts will have to face new challenges that had not been anticipated 
by Scollon and Scollon in 2004. Indeed, with the rise of big data and the increasing 
complexity of social media, social scientists now have access to a range of methodological 
tools to select and analyse meaningful data samples online. Paradoxically, when 
conducting virtual ethnography, researchers often come to use computerised methods that, 
unlike CDA, originally rely on a more naturalistic conception of discourse and language. 
 
5.5. A naturalistic approach of discourse: towards computerised 
textual analyses 
Discourse analysis was also influenced by various schools of thought in the field of 
language cognition, such as logical empiricism, symbolism or generative grammar. Yet 
unlike CDA, this tradition intended to apply replicable logics based on grammatical 
structures to interpret the meaning of a text. According to O’Halloran (2003), Benjamin 
Lee Whorf and Michael Halliday were among the first linguists to contribute to this field 
of research. Between the 1930s and 1940s, they developed an approach called 
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mystification analysis intended to systematically decode implicit meaning by identifying 
specific turns of phrases.  
 
Their approach was inspired by the work of rationalist and empiricist philosophers like 
Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Hume, who assumed that language cognition could be 
explained by a set of replicable syllogisms (O’Halloran, 2003). In fact, Aristotle was most 
certainly the first philosopher to formulate this assumption with his law of categories, as he 
sought to explain how the predicate of a sentence is determined by a set of attributes.  
 
Many linguists relied on this tradition to understand the process through which the human 
brain draws inferences, by focusing on the micro-level of discourse. Along with the 
development of computerised research methods, this prompted the thought that language 
and discourse could be encoded, decoded and processed thanks to mathematical and 
computational algorithms.  
 
Today, with the proliferation of data available online, social scientists are searching for 
computerised research applications able to process a large amount of data in a limited 
amount of time (Fischer, Lyon et al. 2008; Rasmussen, 2008). As a result, social sciences 
are likely to evolve towards more quantitative approaches to discourse.  
 
Computerised research applications are now being used in various fields of social sciences 
to conduct surveys, archive data and run statistical analysis. They may also be applied to 
interpret large bodies of text by running content or sentiment analysis. Whether these 
methods are employed in business studies, marketing research or political sciences, they 
provide a rather quantitative and normative understanding of discourse.    
 
Among others, Grimmer and Stewart (2013) explore how large data sets of texts and 
documents commonly used in political sciences can now be entirely codified and analysed 
thanks to automated text-analysis programming. These tools can for instance help identify, 
which political actors are most frequently referred to in a body of texts or with what type 
of ideological vocabulary those political actors are commonly associated. Grimmer and 
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Stewart (2013) demonstrate that this alternative to manual coding appears to be more time 
and cost effective when running quantitative analyses likely to be translated into 
algorithms. However, such computerised methods are not sufficient to draw inferences on 
the meaning of a text and still require from the researcher to have an in-depth knowledge 
of his or her data set: 
Automated content analysis methods have demonstrated performance across a 
variety of substantive problems. These methods will not, however, eliminate 
the need for careful thought by researchers nor remove the necessity of reading 
texts. Indeed a deep understanding of the texts is one of the key advantages of 
the social scientist in applying automated methods. (…) the most productive 
line of inquiry is to identify the best way to use both humans and automated 
methods for analyzing texts. (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 4) 
Consequently, the findings driven by such types of analysis should always be verified 
through some kind of validation process. In their study, Grimmer and Stewart distinguish 
between two kinds of automated text-analyses, each presenting different benefits and 
challenges (ibid). The first one, called the supervised method, requires the researcher to 
compute a specific research algorithm, thanks to which he or she will be able to assign the 
text to pre-defined categories. This involves anticipating and including all function words 
that may be meaningful to the search in a specific context. Simultaneously, the researcher 
also has to prevent all polysemous words, or words that only have a grammatical function, 
from distorting the result of the computation. Grimmer and Stewart view this technique as 
more reliable and easier to validate.  
 
The alternative form of automated text analysis is called the dictionary method. In this 
approach, dictionary functions are used to automatically identify the most frequent 
sequence or text unit of a data set. This kind of computation also enables the researcher to 
run what is commonly known as sentiment analysis, by identifying whether an element is 
more likely to be referred to in negative or positive terms.  
 
This method (also called opinion mining) is documented by Liu (2010), who stresses the 
fact that such dictionary-based computation can often lead to misleading interpretations of 
a text. Indeed, a statement may refer to different attributes relating to the word under 
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computation. In addition, names or attributes may also be designated by a pronoun, which 
is likely to make the analysis less accurate. Moreover, some statements may be attributed a 
positive or negative value while hiding an implicit or ironic meaning.  Most importantly, as 
Grimmer and Stewart (2013) emphasise the researcher has less control over such 
dictionary-based computation and is therefore often unable to perform any validation, 
depending on the size of the data set: 
The consequence of domain specificity and lack of validation is that most 
analyses based on dictionaries are built on shaky foundations. Yes, dictionaries 
are able to produce measures that are claimed to be about tone or emotion, but 
the actual properties of these measures — and how they relate to the concepts 
they are attempting to measure — are essentially a mystery. Therefore, for 
scholars to effectively use dictionary methods in their future work, advances in 
the validation of dictionary methods must be made. (Grimmer and Stewart, 
2013: 9) 
In light if this, Grimmer and Stewart propose tesing unsupervised dictionary-based 
automated text-analyses by manually analysing a sub-sample of the data set. Their work 
anticipates some of the challenges that social scientists will have to face in the age of Big 
Data, as computerised methods become increasingly more complex and designed to map 
considerably large data sets.  
 
Beyond the fields of political sciences or media and communication studies, other 
researchers began to extract data from participative media to experience virtual 
ethnography and other tools designed for online research (Garrison, Anderson and Archer 
2001; Hara, Bonk and Angeli, 2000; McKlin et al. 2002).  
 
In order to compare manual and computerized content analysis (CA), Corich, Kinshuk and 
Hunt (2006) applied each of these techniques to analyse data extracted from discussion 
forums designed for e-learning purposes. After comparing the findings of their manual CA 
with the statistics computed thanks to an automated content analysis tool, they conclude 
that these two sets of results remain significantly different. In fact, the relation between 
manual and computerised CA just fails to reach the expected coefficient of reliability 
(80%) suggesting that these two methods are not interchangeable. On the other hand, 
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Corich, Kinshuk and Hunt (2006) also demonstrate that that the automated text analysis 
tool used in their study appears to be statistically more reliable than some of the 
applications used in earlier studies (Garrison et al., 2000). For that reason, their work 
suggests that computerised research tools are likely to become more accurate in future, 
which would provide a less-time consuming method for coding.  
 
In response to the increasing complexity of social media, data visualisation tools have 
introduced a new generation of computerised research methods. These applications are 
most commonly applied to compute statistics and produce diagrams that map the activity 
of social media users: 
A common step in network analysis is visualization. These diagrams are 
excellent tools for rapid pattern recognition. (…) However, it is possible to 
oversell the utility of these diagrams. They are interpretative tools, not 
unambiguous facts. In many cases the visuals have to be carefully massaged to 
accentuate the aspect of the graph that the researcher finds noteworthy, which 
is than reinforced by tabular data. As with the adage, ‘an unexamined life is not 
worth living’, an uninterpreted sociogram is not worth presenting. (Hogan, 
2008: 149) 
In addition to the fact that these applications may sometimes be very expensive, they 
require a considerable amount of time from researchers to master the scripting language or 
customise the software (Hogan, 2008: 157). Furthermore, the same argument formulated 
by Grimmer and Stewart (2013) with regards to text analysis applies to the case of data 
visualisation. Given that the application processes a significantly large data set, it becomes 
very hard if not impossible for researchers to validate the findings manually. 
 
Overall, computerised research tools, such as those for automated text analysis, sentiment 
analysis or data visualisation considerably facilitate large-scale quantitative research. They 
can also be used to map the activity of a network on social media, assess the frequency of a 
term or test whether a word is referred to positively or negatively. For this reason, 
computerised research methods are becoming increasingly fashionable and may one day be 
essential to online ethnography. However, these forms of analysis also prove to be less 
reliable or meaningful whenever the researcher is unable to fully understand or refine the 
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algorithm behind the computation. In addition, one needs to have an extremely good 
knowledge of the data set in order to interpret the patterns or correlations that may be 
highlighted by such methodological tools.  
 
For this reason, all the computations and data visualisations incorporated in the second 
empirical chapter of this study are considered as complementary to my discourse and 
thematic analyses. They are used to corroborate empirical findings that had already been 
observed qualitatively and contextualised through the process of conducting the entire 
nexus analysis.    
 
5.6. Nexus of practice: combining virtual and fieldwork ethnography  
In order to conform to Scollon and Scollon’s (2004) model of nexus analysis, researchers 
should be fully immersed in the environment studied. This ethnographic approach is 
essential in order to understand how discourse is constructed or challenged by the different 
actors involved in what they call the nexus of practices and to identify how the channel of 
communication may affect this process. In their work on the Alaskan Native population, 
Scollon and Scollon (2004) document both face-to-face and online interactions with 
participants. By doing so, they apply the ethnographic approach to both virtual and 
naturalistic settings.  
 
Accordingly, my research examines the evolution of the post-revolutionary debate online 
in relation to the way participants experienced it in the field. Mapping the debate across 
different blogs and social media between 2012 and 2013 involved following prominent 
activists on Twitter, identifying different social media campaigns, receiving regular 
notifications and archiving a considerable amount of sources. This constituted a virtual 
ethnography, thanks to which I became aware of revolutionaries’ vocabulary and identified 
key actors as well as major political issues commonly referred to by citizens and activists 
on social media. In this regard the fieldwork ethnography was complementary to the 
ethnography I had conducted online.  
 
  
 
 
85 
Unlike naturalistic ethnographic settings, virtual ethnography raises challenges with 
regards to the authenticity of the field (Hine, 2000; Turkle, 1995). Given that the 
ethnographer is not physically immersed in the environment of study, the identity of 
participants as well as the information they might share with the researcher remain 
questionable. Yet on the other hand, provided that the Internet constitutes a particular kind 
of social environment, the relationships and social practices that take shape in a virtual 
setting should still be considered as authentic.  
 
Depending on the object of the study, researchers might want to conduct face-to-face 
interviews in addition to their online ethnography, as a way to verify the authenticity of the 
field (Hine, 2000).  Yet the researcher has to be aware of the fact that those two settings 
constitute two different ethnographic fields, in which individuals may construct distinctive 
social realities that may or may not exclude each other. In other words, virtual ethnography 
should be applied to identify a new range of social practices, rather than as a way to assess 
whether virtual settings are representative of the offline world: 
This leaves us with a paradox: while pursuing face-to-face meetings with 
online informants might be intended to enhance authenticity via triangulation 
(Silverman, 1993; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995), it might also threaten the 
experiential authenticity that comes from aiming to understand the world the 
way it is for informants. Rather than accepting face-to-face as inherently better 
in ethnography, a more skeptical approach suggests that it should be used with 
caution, and with a sensitivity to the ways informants use it. (Hine, 2000: 49) 
Drawing on their ethnographic study of local activist networks and cyberactivism in 
Barcelona, Postill and Pink (2012) outline the reasons why combining virtual and 
fieldwork ethnography may however be relevant in the age of digital media: 
Hine has suggested that undertaking internet ethnography need not involve the 
ethnographer travelling physically to a field site (Hine, 2000: 43) when internet 
ethnography is focused around a certain media event (Hine calls it an ‘Internet 
Event’ (2000: 50). However, the issues that internet ethnography engages with 
can also become particularly relevant in relation to specific localities. Uses of 
social media can also be interwoven with the qualities, political structures and 
histories of localities or regions (Postill and Pink, 2012: 1) 
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On one hand, Postill and Pink acknowledge the contribution of Hine (2000) in postulating 
the validity of online-based ethnography as a textual practice disconnected from the field. 
Yet whereas this argument appeared to be particularly relevant in the age of Web 1.0, 
social media progressively bridged the gap between the offline and the virtual world. 
Today, social media may in fact be regarded as part of a complex “ethnographic place”, 
involving both online and offline practices. In that sense, these “ethnographic places” 
(Pink, 2009) are very similar to what Scollon and Scollon (2004) have conceptualised as a 
nexus of practices (2004): 
Many digital traces of the ethnographer (and ethnographic process) remain part 
of the internet (e.g., her/his social media engagements and online archiving 
practices), thus weaving a digital ethnographic place that is inextricable from 
both the materiality of being online and the offline encounters that are 
intertwined in its narratives. (Postill and Pink, 2012: 6) 
In this new generation of virtual ethnography, Postill and Pink identify a set of practices 
through which researchers can construct the ethnographic place. As soon as the 
ethnographer becomes involved in a specific network or field of interest online, he or she 
comes to follow Twitter users and receive regular email updates or Facebook notifications. 
Postill and Pink label this type of practice as “catching up” (ibid), as it enables the 
researcher to remain constantly informed and connected with the population observed.  
 
The ethnographer may also interact with participants via instant messaging, tweets and 
Facebook likes. Despite the fact that these types of interactions are sometimes 
asynchronous and considerably different from face-to-face communication, they help in 
understanding how virtual networks consolidate a social identity.  
 
Finally, Postill and Pink (2012) emphasise the importance of archiving via social media 
secured profiles or cloud platforms and by creating metadata that will enable the 
ethnographer to encode and ultimately analyse his or her experience. Overall, they argue 
that as social media and web applications are becoming a constitutive part of everyday life, 
virtual ethnography should not only be conducted simultaneously to face-to-face 
interviews, but may also employ different social platforms relevant to the research:   
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Social media ethnography, therefore, does not mean doing fieldwork in or 
about one particular social media platform – such as Facebook, Twitter or 
YouTube. While the latter is possible, it is complicated by the fact that most 
internet users constantly criss-cross a range of platforms through aggregators, 
search engines, hyperlinks and other devices. Moreover, the movement of the 
digital ethnographer involves traversing interrelated digital and co-present 
contexts, for example, sharing a bus ride with activists, a Facebook 
collaboration or a smartphone image over coffee. These field situations are 
neither communities nor networks – they are hybrid forms of sociality through 
which the ethnographer and her research participants gain variously mediated 
senses of contextual fellowship (Rapport and Amit, 2002). (Postill and Pink, 
2012: 11) 
This argument proves to be highly relevant when studying digital activism in Tunisia and 
Egypt, since earlier research has demonstrated that pro-revolutionary activism consisted in 
a dialogic relationship between online and offline political action. Furthermore, I would 
argue that in order to approach connectivity from a critical perspective, one should not 
entirely rely on online research methods. Conducting virtual ethnography across different 
social media and in addition to a traditional fieldwork helps to contextualise digital 
activism and encourages critical thinking about its impact on the circulation of discourse. 
 
5.7. Analysing the activist blogosphere: data set and method 
Analysing the activist blogosphere allowed me to identify some of the key events and 
controversies around which the post-revolutionary debate was articulated. This aspect of 
the research made me accustomed to the ideological vocabulary of the revolution. But 
most importantly, it demonstrated that pro-revolutionary activists had commonly 
experienced the feeling of loosing control over the narratives that surrounded the 
revolution over the months that followed the 2011 uprisings.  
 
After exploring the activist blogosphere in both countries, I selected six Tunisian and five 
Egyptian bloggers writing in Arabic, English and French. All bloggers were chosen for 
having significantly contributed to the revolutionary movement or being considered as 
prominent figures of the 2011 youth mobilisation. They had created and edited their blogs 
on a regular basis prior to the 2011 uprisings, which indicated they had been part of the 
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opposition, before the majority of the middle class and the international community 
manifested interest in local cyber-activism.  
 
All bloggers had participated to the revolutionary discourse in its early stage, as it was still 
emerging. Consequently, they were more likely to have experienced what I described 
earlier as a sense of intellectual leadership and were well-placed to witness an evolution in 
the way political institutions progressively interfered with participative deliberations. 
 
Admittedly, other prominent cyber-activists such as the famous Egyptian software 
developer Alaa Abdel Fatah, who had been blogging with his partner Manal since 2004, or 
Egyptian award-winning blogger SandMonkey could have been included in this sample. 
These activists had however become progressively more active on Twitter, sometimes 
publishing only very few blog articles after 2013. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
other significant bloggers could have been included in this selection and would have been 
as relevant to this study as the bloggers sampled.  
 
As I will argue in my first empirical chapter, this panel soon appeared to be representative 
of the multiplicity of voices and diversity of ideological views that composed the pro-
revolutionary community. However, I believe that the bloggers considered in my data set 
have expressed these divergences of opinion in a very subtle way. In spite of the fact that 
they often expressed very different visions of the revolution and disagreed regarding the 
strategies of the opposition, they did not always formally state to which ideological 
approach they belonged.  
 
As is shown in the table below (table 2), the sample included a different proportion of 
articles for each blog. Given the considerable amount of articles published during the 
period considered (2011-2014), blog posts were selected provided that they covered 
specific events or addressed a set of recurrent themes considered as relevant to my research 
questions.  
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A first category of writings relates to the 2012 presidential campaign or constitutional 
referendum.  Later articles may also report the controversy that led to the 2013 coup d’état, 
as opponents to Mohammed Morsi conducted the Tamarud mobilisation10.  Each of these 
events were regarded as highly pertinent to this research, since they had punctuated the 
post-revolutionary crisis in Egypt. In addition, I considered that these events, as narrated 
by bloggers, would help me set the context in which the data relating to each of my 
empirical strand had been collected.  
 
Another set of articles was considered as relevant for formulating a critique of traditional 
mass media as well as a reflection on the relationship between participative and old media. 
Finally, a third category of blogposts were included for outlining the way political 
institutions (leading parties, workers’ unions, governments and political officials) would 
portray themselves as they responded to protests or attempted to gain legitimacy in periods 
of election. I regarded this category as particularly relevant when it came to conceptualise 
the distinction between discourse and counter-discourse.  
 
Before running the analysis, blogposts were archived via the Zotero Firefox application, 
which creates live screenshots of a webpage. The application enabled me to store the entire 
content of a post in its original layout, including readers’ comments, hyperlinks and 
illustrations – while creating metadata for each of the webpages archived. The date of the 
archive as well as the original web address were automatically stored in my personal 
secured Zotero account. In addition, this tool allowed me to encode content published in 
Arabic. Thanks to Zotero, this data set could be stored for free provided that it did not 
extent to 300MB of data. Alternatively, the application would secure up to 2GB of data for 
$20 renewable on a yearly basis.  
 
Out of the ten bloggers considered for this sample, six were publishing under a 
pseudonym. Bloggers Wael Abbas, Yassin Ayari, Fares Mabrouk and Lina Ben Mhenni 
                                                10 Tamarud - which means rebellion in Arabic – was the name of the grassroots movement that led the 
opposition against Mohammed Morsi’s government in 2013. It launched a campaign and circulated a 
petition, which contributed to the success of the June 2013 protests.  
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made public appearances at conferences, public talks as well as in the media and had 
become public figures outside from the social media sphere. Political cartoonist  _Z_ 
attended public events abroad but kept publishing under a pseudonym.  
 
Table 2: Blogosphere data set 
 
 
As I argued when completing the institutionalised ethics process required for this research, 
bloggers had already been concerned with anonymising the data published on their 
webpages. All the publications posted online were already part of the public domain. In 
this regard, I was confident that my data set did not involve any additional risk and did not 
require me to filter traceable information.  
 
Some bloggers formally published a disclaimer and intellectual property statement, 
suggesting that all references to their work should be formally quoted. Legally as well as 
from an ethical perspective, I was responsible for referring to those writings as they had 
been released and labelled by their authors in the public domain. Furthermore, while 
running the analysis, I did not come across any critical information likely to harm or affect 
the privacy of any third party.  
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Table 3: Description of the Blogosphere Data Sample 1 
 
 
Among the 237 blog posts collected, some incorporated pictures, video footages (Wael 
Abbas and Zeinobia) and illustrations (_Z_). With the exception of Tunisian satirical 
cartoonist _Z_ , bloggers used visual media as a way to corroborate or illustrate their 
statements. Photos and video footages were then used as evidence or as supportive 
documents in any article written with an editorial tone or developing some form of 
investigative journalism.  
 
Pictures or footage would, for example, feature a TV campaign, which the writer regarded 
as particularly representative of the military propaganda in Egypt. Other videos filmed by 
the activists themselves, such as the ones published by bloggers Wael Abbas or Yassin 
Ayari, would directly evidence acts of police brutality or corruption. In my data set, only 
four publications consisted of video footage with no supportive text.  In this cases, 
however, the images were very factual and self-sufficient in outlining the object of the 
post.  
 
!
Blog Blogger Profile Blogging since Frequency of publications  
Al Wa'I al Masry 
 
Wael 
Abbas 
Egyptian activist and journalist well-known 
among the revolutionary community for 
denouncing acts of police brutality on his blog 
and is considered as one of leading voices of 
revolutionary cyber-activism in Egypt (still 
actively blogging in 2015). 
Apr-04 
One to several blog posts per 
month (video footages, 
hyperlinks, document and sources 
of investigative journalism)  
Egyptian chronicles Zeinobia  
Female Egyptian blogger covering political 
news in English and often quoted by foreign 
journalists. (Still actively blogging in 2015) 
Aug-04 
Writes an average of 60 blog 
articles per month between 
August 2004 and December 2013. 
Malhit Yassin Ayari 
Tunisian blogger and activist involved in the 
opposition against former Egyptian president 
Ben Ali. Yassin Ayari has been condemned and 
incarcerated in November 2014 after 
denouncing acts of corruption within the 
military administration. (Still actively blogging 
in 2015) 
Jul-10 
Writes an average of 3.1 blog 
articles per month between July 
2010 and December 2013. 
Behayya Behayya 
Egyptian blogger writing under a female 
pseudonym. Behayya has been covering the 
different stages of the political transition after 
2011 and provides considerable amount of 
information on the 2012 presidential campaign. 
(Still actively blogging) 
Mar-05 
Writes an average of 1.9-blog 
articles per month between March 
2005 and December 2013. 
Fares Mabrouk Blog Fares Mabrouk 
Young entrepreneur and former attaché in the 
Ministry of Energy and Industry in Tunisia. He 
studied in USA and advocates digital 
technologies as a way to stimulate local 
economy. (Still actively writing) 
May-08 
Writes an average of 0.6-blog 
articles per month between May 
2008 and December 2013. 
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Table 4: Description of the Blogosphere Data Sample 2 
 
 
Unlike other bloggers, Tunisian cartoonist  _Z_ primarily expressed himself visually. 
Although his texts further elaborated on the meaning of his illustrations, the substance of 
his statements resided essentially in his drawings. The 107 publications sampled from his 
blog would therefore require combining semiotic with discursive analysis.  
 
5.8. Applying data visualisation tools to map the 2012 presidential 
campaign (Egypt) 
As witnessed by bloggers and revolutionary activists, the post-revolutionary debate soon 
became codified in the context of the first presidential election in Egypt (2012). Political 
leaders and parties willing to gain or regain their legitimacy stepped into the political 
scene, labelling the debate with their names and slogans. Different narratives of the 
revolution were progressively marketed in order to promote competing political agendas. 
This became particularly visible online as these labels were likely to induce a trend in 
terms of tweets or search keywords.  
 
!
Blog Blogger   Profile Blogging since Frequency of publications  
A Tunisian Girl Lina Ben Mhenni 
Famous Tunisian female blogger, activist and assistant 
lecturer in linguistics at Tunis University. The Blogger is 
nominated to the Nobel Peace Price for her engagement 
in the Tunisian revolution (Still actively blogging in 
2015) 
Jun-09 
Writes an average of 14 blog 
articles per month between 
June 2009 and December 
2013. 
UnderAshes UnderAshes 
Tunisian blogger member of the association Tunis al 
Fata and the movement of young Tunisians. (Still 
actively blogging in 2015) 
Dec-07 
Writes an average of 1.67 
blog articles per month 
between December 2007 and 
December 2013. 
Débat Tunisie  _Z_ 
Tunisian caricaturist illustrating the news by posting 
series of satirical and controversial drawings or short 
comments. Publishes his work (online and print 
publications) under a pseudonym. (Still actively writing 
and drawing in 2015)  
Aug-07 
One to ten blog post per 
month on average (drawing 
and comments) 
The Big Pharaoh The Big Pharaoh 
Egyptian blogger covering political news, revolutionary 
protests and clashes with the police or the Christian 
minority; comments political news from the perspective 
of Cairo's distinctive districts. (Still actively blogging in 
2015).    
Apr-04 
Writes an average of 12.3 
blog articles per month 
between April 2004 and 
December 2013. 
Fustat Ibn ad Dunya 
Egyptian blogger providing alternative news coverage, 
outlining propagandist statements and denouncing abuse 
of power from the military regime; covers local news in 
English for international audience (last blog posts in 
2013).  
May-05 One to ten blog posts per months 
NoMemorySpace Slim Amamou 
Tunisian blogger and former Secretary of State for Sport 
and Youth (under 2011 transitional government) 
Jul-10 
Writes an average of 0.19 
blog post per month between 
2011 and 2012 
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Whereas most of the studies conducted at the time of the uprisings had portrayed the 
Internet as a tool for the pro-revolutionary youth, it was now crucial to assess the presence 
of traditional political actors on social media. Along with the election of a new parliament 
in 2011– which was dissolved in June 2012 – the 2012 presidential race arose as social 
media began to be regarded as a potentially strong political tool. The campaign occurred in 
a period of increasing social media usage and as people recovered an interest in politics. It 
was therefore very likely to have raised the interest of parties and political leaders in social 
media. Presidential candidates in particular were potentially keen to campaign online, 
especially when targeting the middle class and pro-revolutionary opposition.  
 
In the context of the 2012 presidential election, my third empirical strand was designed to 
determine to what extent those political leaders had become more active and visible online. 
This approach aimed at responding to my first research question in evaluating whether 
social media had become a tool for more institutional forms of politics.  
 
Two different data visualisation tools were used to assess the visibility of the five 
candidates leading the first round of the 2012 presidential race.  The first application, 
called R-Shief, was used to assess the visibility of the five candidates on Twitter during the 
first round of the election.  
 
R-Shief11 is an open source project founded by Laila Shereen Sakr in 2009 and designed to 
offer various data visualisation applications for researchers working on social media and 
global media activism. It initiated a range of studies conducted in the field of politics and 
media studies in collaboration with the American University in Cairo and is currently 
developing new data visualisation tools, which will be applicable across various social 
media platforms.  
 
This media lab provides access to a considerably large database of tweets published in 
Arabic and in English between 2008 and 2013. It also offers various data visualisation and 
                                                11 http://r-shief.org/ 
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sentiment analysis applications thanks to which researchers can evaluate the volume and 
popularity of a tweet over a specific period of time.  
 
By examining the volume of tweets mentioning the names of the leading presidential 
candidates over the first round of the campaign, this tool allowed me to identify which of 
the presidential candidates were more visible on Twitter. Simultaneously, I collected all 
tweets posted from candidates’ official Twitter accounts during this period in order to 
determine which candidates had been the most active on Twitter.  
 
On the basis of the presidential candidates and their distinctive programme, this allowed 
me to determine which political agendas were more represented online and which political 
elites had invested in this new form of campaigning. Most importantly, this approach 
confirmed that some of the leading political actors, who were barely active online prior to 
the revolution, were now increasingly visible on social media. 
 
The analysis conducted on my Twitter data set corroborated the findings of a study I had 
conducted for an ESRC research project and in which I investigated how Egyptian Google 
users sought information during the presidential campaign 
(https://voterecology.wordpress.com/). The Voter Ecology project investigated voters’ use 
of search engines in election periods and across four different countries: the United States 
and the United Kingdom, Italy and post-revolutionary Egypt. This cross-country study 
aimed at determining whether Google users’ search interests reflected the traditional mass 
media coverage at the time of a campaign by identifying unexpected search terms, which 
had not been inspired by mass media narratives. The methodology applied for this research 
relied on the data visualisation application Google Trends. This freely available tool 
enables any user to visualise variations of search volume for a specific term and to 
compare up to five different Google search terms over a specific period of time from 2004 
onwards.  
 
This method allows the extrapolation of the evolution of Google users’ interest in a 
particular search term during the course of a campaign. Search trends can be filtered to 
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target one specific location. Google Trends generates graphs that represent variations in the 
search volume of the chosen keyword or set of keywords over time. Thus it does not 
provide raw search data, but computes instead a search popularity index from 0 to 100, 
where 100 represents the highest number of searches in the series and all other values are 
calculated in relation to that value. In addition, Google Trends also provides a list of 
additional search terms that are most frequently associated by users with those in question. 
The scale of search volume depends on the set of search terms compared in the same graph 
and the exact amount of searches remains private to Google. 
 
As I investigated the Egyptian case for the purposes of this research, I came to compare the 
popularity of the candidates’ names in terms of Google searches over the first round of the 
presidential campaign. This further illustrated the findings of my R-Shief computation, 
suggesting that the most visible and popular candidates on Twitter were also the ones for 
whom Egyptian citizens searched for information online. And as mentioned above, this 
evidenced the fact that the internet and social media were no longer used exclusively by 
the pro-revolutionary opposition.  
 
These findings had to be analysed in relation to the way traditional mass media reported 
the campaign. For this, I applied a similar computation to quantify the amount of 
occurrences that could be found for the names of the five leading candidates on the 
NexisLexis news database. The NexisLexis news database provided me with access to a 
selection of 37 Egyptian general news sources likely to have reported the campaign 
between the 1st March and 22nd May 2012 (cf. Appendix). Within this sample of the 
Egyptian press, four newspapers proved to have recurrently mentioned the names of the 
five candidates in reporting the first round of the presidential race: Al Messa (Arabic), Al-
Ahram, Al-Ahram Gate (Arabic) and Al Gomhurriah (Arabic).    
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Table 5: Sample of Egyptian newspapers extracted from the NexisLexis database 
 
Together, the searches computed on R-Shief, Google Trends and the Nexis Lexis database 
provided me with an overview of the most mediatized candidates and political groups in 
the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. Furthermore, this led me to identify which political 
actors may have been more visible on the internet and social media than in the national 
press.  
 
News sources extracted from the NexisLexis database and mentioning the names of 
the five leading candidates during the first round of the 2012 presidential campaign 
Newspaper Content-Summary Frequency/Update-Schedule 
Al Messa 
(Arabic) 
Evening newspaper covering politics, 
society and sport.  
 
 
Irregular/Updated regularly - 
Atypical update schedule 
Al-Ahram 
Most widely circulated Arabic 
language daily newspaper in Egypt, 
published by Al-Ahram Publishing. 
Al-Ahram covers Egyptian politics, 
international news, economy, sports, 
crime, culture, science and 
environment. 
Daily; Monday – 
Sunday/Updated regularly - 
Atypical update schedule 
Al-Ahram Gate 
(Arabic) 
 
News portal from Al-Ahram 
Publishing, which covers Egyptian 
politics, International news, business, 
opinion, arts & culture, sports, 
lifestyle, fashion. 
Daily; Monday - 
Sunday/Updated regularly - 
Atypical update schedule 
Al Gomhurriah 
(Arabic) 
Newspaper covering news, politics, 
business, sports, entertainment, 
culture and society. 
 
Irregular/Updated regularly - 
Atypical update schedule 
!
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Finally, in order to assess candidates’ visibility and campaigning strategy in relation with 
their respective political programme, I collected all tweets produced by the two candidates 
who appeared to be the most active on Twitter. All the tweets considered in this additional 
data set were produced over the first round of the presidential race and archived in my 
Zotero Firefox secured account. I then proceeded to a thematic and discourse analysis of 
the tweets in order to identify which aspects of the campaign had been emphasised by 
these two political actors. This rather alternative approach not only allowed me to 
understand candidates’ Twitter campaigning strategy in a more qualitative way. Most 
importantly, however, it demonstrated that the Internet and social media were now serving 
the interests of the counter-revolution as well as to consolidate the revolutionary 
opposition.    
 
Overall, this empirical strand led me to reflect on how the revolution, as much as the 
presidential campaign, had been semantically encoded via applications such as Twitter or 
Google. This had inevitably contributed to make the revolutionary vocabulary fluid and 
superficial. The same words that had driven the revolutionary movement were now serving 
different political agendas, which could potentially explain the failure of pro-
revolutionaries in the 2012 presidential race.  
 
5.9. Analysing the 2012 constitutional debate (Egypt): the Dostour 
Sharek e-consultation platform  
The Dostour Sharek website was designed by an external software engineering company 
for the interim government. This social platform aimed at providing an interactive 
environment for citizens to comment on and rate the drafts of the new constitution 
developed by the Constituent Assembly before the referendum of 2012. In December 2012, 
designers released the statistics of the project, which indicated that 653,718 contributions 
from 68,130 participants had been made to the draft of the constitution, among which 12% 
were in comments and the other 88% were ratings (“likes”/”dislikes”).  
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According to this statistical report, the large majority of rates assigned by users were 
“likes” (89%). The most commented and ranked articles addressed the themes of public 
authority and rights and freedom and the amount of contributions raised between 
September and November 2012. Most participants were located in the largest Egyptian 
cities, such as Cairo, Giza, Tanta, Port Said, Alexandria, Mansoura and Suez. Outside 
Egypt, more than 5,500 participants originated from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the 
Emirates. 1,313 visitors were located in the United States. Only 14% of participants were 
females aged on average 24 to 44. The majority of male participants were aged 24 to 34.  
 
The most contested article in terms of comments and dislikes was article 2, which had been 
reviewed and further explained in a reviewed version of the article produced by the 
Constituent Assembly.  
 
Table 6: Statistics released on the Dostour Sharek website after the 2012 referendum 
Dostour Sharek Statistics  
Total amount of contributions 653,718 
Comments on constitution articles 75,626 
likes/dislikes 578,092 
Total amount of participants 68,130 
Final draft downloads 6,336,947 
Number of participants on final draft 35,697 
Contributions on final draft 279,060 
Source: www.dostour.eg/sharek; Contributions Statistics on 2012 Constitutional Article 
 
The data set analysed in my third empirical chapter was collected from the archives of the 
independent web design company in charge of creating and administering the Dostour 
Sharek e-consultation platform, for the 2012 Constitutional referendum. Out of the 320 
articles originally drafted by the constituent assembly, designers gave me access to the 
archives of the posts and comments relating to the first 30 articles of the draft. This 
considerable amount of data was manually recorded via the Zotero Firefox application.  
 
Whereas the application presented substantial advantages when organising the data set, 
collecting the data manually proved to be a very time consuming process. Indeed, when 
applying Zotero, users have to scroll down to the bottom of a webpage, while opening 
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every window that might exceed a certain amount of words by post in order to record the 
entire content. Consequently, archiving a social media page containing several thousands 
of comments requires a lot of time for users to make this information visible as well as for 
the software to process and record it.  
 
This tool however enabled me to file different samples of comments for each of the 29 
articles analysed, varying from 10 to 109 posts, which represented on average 63% of the 
comments published for each of these articles. In total 1, 317 comments were analysed and 
classified into different categories for each article, depending on the topic addressed and 
the argument formulated by users.  
 
The approach applied in this empirical chapter draws on a set of studies conducted in the 
field of e-governance and e-democracy, which were designed to analyse similar e-
consultation projects (Chatfiel and Alhujran, 2009; Saebo, Rose and Molka-Danielsen, 
2010; Glassey and Leresche, 2012).  Whereas the statistics issued by the Dostour Sharek 
platform only assessed participants’ approval by computing the number of “likes” and 
“dislikes” for each article, my content analysis categorises participants’ comments. 
Independently from the number of “likes” and “dislikes” posted, I distinguished the 
comments that formally contested the content of the draft from those that explicitly 
approved the article. In addition, I considered a third category, which included all the posts 
in which participants discussed the content of the draft in a critical way, by justifying their 
views or questioning certain aspects of the articles (cf. Appendices). 
 
My content analysis identifies recurrent comments and assessed to what extent users would 
reach a consensus when reviewing the constitutional draft. By doing so, it enabled me to 
highlight major differences in the way citizens interpreted the concepts formulated during 
the revolution as they would materialise in constitutional law. Most importantly, it led me 
to discuss the question of sustainability from a particular angle. 
 
Indeed, by focusing on how social media had been used to generate direct interactions 
between citizens and government officials, I came to reflect on the third quarter of the 
  
 
 
100 
discursive cycle: the stage during which the revolutionary discourse is likely to become 
institutionalised. This part of my research proved to be essential when it came to determine 
the reasons why the revolutionary counter-discourse was not sustainable. As I will show, it 
demonstrated that the ideological vocabulary of the revolution had remained fluid in the 
context of the 2012 constitutional debate.  
 
Table 7: Description of the data set extracted from the Dostour Sharek e-consultation platform (2012) 
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Given the fact that each of the draft articles considered generated a different amount of 
comments, the proportion of the comments sampled varies depending on the article. 
Among the 29 sets of comments collected, the 57 posts extracted from article number 2 of 
the draft only constituted 0.4% of users’ inputs. However, article 2 had proved to be the 
most controversial as well as the most discussed article, generating a total of 15,769 
comments according to Dostour Sharek’s statistics.  
 
Table 8: Inventory of comments sampled for each constitutional article  
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In order to have access to the entire set of comments posted at the time of the constitutional 
debate, the data were collected after the 2012 referendum. The data sample was retrieved 
and archived between September and October 2013, as the web design company in charge 
of editing the Dostour Sharek platform was launching a new version of the project to cover 
the January 2014 referendum.  
 
The company in question provided me with access to all the comments posted on the 2012 
version of the constitutional draft, which were no longer public and could not be accessed 
via the official Dostour Sharek webpage. The web designers in charge of the project were 
therefore informed of my study and kindly allowed me to use their own archives to run my 
analysis.  
 
Table 9: Interview with members of the Dostour Sharek e-consultation project 
Draft of the questionnaires used as a guide to the qualitative interview (submitted to the 
University of Glasgow College of Social Sciences’ Ethics committee in September 2014) 
 
1. Did the 2012 constituent assembly have specific expectations regarding the design of the 
Dostour Sharek platform?  
2. How did you start developing user interface?  
3. How were users’ comments aggregated and presented to the constituent assembly? 
4. How many updates were uploaded to the constitutional draft when the 2012 Dostour Sharek 
platform was active? 
5. How were the “top three comments” selected for each constitutional article selected? 
6. What was the average number of Unique Visitors for each constitutional article posted?  
7. Did some constitutional articles reach a substantially higher amount of Unique Visitors as 
others? 
8. Which article generated the highest amount of visits? 
9. Which article generated the highest amount of contributions? 
10. Did you consider enabling users to respond to each other’s comments when designing the 
platform? 
11. How did you notify people, when the draft of a constitutional article had been updated? 
12. Did many users revisit the pages of the constitutional articles that had been reviewed and 
updated on the Dostour Sharek website. 
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5.10. Face to face interviews with key actors involved in the Dostour 
Sharek project 
Approaching the designers also allowed me to obtain additional information on the process 
through which the e-consultation project had been initiated and administered. Apart from 
the statistics delivered by the website and the name of the web designing company, no 
additional information could be found on the implementation of the project. Yet, for the 
purpose of this research, it was crucial to identify which and whose political interests lay 
behind this initiative. Not only would this enable me to set the context in which this 
particular form of online deliberation took place, but it would also help me to understand 
whether it had contributed to the institutionalisation of the revolution.  
 
For the same reason, I was also very keen to find out how and according to which 
regulations the architecture of the social platform had been designed. This was essential for 
me to determine which aspects of the debate were induced by its technological format and 
what was specific to contributors’ input. For this purpose, I conducted a face-to-face 
interview with two stakeholders involved in the implementation of the 2012 Dostour 
Sharek project during the course of my fieldwork.  
 
One interview was originally scheduled with a member of the web designing company 
commissioned by the Constituent Assembly to develop the platform. Prior to this 
interview, this participant (Nouredin) spontaneously contacted me and proposed to 
introduce me to one of the government officers (Said) who had collaborated on the 
implementation of the project within the Constituent Assembly. The first part of the 
interview was then conducted with my original participant. The second participant, Said, 
was interviewed afterwards and was asked further questions on the position of the 
Constituent Assembly regarding the project and the way the former government had 
conducted the campaign in favour of the referendum.  
 
This qualitative interview involved a different questionnaire to the one applied for the 
ethnography and was specifically intended to outline the conditions in which the project 
had been initiated. However, as I will argue in my fourth empirical chapter, although this 
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questionnaire was designed to contextualise the 2012 constitutional debate, participants’ 
experience appeared to be highly relevant to the entire ethnography. For this reason, Said’s 
and Nouredin’s statements are referred to in my third as much as in my fourth empirical 
chapter.  
 
5.11. Fieldwork ethnography: recruiting participants and facing the 
ethical challenges 
The fieldwork took place between September and November 2014 in affiliation with the 
American University in Cairo. Twenty participants were interviewed for this study, among 
which eighteen were recruited through a snowballing method. The first participants were 
introduced to me thanks to a network of fellow researchers, who had already been 
conducting studies on the field. Out of the nineteen meetings conducted for this 
ethnography, only sixteen led to formal interview recorded and reported in the interviews 
transcripts. Five additional appointments were conducted as informal conversations and 
documented as such.  
 
The sample of participants recruited included highly-educated middle class citizens 
between 20 to 50 years old. Among the twenty informants I interacted with, seven were 
left wing pro-revolutionary activists involved in opposition movements or working for 
human rights advocacy NGOs. Five of these seven activists were still applying social 
media on a regular basis to promote their political activities. Five other participants were 
journalists or editorial writers working or occasionally writing for private news outlets and 
three others were members of officially recognised post-revolutionary parties, involved in 
more institutional forms of politics. Three additional interviewees were not directly 
involved in the political debate and did not claim to belong to a specific political camp. 
These three participants can be characterised as regular social media users, commonly 
applying digital devices for personal and social purposes.  
 
As I will argue when addressing ethical considerations, it can be acknowledged that this 
sample is not fully representative of the heavily polarised political environment in Egypt. 
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Overall, the most politically engaged participants belonged to the left-wing opposition. 
Only two interviewees introduced themselves to me as liberals and no member of the 
traditionalist parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi movements was recruited. 
This was partly due to the fact that the Islamist opposition suffered from a high level of 
repression over the months that followed the 2013 coup and proved to be, therefore, hardly 
willing to participate to this research. In addition, the snowballing method also contributed 
to recruit participants with similar ideological views. As a result, it should be said that the 
findings of this ethnography might have been partially biased by the lack of 
representativeness of my sample. Nevertheless, it could be argued that left-wing pro-
revolutionaries were more likely to formulate a critical reflection on the outcome of the 
revolution, given that, unlike traditionalists and pro-militaries, most of them did not belong 
to a long-established political institution.     
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Table 10: Interviews conducted as part of the fieldwork ethnography  
Draft of the questionnaires used as a guide to the qualitative interview (submitted to the 
University of Glasgow College of Social Sciences Ethics committee in September 2014) 
 
1. In your opinion, who started using social media as well as other participative tools to discuss 
about politics in Egypt? 
 
2. In your opinion, what was the characteristic of this early form of social media use? 
 
3. In what way was this early form of social media use different from the way mainstream media 
and political institutions covered politics before the 2011 uprisings? 
 
4. How do you think the application of social media and other participative media evolved over 
the months that followed the 2011 uprisings? 
 
5. How might the category or diversity of political actors involved in the participative debate 
have changed between 2011 and 2013 (online as well as offline)? 
 
6. How do you think that the debate and the dominant political arguments may have evolved 
between 2011 and 2013 (online as well as offline)? 
 
7. In your opinion, how and when did official political institutions became active online and in 
the broader debate that was initiated by the revolution? 
 
8. Do you think that the arguments and tools used for revolutionary discourse have also been 
employed to promote the discourse of the counter-revolution and if so, in what ways? 
 
9. What did activists and grass-roots movements learn from the experience of using social media 
(or network activism) in Egypt? 
 
10.  Is there a clear relationship between reliance on social media activism by movements, and 
the control they have over their political message? 
 
11. Which political actors involved in the debate between 2011 and 2013 do you think benefitted 
most and least from social media activism over the short and the longer terms? 
 
12. From your perspective on the revolutionary process, what overall were the biggest 
advantages and disadvantages of the use of social media activism in Egypt? 
 
13. What alternative forms of political engagement might have been more productive than social 
media activism? 
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A set of informal conversations was conducted over the first week of the fieldwork in order 
to build trust and introduce myself to participants. This was also intended to experience 
how participants from different political perspectives might react to the questionnaire and 
identify any questions that might be received as too controversial. By the end of the first 
week, the draft of the questionnaire was slightly refined and the final version was sent to 
the ethics committee before being approved by my supervisor.  
 
The ethnography generated considerable ethical concerns, given the instability of the 
political context in Egypt. Some participants known as opponents of the military regime 
were facing risks of being investigated by the authorities. Over the months that preceded 
the fieldwork, the new military elite had proved to be extremely repressive with any 
member of the activist community considered as likely to affect the image of the new 
military regime vis-à-vis international public opinion. Since 2012, the government had 
released television advertisements warning citizens not to divulge information to 
foreigners12, portraying them as potential spies and enemies of the state.  
 
The environment required handling all the data collected with particular care in order to 
preserve the anonymity of informants, as both participants and myself could have been 
identified or tracked. Despite the ethics approval procedure I had to go through prior to the 
fieldwork, I was not able to fully forecast the measures that could be taken to prevent those 
risks.  
 
My academic advisor at the American University in Cairo (AUC) suggested during our 
first meeting that participants themselves would be better suited to assess potential risks 
and know how to prevent them. I would then have to refer to their experiences of and 
follow their recommendations on how to create the safest environment for the interviews. 
Although I came to the same conclusion after conducting this ethnography, I became 
concerned that this approach would inevitably affect my ethical responsibility. 
  
                                                12 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/12/beware-foreign-spies-egypt-warns-ads 
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Table 11: Sample of Participants 
 
Pseudonym Profile 
Mukhtar 
40-something Marxist involved a post-revolutionary left 
wing party. Social media activist, who occasionally writes 
editorials for the press. 
Muna 
Employee of a private media group, working for a prominent 
TV channel 
Yasmeen 
Social media activist, who contributed to several campaigns 
and mobilisations and engaged in a human rights advocacy 
organisation. 
Nadim 
(Christian) Activist and editorial writer with an extended 
network among the left wing activist community. 
Nouredin 
Software designer and entrepreneur involved in the Dostour 
Sharek project. 
Said 
Civil Servant who contributed to communicate the 2012 
constitutional draft and promote citizens’ participation to the 
2012 referendum 
Farid 
Human right advocate involved in several humanitarian 
projects and actively using social media to promote his 
activity. 
Zakaria Member of one of the post-revolutionary civil parties.  
Mehdi 
Young revolutionary activist affiliated to one of the post-
revolutionary civil party and involved in several students’ 
mobilisations.  
Tariq 
(Christian) Representative of the young middle class not 
affiliated to any specific political movement but sympathiser 
of the revolution.  
Amir 
Middle class liberal political scientist occasionally writing 
for foreign press and independent news outlets.  
Samira 
Middle class liberal secularist writing for foreign press and 
independent news outlets. 
Khalil 
Journalist in charge of developing the online edition of a 
private Egyptian newspaper. 
Elias Marxist and left wing activist involved in the 2011 uprisings. 
Samy 
40-something member of the middle class not involved in 
politics. 
Nabil 
30-Something parliamentary candidate involved in politics 
over the two years that preceded the fieldwork. 
Informal conversation 1 
Press and communication officer of a foreign embassy with 
an extended network among the bloggers and activists 
Informal conversation 2 
50-something member of a post-revolutionary Civil party. 
Left-wing secularist. 
Informal conversation 3 
Lower middle class member of the 2011 revolutionary 
mobilisation and founder of an emerging party. 
Informal conversation 4  Communication officer of a human right advocacy NGO !
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Prior to the fieldwork, I had been informally advised by a fellow researcher who had been 
conducting interviews and living in Cairo for the past three years. The researcher in 
question emphasised the challenges caused by the political repression, stating that foreign 
researchers were now commonly considered as a threat, due to the conspiracy theory 
initiated by the state. Given the circumstances, she advised me to collect informed consent 
orally and avoid using any written documents attesting to my research activities. For 
example, this involved delivering the content of the Plain language statement orally. Such 
advice led me to think that the common ethical procedure was inappropriate, in case of a 
conflict of interest between participants and local authorities.  
 
In accordance with what was suggested by my AUC advisors, fellow researchers and 
participants themselves, fourteen out the twenty interviews and informal conversations 
were set in coffee shops located in middle class areas. Three of them took place in 
interviewees’ private homes and three others were conducted in their work places. As 
required by the ethics committee regulations, I informed all participants of my institutional 
affiliations, commented on the purpose of my research and discussed any potential risks 
with them. Interviewees were also informed that their identity would never be disclosed. 
All participants interviewed provided oral informed consent.  
 
Surprisingly, some of them asked me for further information about the reasons for such 
ethical measures, sometimes questioning the need for anonymising the data. Some 
interviewees who were well known among the activist community for publically 
expressing their political views on social media and the independent press claimed that 
they would not mind being identified in my research. I informed them that my commitment 
with the ethical committees of the academic institutions hosting the study required me to 
remove names or personal information relating to all participants.  
 
As stated in the form submitted for ethical approval prior to the fieldwork, the ethnography 
also involved limiting any electronic interactions with participants that might be tracked 
online. Indeed, as the research aimed at developing a critical perspective on social media 
activism, I argued that my critical approach should be applied precisely when designing 
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the research in order to preserve participants’ anonymity. For this reason, I intended to 
contact participants via text messaging and private or professional email channels, 
avoiding public social media platforms and Gmail applications likely to be monitored by 
security agencies.  
 
Yet despite the information provided in the Plain Language Statement, participants 
spontaneously sent me Facebook friend invitations or tagged me in Facebook posts. In 
spite of the fact that many of them admitted to being aware of the risk of being monitored 
online, they argued that social media remained one of their main channels of 
communication. As they kept using it to disseminate their views and cover their political 
activities, they considered it as a way to provide me with an insight into their experiences 
of the technology.  
 
Ironically, then, the publicity versus the confidentiality of my involvement in the field was 
beyond my control as a result of the sociological phenomenon that I intended to 
investigate. Informants discussed their participation in this research with other members of 
the activist community, with reference to my name. As I recruited new participants, three 
weeks after the beginning of the fieldwork, I was surprised to learn that they had already 
heard about me from some of the interviewees I had already met.  
 
Once again, this was due to the rapidity with which information spreads among the activist 
Egyptian middle class, which partly constituted the object of my study. But most 
importantly, it highlighted the fact that the ethics procedure was less applicable in a 
context in which gaining public recognition was considered as more valuable and 
empowering than preserving one’s privacy. Indeed, many militants had put their personal 
lives at risk purposefully to pursue revolutionary action and would often see private and 
social interests as conflicting.   
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This also made me aware that some of the interviewees felt very much invested in the 
process of being interviewed. While I was concerned about my ethical responsibility as a 
researcher, many participants demonstrated their political engagement through the way 
they shared their experiences of the revolution. They appeared to be very conscious of the 
fact that their testimony would shape my perception of the field. In that respect, interviews 
were often approached as a continuation of their everyday political engagement.  
 
Whereas the ethics procedure had specifically trained me to think in terms of my ethical 
obligation vis-à-vis my participants, interviewees saw themselves as partly responsible for 
the contribution that this research was likely to bring to the literature on the revolution. 
Overall, my ability to ensure that all formal ethical measures would be applied was 
considerably limited. As they did not dissociate their participation in this study from their 
political activism, some participants were ready to face the same risks that they already 
faced in their everyday lives in order to communicate their political message. I had to rely 
on their experience of the field to anticipate any security issues and determine whether the 
environment in which interviews were conducted would be appropriate.  
 
However relevant the formal ethical procedure was from the perspective of the 
University’s legal obligations and institutional framework, it initially led me to 
overestimate my leeway and assigned me with a level of control that I did not have in 
practice. The reality of the field was that, however cautious and solicitous I was in 
ensuring safety and privacy for interviewees and for myself, I was entirely dependent on 
my interviewees to anticipate the risks and decide whether those risks should be taken.  
 
5.12. Limitations of the research 
The first limitation of this research lies in the fact that the online ethnography could not be 
conducted in Tunisia. Recruiting potential participants online and from abroad appeared to 
be considerably challenging. However, from a methodological perspective, this 
demonstrated that a virtual ethnography, when it is not supported by fieldwork, is not 
always appropriate to building trust with participants. This is also the case when social 
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media constitutes the environment in which the population observed was originally 
formed.  
 
To some extent, the challenges I had to face when recruiting participants virtually in 
Tunisia could also be interpreted as a sign of the evolution of digital activism into a 
mainstream communication channel. Indeed, when analysing the blogosphere, as well as 
during the fieldwork conducted in Egypt, cyber-activists expressed the fact that blogs and 
social media could no longer be exclusively regarded as the media of the opposition. Since 
the uprisings, they had become aware that social media were now monitored or infiltrated 
by private agents from different political groups (Legan electrony13). As the cyberspace 
was becoming more representative of the political debate occurring offline in all its 
diversity, members of the opposition would inevitably become as mistrustful online as they 
had to be in real life. In this respect, I suggest that the difficulties I came across when 
conducting my virtual ethnography in Tunisia are also revealing of what I will describe as 
the alienation of the revolution. This however, is only a supposition, which should be 
tested by verifying whether a similar virtual ethnography would have been more successful 
over the years that preceded the revolution.  
 
5.13. Conclusion to methodology 
Each of the four empirical strands that compose this data set enabled me to witness the 
alienation of the revolution from a different angle. Together, they allowed me to articulate 
the evolution of the narratives that surrounded the revolution chronologically, from the 
first presidential election to the constitutional referendum that unleashed the 2013 military 
coup in Egypt.  
 
Applying data visualisation significantly enhanced my knowledge of the vocabulary 
(semantics) through which the post-revolutionary debate had been encoded online. In order 
to identify some of the key words and hashtags through which the 2012 presidential debate 
                                                13 “Legan electrony” is the term used by Egyptians to designate agents hired by different political groups to 
influence public debate by spreading rumours and controversies on social media  
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had been codified, I had to further investigate which aspects of the campaign had 
potentially affected public opinion.  
 
The main limitation of this approach lies in the fact that, while being virtually immersed in 
the presidential or constitutional debate, I was unable to relate this to my own socio-
political environment. This was precisely what my fieldwork ethnography intended to 
rectify. Yet from a methodological perspective, this argument may contribute to the debate 
on the validity of virtual ethnography. As many have already argued (Hine, 2000; Postill 
and Pink, 2012), online ethnography is undeniably relevant, when researchers intend to 
understand a social reality that is exclusively constructed in a virtual space. However, this 
may not be sufficient when the socio-political factors studied operate in an environment 
which is different from that of the researcher (O’Connor et al. 2008: 280-281).  
 
With this in mind, my fieldwork allowed me to confront my perception of the field, as it 
had been framed by my virtual ethnography. Informally interacting with Egyptians, 
witnessing the physical presence of the army, being surrounded by displays of pro-
revolutionary art gave me access to broader range of mediums through which both 
discourse and counter-discourse had been mediatized.  
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6. First empirical analysis: across the activist blogosphere  
In this chapter, I will set out the results of the CDA I conducted on a sample of blog posts 
collected from the Tunisian and Egyptian activist blogospheres between 2011 and 2013. 
Although this analysis centres on the pro-revolutionary opposition, it remains critical in 
that it contributes to identify how different instances of discourse were competing for 
leadership over the months that followed the 2011 uprisings.  
 
On the one hand, this chapter analyses how leading political institutions attempted at 
regaining legitimacy on the political scene, as this was reported by bloggers within the 
opposition. On the other hand, it demonstrates that revolutionary bloggers originally 
benefitted from a form of intellectual leadership, which is similar to what Habermas 
(1962) described in the model of the bourgeois public sphere. This was however not 
sufficient to consolidate a sustainable counter-discourse, for they suddenly became 
deprived of intellectual leadership, as soon as a broader range of political actors become 
involved in the revolutionary debate.  
 
To perform this analysis, I will first set out the context in which Tunisian and Egyptian 
bloggers report the post-revolutionary debate and feature this particular type of counter-
discourse. I will discuss the function of revolutionary blog posts and comment on the tone 
and discursive strategies that characterise this form of writing. I will then explore two 
circumstances, in which revolutionaries across the blogosphere manifest the feeling of 
losing control over the narrative of the revolution. On one hand, I will explore what 
bloggers describe as an “institutionalisation” of the revolution. I will demonstrate that 
bloggers commonly witness the fact that leading political institutions strategically attempt 
at distorting the narrative of the revolution to their advantages.  
 
On the other hand, I will show that, in bloggers’ terms, the revolutionary movement is also 
affected by the process through which the revolution becomes mainstream. Yet unlike the 
institutionalisation process, this phenomenon, which I will refer to as mainstreaming, 
spontaneously emanates from the revolutionary movement. It announces the transition 
period during which the revolution ceases to be a counter-discourse to potentially become 
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another political discourse. As a result, it generates strong divisions among pro-
revolutionaries, while rendering the revolutionary debate more chaotic and highly likely to 
be manipulated.  
 
Overall, I will demonstrate that bloggers agree that digital media contributed to both the 
institutionalisation and mainstreaming of the revolution. I will show that cyber-activists 
themselves came to formulate a critique of cyber-activism as they witnessed the failure of 
the revolution over the months that followed the 2011 uprisings.  
 
This chapter will provide answers to each of my three research questions, from the 
perspective of pro-revolutionary activists. It will lead me to comment on how digital media 
activism affected the first half of the discursive cycle, which I have conceptualised in 
relation to both Habermas’ (1962) and Fraser’s (1990) model of the public sphere. In doing 
so, it will show how connectivity alters the transformation of counter-discourses into 
sustainable political powers. 
  
6.1. Intellectual leadership across the activist blogosphere 
Before entering into this analysis, I shall elaborate on the reasons why the blogosphere 
appears to be an appropriate field to study the circulation of discourses. This will lead me 
to clarify the notions of intellectual leadership and institutionalisation versus 
mainstreaming of the revolution.  
 
In my theoretical chapter, I identified two conceptions of web-activism that rely on two 
different structures through which discourses/counter-discourses are formed. On one hand, 
the Habermasian model suggests that the public sphere is shaped by an elite of critical 
thinkers exercising intellectual leadership over public opinion. I proposed that this theory 
was not entirely antithetical to Fraser’s critique of the public sphere and that these two 
models described two different stages of the cycle of discourse.   
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Figure 7: Intellectual Leadership in the discursive cycle 
 
 
In the literature on the Arab Spring, researchers who focused on the pro-revolutionary 
youth within the middle class suggested that this category of political actors benefitted 
from a form of intellectual leadership.  
 
Studies like that of Breuer (2012) suggested that young technology-savvy pro-
revolutionaries among the highly-educated middle class acted on behalf of those who, 
within the working class, suffered from corruption and police brutality. Pro-revolutionaries 
among the middle class were driven by the will to fight against repression and censorship 
as well as by the desire to improve conditions of life for the working poor.  
 
Admittedly, researchers who have approached the revolutionary uprisings beyond the 
perspective of digital activism acknowledged the significant role of the working class 
(Beinin, 2012) in consolidating the 2011 mobilisations. As suggested in the third section of 
my theoretical chapter (Chapter 4) this literature is rather critical with regards to the media 
narratives, according to which the uprisings could be interpreted as a “Twitter revolution” 
(Fuchs, 2012; Hirst, 2011; de Souza and Lipietz, 2011, 2012). In order to allow for a 
broader range of political actors involved in different aspects of the protests, it offers a 
skeptical perspective on the correlation between technology and democracy: 
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(…) as observers—from the West as well as from the Maghreb and Middle 
East—we should perhaps be wary of an (inevitable?) fault: are we, in fact, 
projecting our own fascinations, our own wishes, rather than seriously trying to 
understand the complex situations as they ‘are’? The fascination regarding the 
role of cyberspace and technology in the framework of the ‘Arab Spring’ is a 
case in point. (Lopes de Souza and Lipietz, 2011: 619) 
Accordingly, this literature pays tribute to creative forms of political expression, other than 
social media, and gives credit to a larger spectrum of political players among the 
grassroots.  
 
Nevertheless when it comes to digital activism in particular, it should be noted that the 
revolution was initially relayed by a privileged minority that benefitted from the resources 
to potentially consolidate a critical theory around the opposition.  In spite of the fact that 
Internet and social media penetration had been increasing, statistics showed a significant 
digital divide on the eve of the revolution (Salem and Mourtada, 2011)14. Cyber-activists 
were more likely to act as a sort of bourgeois public sphere, by reporting and commenting 
on some of the injustices suffered by the working class. While contesting the privileges of 
the ruling elite, they spoke the language of the upper class and were therefore well-placed 
to draw the attention of the middle class and the international community on their political 
message. Accordingly, one could easily argue that many cyber-activists in Tunisia and 
Egypt benefitted from a form of intellectual leadership comparable to that described by 
Habermas when conceptualising the bourgeois public sphere. 
 
This idea had been formulated by many of the participants I interacted with during the 
course of my fieldwork, as they reflected on the failure of the revolutionary agenda. 
During one of the informal conversations I conducted in Cairo, one of my participants 
illustrated this phenomenon by referring to the famous martyr of the Egyptian revolution 
Khaled Said15.  
                                                14  United Nations (2013) UN Data country profile, United Nations Statistics Division, 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx? 15 Young Egyptian who died under police custody in June 2010, after posting a video evidencing an act of 
corruption by two policemen online. He inspired the famous “Kuluna Khaled Said” (We are all Khaled Said) 
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In his views the particularity of the Egyptian uprisings – as opposed to the Tunisian one – 
lay in the fact that it had been triggered by the Khaled Said incident. Whereas the middle 
class had been aware of the acts of police brutality and corruption endured by the working 
poor for a very long time, it only became sensitive to this issue when someone from the 
middle class proved to suffer the same injustices. According to my participant, this was 
representative of the fact that the gap between social classes remained extremely 
significant in Egypt. In retrospect, this aspect of the Egyptian revolution foreshadowed the 
fact that the left-wing intelligentsia – despite it’s engagement – would struggle to act as a 
mediator between the working and the middle class.  
 
As I will argue in this chapter, pro-revolutionary bloggers tend to describe the same 
phenomenon. In reporting the condition of the working poor they intend to stimulate a 
debate among the middle class and draw the attention of the international community. To 
some extent, this positions them as mediators and gives them a potentially strategic role to 
play in consolidating the revolutionary discourse. However, despite the fact that they 
initially benefit from this intellectual leadership, they also come to the realisation that 
digital activism progressively isolates them from the labouring class.  
 
Due to digital divide and the compartmentalisation of the debate on social media, cyber-
activists only interacted within the same circles and developed a vocabulary that was 
essentially understandable by the few people who shared the same social and ideological 
background. To some extent, this originally produced the conditions for intellectual 
leadership. As such, it could have been beneficial to the revolution if it had lasted long 
enough to generate a sustainable ideological framework.  
 
With the sudden decrease of digital divide and the fact that the revolution invigorated 
citizen interest in politics, however, the first generation of bloggers and web activists very 
soon became deprived of its intellectual leadership.  
                                                                                                                                              
Facebook page, which contributed to the success of the January 25th protests and became a symbol of the 
Egyptian uprisings.  
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Figure 8: Digital media and Intellectual Leadership 
 
As social media became appealing to a broader range of the middle class, the revolutionary 
counter-discourse was progressively dissolved in the multiplicity of political arguments 
circulating on social media. This inevitably reduced the impact of the revolutionary youth, 
while making the opposition highly polarised. Despite the fact that the debate had become 
more democratic, it was now more chaotic and unable to rely on any ideological and 
intellectual leadership.  
 
As shown in the graph below, this phenomenon was the direct result of what I will refer to 
as the mainstreaming of the revolution. Everyone was now able to re-apply the concepts as 
well as the technological tools through which the revolutionary counter-discourse had been 
formulated. Yet, while this should have heralded the success of the revolution, it resulted 
in its decline.   
 
Figure 9: Dissolution of Intellectual Leadership 
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6.2. The role of the blogosphere the post-revolutionary debate 
Before developing an in-depth analysis of this data set, it is worth determining what 
characterises the pro-revolutionary blogosphere in Tunisia and Egypt. On one hand, 
bloggers provide facts. They cover the news from an angle, which is different from that of 
mainstream media, by delivering uncensored information and developing an alternative 
form of investigative journalism. For this purpose, they may document protests and rallies, 
provide evidence of abuses of power or report a campaign launched by the opposition.   
 
On the other hand, they formulate a critique of the dominant political discourse and media 
narratives. In order to do so, they may comment on the strategies applied by political 
leaders, call for citizens to boycott elections or constitutional referendum, and reflect on 
the challenges that the revolutionary opposition will have to face.  
 
In doing so, bloggers show how leading political institutions subvert the arguments and 
ideological vocabulary initially formulated by the opposition. Whereas their early articles 
state the demands that will constitute the essence of the revolutionary cause, their later 
writings focus on deconstructing what they consider to be a distortion – or alienation – of 
the revolution.  
 
This inevitably leads them to define the revolution by denying distorted perceptions of it 
instead of further conceptualising the revolution in their own terms. To some extent, one 
could argue that this phenomenon already provides evidence for the fact that revolutionary 
activists progressively lose their intellectual leadership. By positioning themselves in 
relation to different interpretations of the revolution, they highlight the fact that the 
opposition no longer has an ideological structure. 
 
In addition, the blogosphere is revealing of the fact that the first generation of pro-
revolutionary activists becomes highly polarised. To some extent, this phenomenon is to be 
understood as part of the natural circulation of discourse. As I suggested earlier, 
revolutions have always been the theatre of the ideological division between two types of 
revolutionaries: those who remain ontologically political and those who prove to be 
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anarchists. Whereas the first group are ready to enter into the political game to implement 
new institutions, anarchists remain fundamentally attached to the essence of revolutionary 
action. By doing so, they refuse to reshape counter-discourse into a new institutional 
discourse, which inevitably leads them to define themselves both in relation and in 
opposition to the mainstream. These divisions contribute to make the ideological 
vocabulary surrounding the revolution more fluid, which facilitates the transition from 
counter-discourse into power. However, in the absence of intellectual leadership, counter-
discourses become so fluid that they are likely to be hijacked by the leading political 
forces.  
 
To some extent, this reflection applies to both the technological and ideological revolutions 
that surrounded the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Apart from the Islamist 
opposition, left wing and liberal revolutionaries had not yet elaborated a consistent 
ideological alternative to the feloul16 or pro-military government, on the eve of the 2011 
protests. In some cases, the challenges that local cyber-activists came to face was revealing 
of the fact that not only the 2011 Arab revolutions, but also the global revolution instigated 
by digital media had failed. As argued earlier, emerging and mainstream media had 
merged and user-generated content had turned into an object of commercialisation, 
compromising the libertarian utopia that motivated the development of the Internet in its 
early stage. By incorporating the mainstream and progressively competing on the same 
market as traditional mass media, online social networks proved to be less appropriate as 
an instrument of political resistance.  
 
In a talk given at conference on digital activism and documented on his blog17, blogger 
Wael Abbas reports the conflict he had with YouTube after he posted videos showing 
demonstrations and strikes or evidencing acts of police brutality, torture and election 
irregularities. The company decided to remove this content, claiming that it was not 
appropriate as it displayed "graphic or gratuitous violence”. This led Abbas to seek for the 
                                                16 Partisan of the oligarchic elite in power prior to the revolution 
17It can be retrieved from:  
http://misrdigital.blogspirit.com/archive/2012/01/30/ms-social-computing-symposium-2012.html;  
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/11/29/youtube.activist/ (CNN.com, 29/11/2007) 
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support of other bloggers and activists around the world to argue that his videos were of 
great journalistic interest and that it was relevant to make them available for a large 
audience. Among other examples I came across in the blogosphere, this illustrates the 
frustration of revolutionary activists at witnessing the failure of both the political and 
technological revolution.  
 
The residuals of participatory culture – as it was originally defined by Jenkins (2006) – 
could now be found in transnational communities of hackers and activists like Anonymous 
or Wikileaks that contested the monopolies of web corporations such as Google or 
Facebook. In the aftermath of the revolution, Tunisian and Egyptian bloggers and cyber-
activists witness this phenomenon first hand, as they struggle to disseminate counter-
discourse among what has become a mainstream audience. They find themselves 
competing with more powerful instances of discourse and come to the realisation that 
digital media are regulated by new rules that often prevent alternative political arguments 
to emerge. 
 
6.3. Subjective journalism: a personalised account of the revolution 
One of the characteristics of the blogosphere that stands out from this data set resides in 
the fact that it addresses politics from an autobiographic perspective. In doing so, it intends 
to articulate major political issues around citizens’ everyday struggles, making the political 
debate more organic. As expressed by blogger Behayya, cyber-activism as well as all sorts 
of citizen-led initiatives, aims to make political debate revolve primarily around citizens 
themselves:  
 
As many commentators have pointed out, the revolution reversed Egyptians’ forced 
alienation from politics. It put politics back in its rightful place, in people’s daily lives 
where it belongs. And not just in the form of freer political speech and expression, but 
more importantly in the form of political praxis.18 (Behayya, 2012: Ref. 21) 
 
                                                
18 http://baheyya.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/striver.html 
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Accordingly, bloggers employ different stylistic devices to make the political debate more 
tangible and report it from the specific perspective of the grassroots.  
 
Occasionally, they document their statements by posting videotapes, and photos that 
provide an insight into their political activity. For instance, bloggers like Wael Abbas or 
Fustat, post video footage evidencing clashes between protestors and authorities. Video 
blog posts are also used to show extracts of national news coverage or national TV 
campaigns, as a way to comment on the partiality of the media or comment on the military 
propaganda19. These sources are not only meant to attest to journalistic facts. Ultimately, 
they provide an insight into bloggers’ lives and into Egyptians’ experiences of the political 
conjuncture.  
 
On the 10th October 2011, the Big Pharaoh published the testimony of a Christian 
protestor, encountering anti-Christians civilians during the course of a protest and 
witnessing the Maspero massacre, which took place on October 9th. In order to thoroughly 
report the story through the eyes of the protagonist himself, the blogger published his 
testimony as a single blog post, leaving the article written in the first person. By directly 
relaying the voices of those who are the first to witness corruption, repression or 
sectarianism, bloggers can this show how politics translates into Tunisians’ and Egyptians’ 
everyday lives.  
 
Across my data set, the autobiographical dimension stands out in the writings of Zeinobia, 
Lina Ben Mhenni and the Big Pharaoh. The Big Pharaoh’s accounts of the Abbasyah 
events, published on the 24th July 2011, precisely illustrates how bloggers offer a personal 
insight into politics by reporting the facts from the perspective of the grassroots:  
 
I arrived in Tahrir at around 3:30 pm. The sun was blazing and the square looked a bit 
empty. “If this number will go on the march to the MOD, the square will be very 
vulnerable to attackers,” I told my friend who accompanied me to the square. An hour 
later the numbers started getting bigger and we were ready to embark on the long march 
                                                19 http://baheyya.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/a-military-constitution.html 
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to the MOD. The numbers leaving Tahrir were very good and I was quite confident that 
with such numbers, the army would think twice before attacking us. Besides, we just 
wanted to reach the MOD, deliver our message and then head back to the square. Our 
march was peaceful, just like all our marches.20 (The Big Pharaoh, 2011: Ref. 49) 
 
In some cases, bloggers contribute to democratise the political debate by adopting an ironic 
or humoristic tone. This stylistic device is not only applied as a form of subversion and a 
way to circumvent socio-political taboos. It also contributes to develop a rather informal 
and conversational debate, to which any layperson can take part. By referring to a set of 
stereotypes through which Tunisians and Egyptians commonly lampoon their socio-
political environment, bloggers participates to de-institutionalise politics. Such witticisms 
reflect a more intimate form of political deliberation, which commonly occurs in the 
private sphere or in people’s everyday conversations.  
 
Across my sample, this phenomenon stands out from the Tunisian blog Débat Tunisie, 
administered by the caricaturist _Z_. As a satirist, the anonymous blogger _Z_ formulates 
humoristic criticism in every blog post, by publishing comics parodying the everyday 
news. This often brings him/her to challenge a combination of taboos. Indeed, while _Z_ 
ridicules political leaders, he/she comes to illustrate some of the symbols of the Tunisian 
culture, which – with respect to the Islamic dogma – should not be represented.  
 
For instance, in February 201121,   _Z_ comments on one of his controversial drawing, 
which caricatures the arrival of the co-founder of the Ennahdha party Rached Ghannouchi 
in Tunis, after 20 years of exile. In these blog posts, the caricaturist explains his reasons for 
representing the character of a women wearing the hijab and celebrating the arrival of 
Ghannouchi by showing her breasts like a groupie in the crowd: 
I took inspiration from a scene in which the Beatles meet an overjoyed crowd 
of young girls, who throw their bras at them and cry at the sight of the British 
stars. What I wanted to emphasise was not the boobs of this women wearing 
                                                20 http://www.bigpharaoh.org/2011/07/24/my-account-of-what-happened-camel-battle-2/ 21 http://www.debatunisie.com/archives/2011/02/19/20430474.html 
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the hijab, but rather [my] criticism of this sudden adulation for the leader of the 
Islamist movement Ennahda. (…) do not interpret this drawing as an attack to 
women wearing hijab, to Islam or to Ghannouchi. My caricatures (…) are a 
provocation against the low spirit of adulation.22 (_Z_, 2011: Ref. 155) 
 
His/her statement demonstrates that derision often originates from developing associations 
of ideas or references to popular culture. As such it is not entirely driven by the desire to be 
subversive.  It can rather be understood as being part of the process through which 
bloggers advocate a more vernacular form of political debate.  
 
Similarly, the Big Pharaoh published a set of ironic blog posts23 during the course of the 
2011 Egyptian Parliamentary elections. In the articles in question, he imagines how the 
Cairo’s districts of Heliopolis and Nasr city would claim their independence and found 
their own federation after electing non-Muslim-Brotherhood/Salafi MPs. This humoristic 
fiction draws on common Egyptian in jokes about the different populations of Cairo’s 
suburban localities.  
                                                
22 Je me suis inspiré d'une scène où les Beatles sortant de l'aéroport sont accueillis par une foule délirante 
de filles qui leur jettent leurs soutien-gorges et qui hurlent à la vue des stars anglaises. Ce sur quoi je voulais 
mettre le doigt, c'est nullement les nichons de cette femme voilée, mais simplement critiquer cette adulation 
subite envers le leader du mouvement islamiste Ennahdha. (….) ne voyez dans ce dessin nulle attaque envers 
les voilées ou l'islam ni même envers Ghannouchi. Mes caricatures (…) sont une provocation contre le bas 
esprit de l'adulation (…). 
http://www.debatunisie.com/archives/2011/02/19/20430474.html  
 23  http://www.bigpharaoh.org/2011/12/02/welcome-to-the-republic-of-heliopolis/; 
http://www.bigpharaoh.org/2011/12/07/the-heliopolis-nasr-city-federation/ 
  
 
 
126 
 
Like the data collected from the activist blogosphere, the interviews conducted on the field 
outlined the fact that online activism significantly relied on subtle forms of irony, 
caricature and satire. Among the other participants interviewed for this study, 50 years old 
writer and social media activist Mukhtar24 described to what extent such user-generated 
content media was applied to popularise the language of the political debate: 
On Facebook I write whatever I want, whatever comes to my mind, I’m not 
apologizing, I use harsh language, even mixing, even creating a new type of 
writing where formal language is mixed with [‘ammyia]25 is mixed with slang. 
Facebook, I mean, I wrote articles shared by many people, it was not just the 
few people, who either are totally politically correct. Some of my friends, they 
use, I mean we are like a group, myself and […,]26 whoever we are not, it’s not 
that we are thinkers and that we use big words and we are wise and 
blablabla…All of us are very street guys on Facebook, we smash all borders 
and all academic shit. And when I write an article for a newspaper I think 
twice, one time, two times and three times about my words, in a sort of inner 
control. (Mukhtar, cf. Interview transcripts: 66) 
Beyond the fact that social media considerably accelerated the spread of the political 
message, it also contributed to democratise political debate by making it more organic, less 
formal and more representative of the reality of the streets. This aspect of digital activism 
would however be affected by the fact that institutional political players would 
progressively become prominent in the social media sphere.  
6.4. Institutionalisation of the revolution: competing narratives 
Across the blogosphere, the criticism formulated against the actions of the RCD and NDP 
parties prior to the revolution still applies to the Tunisian transitional government and the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt. In Tunisia, bloggers almost 
unanimously condemn the failure of Ghannouchi’s government at communicating on the 
most topical and controversial matters and responding to the people’s demands. In this 
regard, bloggers’ counter-discourse retains the same primary function as before the 2011 
                                                24 A pseudonym is used to ensure the anonymity of the participant 25 Colloquial Arabic 26 The two names mentioned here have been removed to preserve the anonymity of the participant. 
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uprisings. Yet additionally to denouncing corruption, power abuses and repression, the 
post-revolutionary blogosphere aims at restoring the revolutionary agenda, which activists 
consider as being affected by distorted narratives of the revolution. 
 
Despite their diverging political views or ideological backgrounds, bloggers commonly 
witness the fact that the revolution and its technological tools are progressively being 
hijacked by political institutions. While the revolution was initially inclusive and had 
gathered citizens from different socio-political backgrounds, its institutionalisation divided 
it into different exclusive visions of post-revolutionary Tunisa/Egypt. Citizen journalists 
argued that this phenomenon had turned the debate into series of polemics and 
controversies, while making the entire vocabulary surrounding the revolution highly 
confusing.  
 
Tunisian blogger Under Ashes explicitly formulates this idea as he/she reflects on how 
multiple and diverging interpretations of the revolution circulated across both social and 
traditional mass media. Simultaneously, the argument of one’s opponent would 
systematically consist in a conspiracy theory, in which liberals, left wing or conservatives 
would successively be depicted as enemies of the so-called legitimate revolutionary 
agenda: 
 
Almost every sentence circulating in the media does not have the same meaning for the 
speaker as for its reader or listener; to begin with, of course, the term “revolution”, as 
well as its preservation, its consolidation, its martyrs, its injured, its enemies and its 
transitional justice. You should not be mistaken before pronouncing the term, if you do 
not want the recipient to find further evidence for his misinterpretation in your words. 
For instance, “conspiracy” is not [understood as] a replica of the Troika but [as] the 
“democratic” opposition; and this “conspiracy” is not a “progressive” opposition. They 
all agreed on the existence of the conspiracy, but every party is fighting against it. 
Meaning is not determined by “logic” (…) but in accordance to the position of the group 
to which the speaker belongs. (…) a mess of meaning in which the individual pants, 
searching for a group, which would share (almost) the same understanding of the words, 
even if this means sacrificing just a little bit of freedom of speech…The position 
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 طﻁبﺏعﻉاﺍ بﺏدﺩاﺍيﻱةﺓ إﺇلﻝيﻱهﻩاﺍ،٬ وﻭاﺍلﻝمﻡسﺱتﺕمﻡعﻉ وﻭقﻕاﺍرﺭئﺉهﻩاﺍ قﻕاﺍئﺉلﻝهﻩاﺍ لﻝدﺩىﻯ اﺍلﻝشﺵيﻱء نﻥفﻑسﺱ تﺕعﻉنﻥيﻱ لﻝاﺍ إﺇﻋﻼﻣﯿﻴّﺎ تﺕدﺩاﺍوﻭلﻝهﻩاﺍ يﻱقﻕعﻉ تﺕقﻕرﺭيﻱبﺏاﺍ عﻉبﺏاﺍرﺭةﺓ ﻛﻞ ّ 72
 تﺕنﻥطﻁقﻕ لﻝكﻙيﻱ .اﺍلﻝاﺍنﻥتﺕقﻕاﺍلﻝيﻱةﺓ وﻭعﻉدﺩاﺍلﻝتﺕهﻩاﺍ وﻭأﺃعﻉدﺩاﺍئﺉهﻩاﺍ وﻭجﺝرﺭحﺡاﺍهﻩاﺍ وﻭشﺵهﻩدﺩاﺍئﺉهﻩاﺍ اﺍوﻭتﺕحﺡصﺹيﻱنﻥهﻩ حﺡمﻡاﺍيﻱتﺕهﻩاﺍ عﻉنﻥ فﻑضﺽلﻝاﺍ ،٬”ثﺙوﻭرﺭةﺓ“ بﺏعﻉبﺏاﺍرﺭةﺓ
 ”اﺍلﻝمﻡؤﺅاﺍمﻡرﺭةﺓ“ لﻝيﻱسﺱتﺕ مﻡثﺙلﻝاﺍ،٬ .كﻙلﻝاﺍمﻡكﻙ إﺇلﻝىﻯ ”دﺩلﻝيﻱلﻝاﺍ“ تﺕضﺽيﻱفﻑ أﺃنﻥ مﻡعﻉنﻥاﺍكﻙ اﺍﻟﻤﺘﻠﻘّﻲ يﻱخﺥطﻁئﺉ أﺃلﻝاﺍ أﺃرﺭدﺩتﺕ إﺇذﺫاﺍ عﻉلﻝيﻱكﻙ يﻱجﺝبﺏ مﻡاﺍ،٬ بﺏعﻉبﺏاﺍرﺭةﺓ
ﺗﻘّﺪﻣﯿﻴﺔاﺍلﻝ“ اﺍلﻝمﻡعﻉاﺍرﺭضﺽةﺓ نﻥسﺱخﺥةﺓ( ”اﺍلﻝمﻡؤﺅاﺍمﻡرﺭةﺓ“ هﻩيﻱ وﻭلﻝاﺍ )”اﺍلﻝدﺩيﻱمﻡقﻕرﺭاﺍطﻁيﻱةﺓ“ اﺍلﻝمﻡعﻉاﺍرﺭضﺽةﺓ نﻥسﺱخﺥةﺓ( ”اﺍلﻝمﻡؤﺅاﺍمﻡرﺭةﺓ“ هﻩيﻱ )اﺍلﻝتﺕرﺭوﻭيﻱكﻙاﺍ نﻥسﺱخﺥةﺓ(
 وﻭفﻑقﻕ بﺏلﻝ ،٬)...( ”اﺍلﻝمﻡنﻥطﻁقﻕ“ وﻭفﻑقﻕ ﯾﻳﺘﻢ ّ لﻝاﺍ اﺍلﻝمﻡعﻉاﺍنﻥيﻱ تﺕقﻕرﺭيﻱرﺭ.ﺿّﺪهﻩ أﺃﻧّﮭﻬﺎ يﻱجﺝزﺯمﻡ طﻁرﺭفﻑ ﻛﻞ ّ وﻭﻟﻜﻦ ّ اﺍلﻝمﻡؤﺅاﺍمﻡرﺭةﺓ،٬ وﻭجﺝوﻭدﺩ عﻉلﻝىﻯ ﻣﺘّﻔﻖ اﺍﻟﻜﻞ ّ .)”
 يﻱلﻝهﻩثﺙ اﺍﻟّﺘﻲ اﺍلﻝمﻡعﻉاﺍنﻥيﻱ مﻡنﻥ فﻑوﻭضﺽىﻯ هﻩيﻱ)...( .اﺍﻟﻤﺘﻜﻠّﻢ إﺇلﻝيﻱهﻩاﺍ يﻱنﻥتﺕمﻡيﻱ اﺍﻟّﺘﻲ اﺍلﻝجﺝمﻡاﺍعﻉةﺓ رﺭأﺃيﻱ وﻭرﺭاﺍء اﺍلﻝتﺕلﻝقﻕاﺍئﺉيﻱ اﺍلﻝاﺍصﺹطﻁفﻑاﺍفﻑ ”مﻡنﻥطﻁقﻕ“
 بﺏشﺵيﻱء ذﺫلﻝكﻙ سﺱبﺏيﻱلﻝ فﻑيﻱ ﺿّﺤﻰ إﺇنﻥ ﺣﺘّﻰ لﻝلﻝكﻙلﻝمﻡاﺍتﺕ،٬ )تﺕقﻕرﺭيﻱبﺏاﺍ( اﺍلﻝفﻑهﻩمﻡ نﻥفﻑسﺱ تﺕقﻕاﺍسﺱمﻡهﻩ تﺕيﻱاﺍلﻝ ّ اﺍلﻝجﺝمﻡاﺍعﻉةﺓ عﻉنﻥ بﺏحﺡثﺙاﺍ اﺍلﻝفﻑرﺭدﺩ فﻑيﻱهﻩاﺍ
 مﻡنﻥذﺫ يﻱعﻉاﺍنﻥيﻱ مﻡجﺝتﺕمﻡعﻉ فﻑيﻱ طﻁﺒﯿﻴﻌﯿﻴّﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﻴّﻦ مﻡعﻉنﻥىﻯ وﻭرﺭاﺍء اﺍلﻝطﻁاﺍئﺉفﻑيﻱ شﺵبﺏهﻩ اﺍلﻝاﺍصﺹطﻁفﻑاﺍفﻑ هﻩذﺫاﺍ يﻱكﻙوﻭنﻥ قﻕدﺩ…فﻑكﻙرﺭهﻩ ﺣﺮﯾﻳّﺔ مﻡنﻥ قﻕلﻝيﻱلﻝ غﻍيﻱرﺭ
 اﺍلﻝمﻡوﻭاﺍطﻁنﻥيﻱنﻥ،٬ جﺝمﻡيﻱعﻉ نﻥ،٬اﺍلﻝمﻡوﻭاﺍطﻁنﻥوﻭ يﻱفﻑهﻩمﻡهﻩ وﻭاﺍحﺡدﺩاﺍ;  مﻡعﻉنﻥىﻯ اﺍلﻝمﻡوﻭلﻝوﻭدﺩ يﻱكﻙوﻭنﻥ أﺃنﻥ اﺍﻟﻤﮭﻬﻢ ّ )…( ھﮪﮬﻫﻮﯾﻳّﺘﮫﻪ تﺕحﺡدﺩيﻱدﺩ فﻑيﻱ ﺟّﻤﺔ مﻡشﺵاﺍكﻙلﻝ مﻡنﻥ عﻉقﻕوﻭدﺩ
 lmth.tsop-golb/21/2102/ku.oc.topsgolb.hsarednu//:ptth .اﺍلﻝطﻁرﺭيﻱقﻕةﺓ بﺏنﻥفﻑسﺱ
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Such process does not only apply to the revolutionary counter-discourse per se, but also to 
the technological tools used by the revolutionary opposition. That is to say that Internet 
and social media, originally applied by a minority of activists, progressively started to be 
used by leading political organisations in an attempt to compete against the liberal and left 
wing youth. As mentioned above, this phenomenon is highly problematic for the pro-
revolutionary debate, since it creates confusion by conveying divergent perspectives of the 
revolution. Bloggers express the impression of being restricted in their freedom of speech 
and constrained to justify every statement in such a polemic context.  
 
As one of the most famous Tunisian bloggers, Lina Ben Mhenni often comes to comment 
on press articles, social media posts and other blogs referring to her statements, responding 
to or rectifying distortions of her arguments. This in itself illustrates to what extent the 
function of web activism shifted from condemning human rights violations to competing 
for a different narrative of the revolution. Web activism was then formally involved in the 
political discourse and bloggers were forced to anticipate and respond to controversial 
rumours.  
 
In a text posted in January 2012, as she was denying having been interviewed for a pro-
Israeli website, Lina Ben Mhenni commented on the many conspiracy theories circulating 
on social media that benefit the counter-revolution:  
 
It is not because 90% of the Tunisians, who are on Facebook claimed to be (…) 
members of the cyber police or State security (…) and like to imagine that bloggers and 
cyber-activists are all CIA agents, Zionists and freemasons, that I shall respond to each 
and every one of them (…). I don’t have time to lose with conspiracy theories that have 
so much success among the Facebook youth (administrators of Facebook pages created 
after the 17th December 2010 (…)). I don’t have to respond to the mockery of traitors, 
who are paid to discredit cyber-activists (…) following the orders of certain political 
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parties (…) nor the delirium of so called revolutionaries eaten away by jealousy and 
envy. (Ben Mhenni, 2012: Ref. 38)28 
 
A year after the revolution, not only did her description of the social media sphere suggest 
that the ruling elite had become as present and even more powerful as young 
revolutionaries online. It also led to think that the legitimacy attributed to some of the 
prominent figures of cyber-activism in Tunisia had generated conflicts among 
revolutionaries.  
 
To a greater extent, the challenges faced by cyber-activists were directly induced by digital 
media for two reasons; first, because it was within everyone’s reach, including the 
supporters of the counter-revolution. Secondly, it had failed at creating strong and 
consistent linkages between members of the activist opposition. As I will now show, this 
second aspect, however, was rather due to a slightly different phenomenon, which I will 
conceptualise as the mainstreaming of the revolution.  
 
Similarly to Lina Ben Mhenni, Yassin Ayari contests the fact that, after the 2011 uprisings, 
official political events take place in the name of the revolution to promote long-
established parties and political organisations. With regards to this, he condemns the 15th 
August 2011 demonstration organised by the UGTT29. According to the blogger, the 
Tunisian union founded in 1946 had not been pro-active in supporting the January 
mobilisations, and was now competing with the UTT30, a new trade-union organisation for 
workers’ memberships. On the eve of the demonstration, Yassin Ayari argues that the 
                                                28 Ce n'est pas parce que 90% des Tunisiens qui sont sur Facebook se sont auto- proclamés (…) membres de 
la cyber-police  ou de la sûreté d'état (…) et s'amusent à imaginer que les blogueurs et les cyber-activistes 
sont tous des agents de la CIA , des sionistes , et des francs-maçons que je dois répondre à  chacun d'entre 
eux (…). Je n 'ai pas de temps à perdre avec les théories conspirationnistes qui font tant d'émules parmi les 
jeunes de Facebook( les administrateurs de pages Facebook apparues après le 17 Décembre 2010,(…)). Je n 
'ai pas à répondre ni à la dérision de vendus qui sont payés pour discréditer les cyber-activistes (…) sous les 
ordres de certains partis politiques (…) ni aux délires des pseudo- révolutionnaires rongés par la jalousie et 
l'envie.  http://atunisiangirl.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/droit-de-reponse.html 
 
29 Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail 
30 Union Tunisienne des Travailleurs 
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union’s leaders promoting the event intended to increase their popularity and that parties 
would benefit from a new opportunity to advertise themselves: 
 
So the UGTT is calling for this demonstration on 15th August to restore its image and 
position itself as the leader of the revolution and bla bla bla.! A real caricature. And the 
other parties then? The ones that mobilise (supposedly) for the 15th August? It’s simple, 
they just want to be present, they don’t want to miss the event, it’s like a wedding, every 
party don’t want to miss the pictures! even the parties that supported, are supporting the 
government (...) or those that got disengaged from the streets after just a few political 
messages (Nahdha31) will be there! weird right? (Ayari, 2011: Ref.7)32  
 
In both cases, bloggers show how the revolution that had initially successfully gathered the 
Tunisian and Egyptian people in its diversity, had become an arena for competition as the 
social and philosophical debate surrounding the revolution was being politicised. 
Ultimately, the revolution had reached everyone. Yet, apart from the Islamist parties such 
as Ennahdha and the Muslim Brotherhood, none of the political actors involved had 
managed to consolidate an overarching ideological framework to sustain it. The concept of 
the revolution had therefore remained flexible and progressively split into different 
narratives, intended to serve diverging political agendas. Pro-revolutionaries were no 
longer enjoying the feeling of social cohesion they had experienced in the early days of the 
uprisings.   
 
6.6. Polarisation and lack of consensus 
Along with the confusion, bloggers witnessed how the institutionalisation of the revolution 
had created strong social divisions, disrupting citizens’ and policy-makers’ ability to 
                                                31 Conservative party Ennahdha 32 Donc l'UGTT, appelle a cette manifestation du 15 Aout, pour redorer son blason, et se positionner comme 
le leader de la révolution et bla bla bla.! une vraie caricature. Et les autres partis alors? qui se mobilisent 
(za3ma za3ma) pour ce 15 Aout ? C'est simple, ils veulent juste marquer la présence, ils ne veulent  pas 
manquer l’évènement, c'est comme un mariage, chaque parti ne veux pas rater les photos! même les partis 
qui ont soutenu, soutiennent le gouvernement (Tajdid..) ou ceux qui se sont désengagés de la 
rue après quelques messages politiques (Nahdha (…)) vont être la! bizarre hein ?;  
http://mel7it3.blogspot.co.uk/2011/08/le-15-aout-la-mascarade.html   
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negotiate and reach consensus. In Tunisia, blogger Fares Mabrouk deplores the 
polarisation of the debate following the election of the Constituent Assembly. Due to the 
divisions against the Tunisian union UGTT, the Secular elites in power and the leading 
party Ennahda, deliberations about the future of the country entirely centre on the conflict 
between secularists and Islamists: 
 
By all means, the political sphere recomposed, or - shall I say - became polarised again. 
The interests of the corporate circles, composite middle class and the most deprived (…), 
which used to be commonly shared, are diverging again. In this regard, the conflict 
between UGTT and the party in power Ennahda is a revealing prism. (…) On the 
political level, the pro-State movement, which is fundamentally secular and 
constitutionalist, refuses to consider Ennahda as a properly Tunisian emergence (…) I 
consider this position as nonsensical. Why shall we deny our history in such a way 
(youssefisme, islamo-destourisme, MTI become Ennahda in 1989) and dig heels in the 
mention of our Arabic Muslim identity? 33 (Mabrouk, 2013: Ref. 29) 
 
Likewise, when commenting on the controversial constitutional decree issued by president 
Morsi in November 2012, Egyptian blogger Baheyya suspects the opposition formed by 
the National Salvation Front to be opportunistic. Instead of seeking negotiation and 
compromise, opponents would focus on discrediting the democratically elected 
government, which inevitably benefitted the army: 
Morsi became another dictator with whom you never negotiate, not a fumbling 
elected president who can and must be checked. Egyptian politics became a 
zero-sum battle between a moral, valiant opposition and a sinister power-
hungry theocracy. Morsi is Mubarak redux. The opposition must be 
uncompromising, because compromise is defeat. (…) Still, I’m stunned at 
                                                
33 Quoiqu’il en soit, le champ politique s’est recomposé, ou devrais-je dire repolarisé. Et les intérêts naguère 
communs des milieux d’affaires, des classes moyennes composites et des plus défavorisés (…) divergent à 
nouveau. La querelle entre l’UGTT et le parti au pouvoir Ennahda est à ce titre un prisme révélateur. (…) 
Au plan strictement politique, le courant étatiste, farouchement laïque et constitutionnaliste refuse de 
considérer Ennahda comme une émergence proprement tunisienne.(…) je considère cette position aberrante. 
Pourquoi s’aveugler à ce point sur notre histoire (yousséfisme, islamo-destourisme, MTI devenu Ennahda en 
1989) et se braquer à l’évocation de l’identité arabo-musulmane de notre pays ? 
http://www.faresmabrouk.com/2013/05/27/lhorizon-du-possible-1/  
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Morsi’s opponents’ failure to act like a credible opposition ever since his 
November 21 decrees. They could barely contain their glee at his cascading 
failures, outdoing each other in branding him a dictator and clambering atop 
the rising tide of popular protest (…) The sight of politicians refusing to 
negotiate with an elected president but then agreeing to the military’s “we’re 
all family” shindig is beyond pitiful. How much more effective to have 
negotiated with Morsi a cancellation of his decree and a postponement of the 
referendum. (Baheyya, 2012: Ref. 18)34 
As described by blogger Under Ashes in the Tunisian context, this contributed to build the 
polemic environment in which every political camp competed for a different interpretation 
of the revolution. Political leaders with a long-term career in politics formed a coalition 
against the Muslim Brotherhood (the National Salvation Front) regardless of their 
ideological background. In doing so, they paved the way to the 30th June coup d’état 
(2013), which the military elite used as a substitute to the 25th January revolution (2011). 
Overall, the debate surrounding the revolution had become opportunistic and subjected to 
political controversies.  
 
The same criticism applies to the Muslim Brotherhood, as they gain the monopoly of the 
political scene in 2012 and start distancing themselves from the youth activist opposition. 
As stated by blogger The Big Pharaoh in October 2012, divisions arose between the 
conservative party and its younger protesters. This highlighted that what appeared to be the 
only influential and institutionalised movement among the opposition – along with the 
Dostour party mentioned in this blog article – was ironically becoming too institutionalised 
to incorporate street political action:  
Last week, after the clashes in Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood Facebook 
account wrote a status saying that the MB supporters were not present in Tahrir 
after 6 pm. I clicked the comments button to know what people on the MB’s 
official fanpage thought of the MB’s attempt to distance themselves from what 
their supporters did on that day. (…) Not a single comment was positive! And 
that was the official MB fanpage. (The Big Pharaoh, 2012: Ref. 79)35  
                                                34 http://baheyya.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/on-morsis-opponents.html 35 http://www.bigpharaoh.org/2012/10/20/we-are-yearning-for-a-viable-alternative/ 
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Yet in this particular case, The Big Pharaoh also shows to what extent youth activists are 
incoherently seeking a legitimate and well-structured political group likely to represent 
them, while pursuing street mobilisations. At this stage of the discursive cycle, activists 
witness the fact that the revolutionary momentum might have reached its critical mass. 
While contesting the institutions currently represented on the political scene, they start 
considering institutionalised politics as the only way to access power: 
There is no clear data as to how much support the MB did loose, but any 
observer of Egyptian politics will tell you that “MB the victim” is definitely 
not like “MB the ruler”. The last presidential elections, especially round one, 
proved that there are millions of Egyptians who are willing to vote for an 
alternative to the MB. A viable alternative though. (…) We don‘t have an 
alternative that is 1) organized 2) has money 3) and can convince people. (The 
Big Pharaoh, 2012: Ref. 79)  
This statement perfectly illustrates the paradox I mentioned earlier, which is intrinsic to 
any counter-discourse. On one hand, the youth opposition rises against the fact that the 
Muslim Brotherhood does not incorporate street activists, portraying itself as a ruler rather 
than a victim. To some extent, the conservative party precisely loses its popularity among 
the revolutionary opposition precisely because it is now perceived as an institutional 
power. Yet on the other hand, The Big Pharaoh claims that the success of the revolutionary 
agenda depends on such form of well-organised structure. Such contradictions can only be 
explained by understanding power and counter-power as part of the same cyclical process. 
In fact, they reveal how the activist community is torn between the need to keep 
developing a critical theory and the desire to implement their own institutional discourse. 
 
Pro-revolutionary activists commonly witness the fact that the revolution is easily 
distorted, as soon as it is formally debated in the sphere of institutional politics. They 
describe this phenomenon as problematic, since it defeats the original purpose of 
revolutionary activism: to defend an alternative form of political debate, which stems from 
the reality of the street and from the demands of the grassroots. Simultaneously, they come 
to the realisation that political change may only be achieved by incorporating the elites in 
power. Yet in the absence of intellectual leadership, the revolution is being progressively 
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reshaped by institutional politics and cannot be sustained by a viable alternative to the 
leading political forces36  (The Big Pharaoh, 2012: Ref. 79).  
 
6.7. Mainstreaming of the revolution: rising popularity of the 
revolutionary debate 
In May 2012, Tunisian blogger Slim Amamou publishes a blog post in which he comments 
on three video clips directed by Romain Gravas, which he interprets as three different 
critical representations of imperialism. One of the short-films – entitled “No Church in the 
Wild” – represents clashes between the police and young protestors and appears for him as 
a tribute to the revolution.  
 
As he comments on the uprisings as a source of artistic inspiration, Slim Amamou 
celebrates the fact that the revolution reaches a mainstream audience: 
Yesterday, when I saw No church in the wild it confronted me to the work of 
Romain Gravas. He is clearly a propagandist master of our own. (…) What 
makes me really happy is that the video will probably be released on MTV. 
Because it’s Jay Z and Kanye West who sing. The revolution would never have 
dreamed that much exposure. The mainstream revolution. In good French: la 
révolution populaire. Popular. Pure genius37. (Slim Amamou, 2012: Ref. 88)   
 
By celebrating the mainstream revolution and defining himself as part the anti-imperialism 
propagandists, the blogger suggests that marginalised counter-discourses are meant to 
reach the masses. His perspective perfectly illustrates a particular type of revolutionary 
action, which intends to bring the debate on the political scene and raise the attention of 
mainstream media. On that basis, Slim Amamou is particularly representative of what I 
                                                36 http://www.bigpharaoh.org/2012/10/20/we-are-yearning-for-a-viable-alternative/ 37 Hier, quand j’ai vu No church in the wild, ça a conforté mes idées sur l’oeuvre de Romain Gavras. C’est 
clairement un maitre propagandiste de notre bord. (…)Ce qui me fait le plus plaisir, c’est que ce clip va 
probablement passer sur MTV. Parce que c’est Jay Z et Kanye West qui chantent. La révolution n’aurait 
jamais révé de tant d’exposition. La révolution mainstream. En bon français : La révolution populaire. 
Populaire. Du pur génie. (Slim Amamou, May 31st 2012, La propagande anti-impérialiste de Romain 
Garavas, http://nomemoryspace.wordpress.com/2012/05/31/romain-gavras/  
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referred to earlier as political revolutionaries. With regards to that, he had been criticised 
among Tunisian cyber-activists for being named Secretary of state under the 2011 interim 
government38.  
 
Whereas he interprets the rise of a mainstream revolution as an achievement, many 
bloggers see the popularisation of the uprisings as the very reason for its failure in the long 
run. Yet I would insist on the fact that this phenomenon is to be distinguished from the 
institutionalisation process I described above.  
 
In fact, whilst the institutionalisation of the revolution is driven by leading political 
institutions - such as the former RCD, Ennahda, the Muslim Brotherhood or the SCAF - 
mainstreaming is induced by revolutionaries, who seek recognition for their cause. As a 
result, whenever bloggers deplore the mainstreaming of the revolution, they initiate a very 
introspective critique, which also leads them to question the benefits of digital media.  
 
What I conceptualise here as mainstreaming of the revolution is the process through which 
the revolutionary counter-discourse becomes appealing to the masses. This refers to the 
fact that many individuals from the low middle class, who were not part of the activist 
intelligentsia and who never manifested interest in politics prior to the uprisings, suddenly 
incorporated the public debate. Most certainly participative media usage played a 
significant part in the mainstreaming process, enabling anyone to contribute to what had 
become a fashionable revolution. As he recalls the history of Tunisian activism, blogger 
Fares Mabrouk describes how digital media consumers themselves – along with traditional 
mass media – contributed to raise confusion about the actual meaning of the ideological 
vocabulary that surrounded the revolution: 
Today on the Internet, which charms the crowds of commentators, and whose 
revolutionary role shall not be underestimated (…) the beautiful story of this 
genesis proves to be wrong. Because the story has evolved. Because the 
Tunisians, witnessing and being active on the Web obstruct the official story 
with their personal experience, distorting the enlightenment of the emerging 
                                                38 http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/tunisie-slim-amamou-blogueur-ministre-demissionne_996038.html 
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ideals. (…) The poetry is affected. The “spring”, [is] less than an event, rather 
a process, which varies. Romantically referred to as Jasmine39, “2.0” by foreign 
media, the Tunisian revolution has been reversed over two years. (Fares 
Mabrouk, 2013: Ref. 29)40     
To some extent, mainstreaming and institutionalisation are interrelated and could easily be 
conceptualised as part of the same phenomenon. Both of these concepts illustrate the fact 
that the new political elite would have to position itself with regards to the revolution in 
order to regain legitimacy in the political scene. Together they show that the narratives 
surrounding the January 2011 events had become central to public debate. However, in the 
case of what bloggers describe as the institutionalisation of the revolution, this process was 
strategically driven by leading political forces, well-established parties and power 
institutions.  
 
Alternatively, the mainstreaming of the revolution was unintentionally induced by the 
success of revolutionary activists in drawing the attention of the media and the 
international community. Due to the increase of participants incorporating the debate, 
disparities among revolutionaries became more visible and their action more chaotic. 
Unlike the institutionalisation of the revolution, the mainstreaming process suggested that, 
to some extent, revolutionaries might have been the victims of their own success.  
 
By claiming for visibility and recognition, activists traded intellectual leadership for 
celebrity. Whilst they had felt empowered by the relatively small-scale (bourgeois) public 
sphere, in which they were originally interacting, they could not control the large-scale 
                                                39 Reference to a recurrent terminology applied by French speaking media to refer to the Tunisian 2011 
revolution: Révolution de Jasmin.  
 40 Aujourd’hui, sur cet internet qui ravit la foule des commentateurs, et dont le rôle révolutionnaire ne 
saurait être sous-estimé (…) le beau récit de cette origine s’est écorné. Car l’histoire a continué.  Car les 
Tunisiens et les Tunisiennes, présents et témoins sur le net, obstruent le récit officiel de leurs experiences 
personnelles, voilant ainsi la lumière des idéaux naissants. (…)La poésie en prend un coup. Le 
« printemps », moins qu’un événement, est d’abord un déroulement qui varie. Romantiquement parée par les 
médias étrangers de jasmin, « 2.0 », la révolution tunisienne s’est donc, depuis deux ans, retournée sur elle 
même.  
http://www.faresmabrouk.com/2013/05/27/lhorizon-du-possible-1/  
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deliberations that would progressively take shape during the post-revolutionary phase. It is 
precisely in this context that conflicts arose among revolutionaries: 
 
Internet under Ben Ali was good! We were nice and innocents and Ammar 40441 was 
our only enemy. We didn’t take ourselves too seriously and we knew how to remain 
united, when unfortunately one of us was caught. But here we are, after the so-called 2.0 
revolution, things slightly changed. Cyber-heroes emerged from the crowd and became 
very serious people. Some have been appointed as secretaries of State42, other host TV 
shows and some others publish books. Before January 14th there was a minimum of 
decency between cyber dissidents, we would have polite arguments through our blogs. 
Today, a small conflict and the justice gets involved. Just like this stupid fight between 
the “star of the web” Yassine el Ayari and the “blogger celebrity” Sami ben Adbdallah 
(…) Without to mention the many facebook administrators, who became millionaires by 
prostituting their pages for the parties. (_Z_, 2011: Ref. 194)43      
 
It should be noticed that the last sentence of this quote precisely illustrates the correlation I 
mentioned above between mainstreaming and institutionalisation. Cyber-activists’ 
successful online campaigns led parties and political officials to take advantage of social 
media, which was then perceived by activists themselves as another form of mainstream 
media. Over the months that followed the 2011 uprisings, bloggers paradoxically became 
highly critical with regards to the blogosphere and social media sphere.  
 
                                                41 Locution designating the error message appearing on the screen when the government would prevent 
access to the Internet. Analogically, the locution is commonly used to refer to online forms of repression and 
censorship.  42 Reference to famous blogger and Twitter activist Slim Amammou  43 C'était bien l'internet sous Ben Ali! Nous étions innocents et gentils et nous avions Ammar 404 pour seul 
ennemi. Nous ne nous prenions pas trop au sérieux et nous savions rester solidaires quand par malheur l'un 
de nous se faisait choper. Mais voilà après la dite révolution 2.0 les choses ont un peu changé. Des cyber-
héros ont émergé du lot et sont devenus des gens très sérieux. Certains se sont fait nommés secrétaires d'état, 
d'autres animent des émissions télé puis d'autres encore éditent des bouquins (…)Avant le 14 Janvier il y 
avait un minimum de décence entre cyberdissidents et on s'enguelait gentiment par blog interposé. 
Aujourd'hui une petite querelle et c'est la justice qui s'en mêle. Telle cette pitoyable scène de ménage entre 
"la star du net" Yassine el Ayari et le "blogueur vedette" Sami Ben Abdallah. (…)Sans parler des nombreux 
admins de facebook qui sont devenus des millionnaires en prostituant leurs pages aux partis politiques.  
http://www.debatunisie.com/archives/2011/09/11/22005894.html 
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After claiming recognition, pro-revolutionary bloggers progressively developed an 
introspective critique of cyber-activism, arguing that digital media, just as well as 
traditional mass media, could easily be manipulated to convey the dominant discourse. In 
December 2011, Tunisian blogger Yassin Aayari wrote a tribute to Zouhayer Yahyaoui. 
Known as one of the first Tunisian cyber-dissidents, the activist died in 2005 after being 
prosecuted, tortured and imprisoned for his political activities. By referring to Yahyaoui, 
Ayari draws a distinction between an early generation of cyber activism that he describes 
as genuine and deserving, and a later generation of bloggers, which he regards as 
essentially driven by the need for social recognition: 
I want to say a couple of words (…) to the cheap bloggers and Internet users 
(including me): you are nothing, I am nothing, (…) some lied, others said what 
we wanted to hear, and others, the mabrouks, served, but overall, this 
celebrities war for recognition is nothing. There is no one but Zouhayer, who 
deserves to be quoted, honoured, (…) so I am asking you for once to forget 
your pride, your ego (…) your differences and to militate. (Ayari, 2011: Ref. 
13)44  
This introspective critique comes with the realisation that bloggers would no longer benefit 
from intellectual leadership. By making the revolution mainstream before embedding it in 
a sustainable ideological framework, activists facilitated its alienation. The alienation of 
the revolution was the result of leading political forces pulling towards its 
institutionalisation as much as a consequence of revolutionaries’ desire to be heard, 
although they could not be fully understood. 
 
6.8. The Bubble effect: desperate attempt to recover intellectual 
leadership  
Revolutionary activists - as it appears in the blogosphere - witness how much of their own 
political action contributes to the institutionalisation of the revolution. Their introspection 
                                                
44 Je vais dire deux mots (…) aux blogueurs et internautes à deux balles (dont je fais partie) : vous n'êtes 
rien, je ne suis rien, (…) certains ont menti, d'autres ont dit ce qu'on veut entendre, et d'autres les mabrouks 
ont servi, mais tout compte fait, cette guerre des stars, de reconnaissance n'est rien, y'a que Zouhayer qui 
mérite d'être cité, honoré, (…), donc je vous demande pour une fois, d'oublier votre orgueil, égo, (…) vos 
différences, et de militer. http://mel7it3.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/meritons-nous-tunezine-non-mais-on-
peut.html 
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brings them to formulate another criticism, which applies to digital media as much as to 
revolutionary activism in general and which was also raised by many of my participants as 
I conducted my fieldwork. Egyptian bloggers and members of the liberal and left wing 
opposition in particular condemn the fact that revolutionaries had been exclusively 
interacting within their own sphere of influence.  
 
In their views, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter had led them to 
identify a restricted audience of followers, who would prove to have a similar 
socioeconomic background and originally share the same opinions. To a large extent, 
spreading their political message online had led them to believe that their respective 
interpretation of the revolutionary agenda was commonly understood. Due to online-based 
political action, revolutionaries failed at anticipating the challengers of reaching a critical 
mass of supporters among the broader population, especially within the deprived working 
class. Most importantly, they had been developing a vocabulary and a communication 
strategy that would essentially reach out to a very small proportion of the educated middle 
class:  
The revolutionaries are still living in their own self created bubble. They only 
talk to themselves, they rarely talk to the people on the street. They are all 
cocooned in their own meetings, facebook pages and on twitter. There has been 
very little attempt to burst this bubble and talk directly to the public (…) When 
I raise this point, fellow revolutionaries often confront me with this rationale: 
revolutions are done by the minority and we can never expect the majority to 
support us; they will only cheer when we win just as they did when Mubarak 
stepped down last year. (The Big Pharaoh, 2012: Ref. 70)45 
This argument corroborates the postcolonial critique (Allagui and Kuebler 2011; Aouragh 
& Alexander, 2011; Lipietz and Lopes de Souza, 2011, 2012) in suggesting that social 
media was not entirely representative of the reality of streets. Besides, it indicates that, 
although social media was progressively reaching a mainstream audience, many young 
revolutionaries remained convinced that they could recreate the conditions for intellectual 
leadership.  
                                                45 http://www.bigpharaoh.org/2012/05/08/what-did-egypts-revolutionaries-do-wrong/ 
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To some extent, the idea according to which revolutions rely on the minority contradicts 
some aspects of the postcolonial critique. As mentioned earlier, this literature precisely 
intends to demonstrate the self-determination of the Arab people (Benhabib, 2011), by 
arguing that a broader range of political actors, aside from the social media sphere, 
contributed to the success of the 2011 protests (Allagui and Kuebler 2011; Fuchs, 2012; 
Gerbaudo, 2012; Lipietz and Lopes de Souza, 2011, 2012). From this perspective, the 
greatest achievement of the uprisings is that it succeeded in mobilising citizens from 
different social classes (Benhabib, 2011; Breuer, 2012). 
 
However in this particular statement, The Big Pharaoh claims that revolutionaries had 
remained a minority. Despite their devotion to the working class and their desire to involve 
more citizens in public debate, they had failed at successfully communicating their 
political message to the masses. This explains why bloggers and social media activists 
developed their own audience on social media, hoping to recover some form of intellectual 
leadership.  
 
Such contradictions could only be explained by the fact that, although left wing and liberal 
revolutionaries hoped for a fully participative debate, they were originally part of a rather 
elitist public sphere. Through social media, their ideas and arguments had been circulating 
among a restricted circle of young middle class activists that benefitted from the same 
material and intellectual resources to appreciate the revolutionary discourse. This 
phenomenon often described by my participants as the “bubble effect” (Samira, cf. 
Interview transcript: 31; Farid cf. interview transcripts: 89) of social media had most 
certainly provided the youth opposition with a feeling of empowerment but led them to 
believe that the revolution was commonly understood. In this regard, their perception of a 
revolution led by the minority perfectly illustrates my concept of intellectual leadership. 
With the popularisation and mainstreaming of the revolution, activists see their discourse 
being simplified and formatted for the general public. Yet by providing greater access to 
the revolutionary debate, revolutionaries would see their counter-discourse being both 
misunderstood and strategically manipulated. On that basis, the quotation from The Big 
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Pharaoh explicitly expresses the paradox of an opposition willing to empower the people 
but reluctant to renounce its intellectual leadership. 
 
6.9. Conclusion to empirical analysis 1: Connectivity, mainstream and 
absence of intellectual leadership 
In conclusion, the conflicting relationship between bloggers and digital activism is 
revealing of a deeper dilemma. Whenever the revolutionary discourse reaches the masses 
and is likely to be shaped by a wider diversity of actors, activists see their intellectual 
leadership restrained as well as their opportunity to develop a sustainable critical theory. 
Paradoxically, although bloggers aspire to empower the grassroots and aim at 
democratising the political debate, they come to deplore the fact that the opposition – apart 
from Islamist parties - does not rely on any intellectual leadership.    
 
This dilemma explains why, across this data set, pro-revolutionary bloggers appear to be 
divided with regards to how digital activism should contribute to the revolutionary agenda. 
Whereas some of them see it as a way to raise awareness about the revolutionary cause, 
others contest the fact that digital activism deviates media attention from the streets to the 
sphere of institutional politics. Instead of turning critical theory into practice, digital media 
disseminated critical theory as it was still gestating. Consequently, the revolution relied on 
a highly fluid ideological vocabulary, which could easily be redefined by political leaders.  
 
The mainstreaming of the revolution led activists to lose intellectual leadership and, in 
doing so, facilitated the institutionalisation of the revolution. Although digital media 
democratised the political debate, it made the revolutionary discourse too fluid to 
efficiently reflect the perspective of the grassroots. As they were witnessing this 
phenomenon, many revolutionaries attempted to recreate the conditions for intellectual 
leadership, by interacting within small circles of web activists, who would share the same 
political opinion. Yet this only emphasised the polarisation of the debate, making the 
opposition even more vulnerable.  
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7. Second empirical analysis: the 2012 presidential campaign on Google and 
Twitter 
Studies investigating the role of social media in the 2011 Arab uprisings demonstrated that 
the contribution of Twitter or Facebook in facilitating the Egyptian and Tunisian protests 
was often overestimated. As argued earlier, studies considering the technological argument 
from a post-colonial and critical perspective suggested that cyber-activism mainly played a 
role in assisting the logistics of the revolutionary protests and drawing the attention of the 
international community. Yet very few studies have been conducted to evaluate how social 
media usage has evolved over the course of first parliamentary, presidential or 
constitutional campaigns following the uprisings.  
 
In this chapter, I will explore how digital media contributed to institutionalise the 
revolutionary discourse in the particular context of the 2012 presidential race, which led to 
the election of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt. I will discuss how presidential candidates 
incorporated some of the communication strategies originally used by pro-revolutionary 
activists. Simultaneously, I will comment on the aspects of their political programme, 
which was advertised on social media and intended to respond to revolutionaries’ 
demands. In doing so, I will demonstrate that social media campaigning assisted two out of 
the three leading presidential candidates in regaining legitimacy over the first round of the 
campaign, by remediating the revolutionary discourse (Bolter and Grusin, 2000).  
 
Among the events that punctuated the post-revolutionary debate in Egypt, the 2012 
presidential elections marked the return of parties and formal institutions on the political 
scene. Along with the parliamentary elections (2011), the presidential race provided 
political officials with the opportunity to position themselves with regards to pro-
revolutionaries’ demands. Most importantly, the event led them to debate the revolution 
from diverging ideological perspectives. Competing political camps offered different 
views on how the principles of freedom, social equity and dignity should be materialised in 
policymaking.  
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On one hand, militaries insisted on a particular interpretation of freedom and social equity, 
which intended to contrast with Islamists’ political programme. In that respect, they 
presented themselves as the guardians of political stability and modernisation, by claiming 
to ensure gender equity and economic growth, while preventing sectarianism.  
 
On the other hand, Islamists and moderate traditionalists advertised themselves as the only 
political group likely to implement significant political change. Their interpretation of 
freedom and justice – as in the title of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
party – was considerably different from that of the militaries. Justice was to be made for 
the long-time repressed opposition against the former regime. Likewise, the peace treaty 
with Israel and the political alliances decided under Mubarak were to be renegotiated in the 
name of justice and in order to support neighbouring Arab states likely to support a more 
conservative legislation.  
 
During the course of the presidential campaign, the vocabulary of the revolution has been 
endorsing very different meanings depending on the ideological context, in which it was 
used. This alone demonstrates how fluid the revolutionary discourse was. This determining 
moment may also have enhanced the polarisation of the political sphere, despite the 
success of the 2011 uprisings in gathering different social and generational groups.  
 
In order to illustrate this phenomenon, I will make use of two visualisation tools to assess 
the visibility of the five leading presidential candidates online during the first round of the 
campaign. The first application, called R-Shief, allows visualising the popularity of the 
candidates on social media Twitter. The second one, Google Trends, provides an overview 
of the volume of searches computed on search engine Google.  
 
I will briefly comment on these findings with the amount of occurrences found for the 
names of the five leading candidates in a sample of the Egyptian press extracted from the 
NexisLexis database. This will bring me to compare the visibility of the candidates online 
to their visibility on traditional media.  
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I will identify which of these candidates proved to be the most active on Twitter by listing 
the tweets released from their official Twitter accounts during the first round of the 
campaign. Finally, I will analyse the content of the tweets posted by the most proactive 
Twitter users, among the five leading candidate: Ahmad Shafiq and Hamdeen Sabahy. 
 
7.1. Methods: mapping the visibility of presidential candidates online  
Drawing on the data collected from the R-Shief46 open-source database, I will comment on 
the popularity of the 2012 leading presidential candidates, by assessing the frequency of 
five trending hashtags in the days that preceded the election (round 1).  
 
I will then discuss these findings in relation to a study I conducted as part of a project on 
ESRC Google Data Analytics Programme47. This study examined Egyptian voters’ use of 
the search engine Google over the course of the presidential campaign and discussed a set 
of data collected from the application Google Trend. This methodological tool enables us 
to visualize fluctuations of searches computed by Google users and allows us to compare 
the popularity of up to five different search terms over a definite period of time. In the 
context of the 2012 Egyptian elections, the data collected from Google Trends provide us 
with additional findings with regards to the visibility of presidential candidates online. As I 
will show, these results corroborate my findings on Twitter popular trends and hashtags, 
illustrating which political actors might have been the most active and successful in 
campaigning online.  
 
I will briefly compare candidates’ visibility in the press, by examining a sample of the 
Egyptian press, employing the NexisLexis database. Finally, I will conduct a discourse and 
thematic analysis of tweets posted by Ahmad Shafiq and Hamdeen Sabahy, who proved to 
be the most active Twitter users among the five leading candidates.  
Google and Twitter are particularly appropriate sources of data for this study, as they 
encode user-generated content semantically. As such, they are very much representative of 
                                                46 http://r-shief.org/  47 www.voterecology.com 
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the characteristics of semantic web and enable to track and map users’ activities and topic 
of interests. Most importantly, extracting data from these web services by applying 
visualisation tools such as R-Shief and Google Trends allows one to identify different and 
sometimes-conflicting interpretations of the same tag, hashtag or search term. The method 
is especially relevant when combining the findings of data visualisation tools with in depth 
qualitative analysis. This approach enables to assess the fluidity of a discourse circulating 
on social media, by outlining how media narratives might evolve over time or appeal to 
different audiences.  
  
7.2. Introducing the first post-revolutionary presidential election in 
Egypt: 
Following the roadmap and the electoral laws promulgated by the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF), the 2012 presidential campaign took place between the 23rd-24th 
May (round 1) and 16th-17th June 2012 (round 2).  
	  
In accordance with the conditions for candidates’ nomination announced by the electoral 
committee on the 30th January 2012, future candidates were required to be supported by 30 
members of the Parliament or 30,000 eligible voters. They were expected to have been 
Egyptians for at least two generations and to be born in Egypt. Citizens married to a 
foreigner or with another nationality were not eligible for presidential election.  
Candidates’ registration officially took place between the 10th March and the 8th April 
2012. On the 14th April 2012, the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC) 
disqualified ten people among the twenty-three candidates originally registered. Some of 
the most influential and controversial political leaders were removed from the presidential 
contest.  Among them were the prominent figure of the Muslim Brotherhood Khairat El 
Shater, former intelligence chief of Mubarak’s administration Omar Suleiman and popular 
Salafi leader Hazem Abou Ismail. 
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Although many candidates had been involved in the opposition against the former regime, 
they had also strong connections with the previous government and had completed most of 
their political career under Mubarak’s administration.  
 
Among the five leading candidates, independent liberal candidate Amru Mussa had served 
as minister of foreign affairs between 1991 and 2001 and represented Egypt as secretary 
general for the League of Arab states between 2001 and 2011. The candidate had also been 
appointed as permanent representative to the United Nations between 1990 and 1991. 
 
Independent candidate Ahmad Shafiq had served under the former administration as 
Minister of Aviation from 2002 to 2011 and had previously operated the function of 
commander of the Air Force for six years. Ahmad Shafiq stood out as a supporter of the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and was perceived by all the factions of the 
opposition as an agent of the military elite as well as the candidate of the counter-
revolution. 
 
Candidate of the Freedom and Justice party (Muslim Brotherhood) Mohammed Morsi as 
well as left-wing Nasserite Hamdeen Sabahy had been elected in 2000 to serve for five 
years as independent members of the Parliament.   
 
Most revolutionaries as well as the community of bloggers and activists contested the 
validity of the presidential race, which had been entirely regulated by the military council. 
However there was agreement among members of the opposition that candidates Hamdeen 
Sabahi and Abdel Moneim Abu al Futuh were more likely to conform to the revolutionary 
agenda. (cf. The Big Pharaoh, 2012: Ref. 71;72; Behhaya, 2012: Ref. 23;24).   
 
Both candidates had become leaders of the opposition, by mobilizing civilian movements 
for social equity and contesting acts of repression against the Muslim Brotherhood. As a 
co-founder of Kefaya48 (Egyptian Movement for Change), Hamdeen Sabahi had publically 
                                                48 Kefaya is the unofficial label of the Egyptian Movement for Change, which had been active consolidating 
the opposition against former president Hosni Mubarak since 2004. The movement motivated protests and 
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condemned corruption and nepotism under Mubarak’s government. He was involved in the 
former government as an independent member of the Parliament for ten years prior to the 
revolution, enabled to represent his own party - the Al-Karama (Dignity) party, which was 
only formally recognized in August 2011.  
 
Abdel Moneim Abu al Futuh had become famous in the 1970s, after publically expressing 
his criticism to former president Anwar Sadat, claiming more legitimacy for the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The candidate was well known for his moderate position within the 
conservative wing, being considered as particularly progressive on issues relating to 
gender equity and to the Christian minority. Although he competed as an independent, he 
had been committed to the strongest organization within the opposition for his entire 
political career.  
 
The five leaders Abdel Moneim Abu al Futuh, Ahmed Shafiq, Amru Mussa, Hamdeen 
Sabahy and Mohammed Morsi shared more than 90% of the votes in the first round of the 
elections. Commentators stated that the victory of the military candidate Ahmad Shafiq and 
representative of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohammed Morsi illustrated the polarisation of 
the Egyptian political environment and the leadership of two dominant groups: 
traditionalists and the military elites.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                              
grew as the backbone of the revolutionary opposition, gathering activists from different political orientations 
(Liberal, Leftist, Nasserist and Islamist). 
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Table 12: Score of the 5 leading presidential candidates (Egypt, 2012) 
 
 
7.3. Democratising the political debate or counter-discourse 
Following the parliamentary election (November 2011 to January 2012), the presidential 
race appeared as the opportunity for parties and political leaders to reclaim influence over 
the public sphere, by drawing attention to their own political agenda.  
 
 Whereas activists had become the object of media’s attention over the months that 
followed the revolutionary uprisings, officials running in the presidential election were 
now regarded as the main player in the media and political scene. I evidenced this 
phenomenon not only when analysing samples from the Egyptian blogosphere, but also by 
investigating the Egyptian case for the Voter Ecology ESRC research project. 
 
This study explores Internet users’ application of search engine Google in periods of 
elections. In order to compare voters’ behaviour in different political environments, it uses 
the application Google Trends to identify recurrent search keywords relating to four cases 
of presidential or parliamentary elections held in UK, Egypt, Italy and the US. By doing 
so, it intends to detect which aspects of the campaign proved to have stimulated citizens’ 
interest and whether these may be determined by mainstream media coverage.  
 
!
Leading!candidates! Suffrage! Affiliations! Ideology!
Mohammed!Morsi! 24.78%! Freedom!and!Justice!Party! Muslim!Brotherhood!
Ahmad!Shafiq! 23.66%! Independent! Military!
Hamdeen!Sabahy! 20.72%! Independent!(founder!of!the!
Karama!party)!
Socialist,!Nasserite!
Abdel!Moneim!Abu!
al!Futuh!
17.47%! Independent!(former!member!of!
the!Muslim!Brotherhood)!
Moderate!
traditionalist!
Amru!Mussa! 11.13%! Independent! Liberal!
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By comparing a set of search keywords, the study revealed that Egyptian Google users 
were more likely to seek information on political officials over the period of the 
presidential campaign. Alternatively, activists, who used digital media as their main 
channel of communication and remained disconnected from any specific political 
organisation, had generated more searches prior to the election and over the period of the 
2013 coup. But most importantly, this research highlighted the fact that news media shifted 
attention from grass-roots to institutional politics over the period of the 2012 presidential 
election.  
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Figure 10: Data visualisation computed on Google Trends (Voter Ecology Project, 2014)  
 
Figure 11: Data visualisation computed on Google Trends (Voter Ecology Project, 2014) 
 
 
As illustrated above, the Egyptian case study compared the volume of searches computed 
on Google for two sets of political actors. The first category included individuals or 
associations of independent activists, who had played a significant part in mobilising the 
opposition between 2011 and 2013. The second group involved presidential candidates, 
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government officials or party representatives affiliated to leading political organisations, 
whose campaign was more likely to be relayed by traditional mass media.  
 
Given that Google Trends can only be used to visualise fluctuations of search volume for a 
set of up to five keywords, the scale of searches (Google Trend Score) would often vary 
depending on the selection of keywords computed. In addition, the application would only 
operate comparisons of keywords, provided that the search terms in question stimulated a 
substantial amount of searches.  Yet, amongst the large number of names originally listed 
in each of these categories, only a very few proved to have generated a significantly high 
volume of searches. Consequently, the selection of keywords computed in this study is 
only representative of the most popular names in terms of Google searches.  
 
This method however outlines the level of exposure of different types of political actors 
over the months that followed the uprisings, suggesting that the 2012 campaign contributed 
to bring the revolution into the sphere of institutional politics.  
 
Yet beyond acknowledging the fact that the 2012 presidential debate unleashed the process 
of institutionalisation of the revolution, one needs to understand how the revolutionary 
counter-discourse operated this translation. To this end, this chapter explores how political 
officials applied interactive platforms such as Twitter to respond to or remediate the 
revolutionary discourse, and how this contributed to disseminate diverging interpretation 
of the revolution.  
 
7.4. Demystifying the role of Twitter and social media in the Egyptian 
revolution: 
According to a report published by Dubai School of Government (Salem and Mourtada, 
2011), Egypt was among the top five Arab countries in terms of number of Twitter users, 
along with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. However, Egypt’s Twitter 
penetration appears to be considerably low, with a 0.15 average penetration rate between 
January and March 2011: 
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Egypt particularly stands out, with one of the lowest Twitter user penetration 
rates in the region, especially given that the country has close to 7 million 
Facebook users and 17-18 million Internet users. There are two possible 
reasons for this. The first is that the distribution of Twitter users in Egypt is 
primarily concentrated in Cairo (51% of Twitter users), followed by 
Alexandria (8% of Twitter users) (…) This concentration of Twitter users in 
Cairo indicates that Twitter usage has not really caught on outside the capital. 
The second possible factor could be that Twitter has not yet offered an Arabic 
interface (initially scheduled for the first quarter of 2011). (Salem and 
Mourtada, 2011: 24) 
This observation had been confirmed to me by most of the participants I met during my 
fieldwork. When reflecting on the role of social media in the first post-revolutionary 
elections, Nabil, a young candidate to the 2015 Parliamentary election, argued that 
Facebook and Twitter had no significant impact on the votes. In his views, social media 
mainly remained a feature of revolutionary activism, whereas the presidential campaign 
had reintroduced an old fashioned kind of retail politics, bringing political leaders to 
interact directly with the electorate on the field:    
 (…) I mean social media started the whole people fire, but it was now moving 
on the ground, which really started to extinguish the fire a little bit. And if I 
want to take political campaign as an example, I guess I would take something 
like the Shafiq campaign. I mean yea, they were present in social media 
because everybody had to. Shafiq, Morsi, Abu al Futuh and all these guys and 
everybody had the social media presence, because they had to have it, but it 
was really ground work that distinguish between both and the areas, where they 
had the most fierce battles, like Shafiq had in Delta or Morsi had in Upper 
Egypt – those are not really internet-affluent voters motivated by Twitter or 
Facebook type of voters. It was, I mean, the anti-revolution did exactly the 
opposite, by taking the battle out of Facebook rather than onto Facebook and 
Twitter. (…) I’ll give you an example. There is (…) an icon of social media so 
to speak, Mahmoud Salem, Sandmonkey49, at the time 45,000 followers on 
Twitter, ran for Parliament in Heliopolis, got 5, 000 votes! In an area, where 
most of the population is affluent, I would say the Internet penetration would 
be at the higher end of where it would be anywhere it would be in Egypt (…) 
(Nabil, cf. Interview Transcripts: 46) 
                                                49 Famous Egyptian activist, active on social media under the pseudonym “Sandmonkey” 
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Egyptian Twitter users, however, do appear to be active in commenting on the political 
crisis. For example, #egypt and #jan25 launched to report on the 2011 uprisings proved to 
be the most popular trending hashtags across the Arab region (Salim and Mourtada, 2011: 
16). In addition, the study conducted by the Dubai School of Government indicate that a 
higher volume of tweets was published in periods of political crises (2011: 20). Although 
Twitter has only been accessible to a minority of the population, it proves to be specifically 
used as a tool for campaigning and political activism. For this reason the role of Twitter in 
the 2012 presidential debate should be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
 
Despite its low penetration rate and the issue of digital divide, this social platform provides 
an insight into the Egyptian political debate. It outlines some of the controversies that have 
been discussed on social media over the course of the presidential campaign and helps in 
understanding, which political camp had been more visible online. As such, it enables me 
to demonstrate to what extent social media benefitted from the counter-revolution, 
although it was initially regarded as an incubator for political resistance.  
 
7.5. Egyptian Twitter users and 2012 presidential race: 
 
Table 13: Description of the data sample extracted from the R-Shief data base 
 
 
R-Shief is an open-source project, which provides free access to a database of tweets 
posted in English and Arabic between 2008 and 2013. The website is also developing a set 
of data visualisation tools designed to conduct social media analysis in Arabic. The table 
Tweets&archived&in&the&R0Shief&data&base&
Candidates& #hashtag& Number&of&tweets&& days&collected& Start&date& End&date&
Abu&al&Futuh& حوتفلاوبا#	 81991& 423& 14.04.12& 11.06.13&
Hamdeen&Sabahy&
نيدمح#	 141342& 395& 12.05.12& 06.11.13&
يحابص#	 113630& 396& 11.05.12& 11.06.13&
Mohammed&Morsi&
يسرم#	 3157356& 396& 11.05.12& 11.06.13&
بنتسلاا_يسرم#	 2447& 422& 15.04.12& 11.06.13&
Amru&Mussa& ىسوم#	 49259& 396& 11.05.12& 11.06.13&
Ahmad&Shaﬁq& قيفش#	 703354& 341& 01.05.12& 07.04.13&
  
 
 
155 
above lists all hashtags mentioning the five leading candidates, which have been archived 
in the R-Shief database.  
 
As it appears, two sets of hashtags respectively refer to candidates Hamdeen Sabahy and 
Mohammed Morsi. Given that the first date of the archive vary depending on Twitter 
hashtag, I considered variations of tweets between 11th and 24th May 2012, so as to 
compare all tags listed in the table above.  
 
Table 14: Visibility of the candidates across the Twitter data set
 
 
The sample collected indicated that Ahmad Shafiq gained more visibility on Twitter than 
his opponents, with a significantly higher average and total amount of tweets. Additionally, 
as it appears on the graph below, the number of tweets referring to Mohammed Morsi and 
Hamdeen Sabahy considerably increased during the three days that preceded the election. 
However, despite the success of Mohammed Morsi’s campaign, the name of Hamdeen 
Sabahy slightly prevails in terms of visibility on Twitter. The data exported from R-Shief 
revealed a decrease of tweets in relation to candidate Abu al Futuh, which correlates with 
the date of the presidential TV debate, featuring Abu al Futuh and Amru Mussa, on 10th 
May 2012.  
Tweets&men)oning&the&ﬁve&leading&candidates&between&11.05.2012&and&24.05.2012&
&&
Trending&hashtags&&
referring&to&
candidates&
Hamdeen&
Sabahy&
&نيدمح#
	يحابص#
Ahmad&
Shaﬁq& 	قيفش#
Mohammed&
Morsi&
&يسرم#
&_يسرم#
	بنتسلاا
Amru&
Mussa& 	ىسوم#
Abdel&
Moneim&
Abu&al&
Futuh&
حوتفلاوبا#	
Minimum&
amount&of&
tweets&in&a&day&
466& 2,395& 74& 611& 851&
Maximum&
amount&of&
tweets&in&a&day&
10,085& 15,492& 8,484& 4,181& 4,529&
Total&amount&of&
tweets& 38,080& 94,669& 33,179& 19,589& 32,287&
Average&of&
tweets& 2,720& 6,762& 2,370& 1,399& 2,306&
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Figure 12: Visibility of the 5 leading candidates across the Twitter data set  
 
 
These findings coincide with Laila Shareen Sakr’s study (2012)50, which applies R-Shief 
sentiment analysis’ tools to investigate a broader set of hashtags reporting the 2012 
campaign. Among all Twitter occurrences found for the names of the presidential 
candidates, this computerised sentiment analysis identified the tweets, in which political 
leaders were referred to in positive terms. Whereas the number of occurrences associated 
with the name of a candidate highlights his visibility on Twitter, the percentage of positive 
sentiment indicates the quality of his reputation.    
 
The sentiment analysis computed by Sakr (2012) demonstrated that candidates Hamdeen 
Sabahy, Mohammed Morsi and Khaled Ali reached a higher percentage of positive 
sentiment associated with their names than Ahmad Shafiq. However, the number of 
occurrences for the name of Ahmad Shafiq was considerably higher than for the names of 
his opponents.  
 
Mentions of Ahmad Shafiq represented 41.51% of the sample, whereas other candidates 
were referred to by approximately 7% to 13% of the tweets included in this data set. This 
                                                50 It can be retrieved from: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/5716/egypts-presidential-elections-and-
twitter-talk 
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undeniably leads us to think that Shafiq’s campaign was significantly more visible on 
Twitter.   
 
 
Table 15: Findings of the Sentiment Analysis computed by Laila Shereen Sakr (2012) 
 
 
7.6. Candidates’ visibility across the media: Google searches and the 
Egyptian press  
  
Given Twitter’s relatively low penetration rate, these findings should be discussed by 
examining candidates’ visibility across different communication channels.  
 
In this regard, the study I produced for the ESRC comparative research project (above) 
contributes to assess candidates’ visibility across the web. For the purpose of this study, I 
employed the application “Google Trends” to compare frequencies of searches computed 
by Egyptian Google users for the names of the fives leading candidates and over the period 
of the 2012 election campaign. Similarly to Shareen Sakr’s (2012) study, this research 
revealed that candidate Ahmad Shafiq stimulated a constant increase of interest among the 
community of Egyptian Google users, which was not the case for Mohammed Morsi. This 
suggests that the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood was not as visible online during the 
first round of the presidential race. 
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Figure 13: Popularity of the 5 leading candidates in terms of Google Searches (Voter Ecology Project, 
2014) 
 
 
Twitter campaigning strategies can also be examined in the context of the wider media 
ecology, and specifically in relation to traditional mass media. For that purpose, I 
identified occurrences for the names of the five leading candidates across a selection of 
Egyptian news articles archived on the NexisLexis database51. As it appears in the table 
below, the amount of references listed seems to prefigure the success of Ahmad Shafiq and 
Mohammed Morsi in the first round of the election. Most importantly, this indicates that 
candidate Morsi was more visible offline and that his campaign was actively relayed by the 
press.  
  
                                                51 The selection included 37 Egyptian newspapers dedicated to general and political news. Among the 
sources selected and available on the NexisLexis database, four newspapers proved to have constantly 
reported the campaign: Al Messa (Arabic), Al-Ahram, Al-Ahram Gate (Arabic), Al Gomhurriah (Arabic). 
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Table 16: Visibility of the 5 leading presidential candidates across the NexisLexis news data set 
 
7.7. Candidates campaigning on Twitter 
Table 17: Inventory of the presidential candidates Twitter accounts (2012 presidential campaign)  
 
 
Besides quantifying candidates’ visibility and popularity among Twitter users, it is worth 
examining how political leaders attempted to use this medium to promote their political 
programme. For this purpose, I conducted a discourse and thematic analysis of a sample of 
tweets posted on candidates’ official Twitter accounts.  
 
As shown on the table above, only four of the five leading candidates had been actively 
campaigning on Twitter over the months that preceded the first round of the presidential 
race. No official Twitter account was administered on behalf of Mohammed Morsi prior to 
his election in June 2012. This can partly be explained by the fact that, as the 
representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, his campaign was already successfully relayed 
online and offline by the Freedom and Justice party.  
Visibility(of(political(leaders(in(the(Egyptian(Press(1(March822(May(2012(
(first(round(of(presidential(campaign)(
Names& Number&of&occurrences& %&Occurrences&among&political&leaders&considered&
"Ahmad'Shafiq"' 550' 24.8'
"Mohammed'Morsi"' 506' 22.8'
"Hamdeen'Sabahy"' 279' 12.6'
"Abu'al'Futuh"' 493' 22.2'
"Amru'Mussa"' 213' 9.6'
"Hazem'Salah'Abu'Ismail"'' 177' 8'
Data&collected&from&a&selection&of&37&Egyptian&periodic&newspapers&archived&in&the&NexisLexis&database&
'
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Whereas Morsi benefitted from the profile afforded by the network and infrastructure of 
his party, independent candidates were relying to a greater extent on social media’s 
facilitation of more direct engagement with their potential electorate.  
 
Some of the participants I interacted with on the field corroborated this idea. As she was 
contemplating the way in which various political agendas began to circulate via Twitter in 
the aftermath of the uprisings, young liberal journalist Samira raised the fact that candidate 
Morsi was essentially relying on the campaigning strategy of his party:   
 (…) let me tell you something about Morsi is that he was considered as the 
Muslim Brotherhood candidate so the Muslim Brotherhood, they had their own 
Twitter account and they would promote Morsi, regardless of whether he has 
his own Twitter account or not. And that also discredited him in a way. (…) so 
he was not even considered an individual candidate for himself, so he was 
considered just the Muslim Brotherhood pantomime that is used, exactly. 
Because, you know the other person from the Brotherhood, who were supposed 
to be running was Khairat al Shater52, who was more, you know, I’d say he 
was stronger within the organisation himself. (…) I should mention also the 
Salafies, like Abu Ismail, they had a lot of supporters, (…) were very vocal and 
had Twitter account that were very famous (…) I am talking about Twitter but 
also, all of that applies to Facebook of course, as well. Because that, it’s a 
different audience of course, you have to know, Facebook is more, reached the 
more traditional, general population, while Twitter the younger, tech-savvy, I 
know it’s all cliché but I guess it’s true, not only on Facebook but I guess for 
Twitter. (Samira, cf. Interview Transcripts: 27) 
Among the four Twitter accounts included in my sample, Amru Mussa’s moussacampaign 
and Abu al Futuh’s MaadiCampaign produced a larger amount of tweets between April 
and May 2012. Besides, Amru Mussa’s Twitter campaign had generated the highest 
number of tweets since its creation in June 2011. However, these social media profiles 
essentially highlighted public events and directed the audience to additional sources of 
information, by providing links to news articles, YouTube footages and Facebook pages. 
These accounts were not administered by the candidates themselves and were not meant to 
develop personalised interactions with Twitter users.  
                                                52 Leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood 
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Table 18: Inventory of unofficial Twitter accounts excluded from the data set  
 
 
Alternatively, Ahmad Shafiq and Hamdeen Sabahy’s tweets relayed candidates’ personal 
statements. Hamdeen Sabahy consistently applied the first person in his tweets. This was 
not always the case for the AhmadShafikEG account, which mostly quoted statements 
from Ahmad Shafiq’s public speeches and interviews. 
 
Yet unlike their opponents, Shafiq and Sabahy developed a particular Twitter 
communication strategy. Their posts revealed an attempt at developing a more 
conversational form of interaction with the electorate. The two candidates developed a 
more informal form of communication, which was that of the technologically literate 
middle class. As such, it targeted the same audience as digital activists. 
 
Among the 93 tweets produced by AhmadShafikEG, many statements extracted from 
presidential rally events promoted the inclusion and representativeness of women and the 
Christian minority into the future Egyptian government.  
 
This confirms a hypothesis formulated by local citizen journalists53 (The Big Pharaoh, 
2012: Ref. 71) according to which Ahmad Shafiq had been strategically portrayed as an 
alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, by advocating the integration of religious 
minorities as well as women’s involvement in politics, the candidate positioned himself 
along opposite ideological lines to the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, his Twitter 
                                                53 http://www.bigpharaoh.org/2012/05/22/whos-who-in-egypts-presidential-elections/ 
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campaign emphasised his engagement against sectarianism, by reporting his participation 
to the conference entitled “Egyptian Women and the President”, which was organised by 
the National Council for Women on the 19th May 2012. Additionally, Shafiq’s Twitter 
campaign covered his visits to Coptic churches in Egyptian provinces.  
 
Another aspect of Ahmad Shafiq’s political discourse and electoral programme, which was 
highlighted by his Twitter campaign, lies in the argument of national security. As the 
candidate of the counter-revolution, Ahmad Shafiq promoted himself as the only potential 
president able to restore political stability. This distinguished him from Abu al Futuh, and 
Hamdeen Sabahy, who publically contested the authority of the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF).  
 
Unlike his opponents, Ahmad Shafiq called for citizens’ trust in the military council and 
argued that the SCAF’s involvement in electoral regulations and infrastructure would not 
affect the democratic process. Admittedly, this argument – along with his military career 
and involvement in Mubarak’s former administration - characterised him as the partisan of 
the military regime. Therefore, it is very unlikely that this particular aspect of his discourse 
contributed to convince the Egyptian voters, who had celebrated the removal of Mubarak’s 
dictatorship.  
 
However, a closer analysis of the campaign indicates that Ahmad Shafiq’s position was 
advertised as an opportunity to restore stable political institutions and national security. 
Whereas candidates Sabahy, Abu al Futuh and Mohammed Morsi agreed on the need to 
review the peace treaty with Israel, Shafiq’s Twitter campaign reported his visit to Nag 
Hammadi – in which several Copts were massacred on 7th January 2010- advocating 
peaceful and strategic relationships with the United States, neighbouring Arab countries 
and the gulf region. In this case again, his political programme differentiated him from the 
revolutionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Egyptian citizens expected a 
renegotiation of theses political alliances.  
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These aspects of Ahmad Shafiq’s political programme show through his use of Twitter 
during the presidential race, evidencing an efficient and successful Twitter communication 
strategy. Not only did the social media cover daily official visits and presidential rally 
events of the campaign, but it also provided the audience with an overview of the 
candidate’s electoral programme. Indeed, after addressing issues of gender equity and 
women’s right, AhmadShafikEg reported Shafiq’s economic plan in response to youth 
unemployment and industrial development. Tweets posted between the 20th and 23rd May 
referred to his projects of industrialisation of the Suez canal region and his intention of 
democratising education and supporting young entrepreneurs, creating more professional 
perspectives for the post-Mubarak generation.  
 
Simultaneously, despite his attempt at restoring trust in the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces, Shafiq expressed his will to establish an office in charge of monitoring corruption 
as well as an office for democratic development. By addressing the topics of corruption, 
democratic development and youth unemployment on Twitter and by highlighting them as 
a major part of his political programme, Shafiq responded to some of the most consistent 
demands raised by revolutionaries.  
 
Therefore, although he distinguished himself as the candidate of the counter-revolution and 
despite his partnership with the military council, Ahmad Shafiq’s discourse resonated 
some of the demands raised by young liberals and revolutionaries. Egyptian bloggers, who 
reported and deconstructed candidates’ campaign in relation to the revolutionaries’ agenda, 
offered different interpretations to the success of Shafiq’s campaign, highlighting the fact 
that he benefitted from more financial resources than his opponents. Another argument 
precisely lies in Shafiq’s ability to answer to liberals’ concerns regarding the increasing 
popularity of religious parties and to mirror revolutionaries’ demands.  
 
However, these aspects of his political programme stand out from our Twitter data set, 
inasmuch as it characterises Ahmad Shafiq’s entire campaign. In this regard, the 
AhmadShafikEg Twitter account was used to amplify a discourse that had been initially 
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framed by campaigners, rather than as a complementary and straightforward 
communication channel between the candidate and his electorate.  
 
7.8.  Mapping Hamdeen Sabahy’s Twitter discourse 
In contrast, Hamdeen Sabahy’s tweets offered complementary statements and provided his 
followers with exclusive reactions to everyday news. Unlike his opponents, Hamdeen 
Sabahy did not use Twitter to report the highlights of his presidential campaign, but 
positioned himself amongst regular Twitter users by posting personalised comments on the 
most topical issues.  
 
On the 10th April 2012, Sabahy expressed his supports to the workers, who protested on 
April 2nd in front of the state Council to contest the government’s decision to regain the 
companies of Ghazl Shebeen, Tanta for Linen, El Nasr for Steam Boilers and El-Nil for 
cotton Ginning to the public sector. On the 11th April 2012, Sabahy paid tribute to the 
Algerian revolutionary socialist Ahmad Ben Bella, who died on the same date, referring to 
him as a leading figure of the mobilisation for freedom and social equity. On the 19th April, 
the candidate reacted to Sheikh Ali Goma’s controversial visit to the Al-Asqa Mosque in 
support of the Muslim community of Jerusalem, calling for the resignation of the Al-Azhar 
scholar. On the 20th April 2012, he expressed his condolences to candidate Ahmad Shafiq 
for the loss of his wife. On the 22nd April and 4th May, he contested the arrest of the 
Egyptian citizen Ahmed Al-Gizawy in Saudi Arabia, which had led to several protests in 
Cairo. On the 7th May, Hamdeen Sabahy celebrates the election of socialist candidate 
François Hollande in France. Finally, on the 15th May 2012, he refers to the death of 
former Egyptian Prime Minister and member of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s administration 
Zakaria Mohieddin.  
 
By shaping his postings more immediately around everyday news, Hamdeen Sabahy 
affords a certain currency to his political message, adopting the same perspective as his 
audience. Inevitably, this brings him to articulate his political campaign in relation to the 
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controversies that punctuate the presidential debate in a way that reflects pro-
revolutionaries’ application of social media.  
 
His ability to communicate to the pro-revolutionary youth does not only manifest itself in 
the style of his tweets but also in the issues he raises from his Twitter account. Over the 
first round of the campaign, Sabahy continuously pays tribute to the martyrs of the 
revolution and expresses his support to activists protesting in front of the Ministry of 
Defence. He calls for the right of the youth opposition to protest peacefully, naming 
military authorities responsible for their safety. He recurrently formulates scepticism 
regarding the way traditional mass media have been reporting the campaign, which 
coincides with one of the most important criticisms of the revolutionary opposition. For 
these reasons, Hamdeen Sabahy clearly stands out as the only candidate, who applied 
social media and referred to the ideological vocabulary of the revolution in a way that is 
representative of pro-revolutionary activism.  
 
In fact, the analysis I conducted on a sample of the activist blogosphere (Chapter 6) 
revealed that many of the bloggers, who remained critical about the evolution of the 
presidential debate, supported Sabahy’s campaign. Candidate Abdel Moneim Abu al Futuh 
was also celebrated among the activist community for attempting at reconciling liberals 
and conservatives (cf. The Big Pharaoh, 2012: Ref. 71;72; Behhaya, 2012: Ref. 23;24).  
 
Nevertheless bloggers covering the presidential race remained unsatisfied with the way 
most candidates responded to the claims of the revolution. As argued in my previous 
chapter, they contested the way military supporters and Islamist parties competed for 
different interpretations of the revolutionary discourse, so as to increase polarisation and 
discredit the left-wing and liberal opposition. Unlike his opponents, Sabahy echoed the 
revolutionary discourse through his Twitter campaign, by publically contesting the 
partiality of the media and the involvement the SCAF in the electoral process.  
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7.9. From Shafiq to Sabahy: revolution and counter-revolution 
intertwined 
In conclusion, analysing Twitter both quantitatively and qualitatively shows that among 
the top five candidates competing in the 2012 presidential race, Ahmad Shafiq and 
Hamdeen Sabahy were more active and popular on social media. The sample of tweets 
collected from the R-Shief database suggests that the two candidates have been the 
subjects of a significantly larger number of tweets than their opponents.  
 
The sentiment analysis computed by Laila Shereen Sakr (2012) as well as the volume of 
tweets mentioning the names of the five political leaders both suggest that Mohammed 
Morsi’s Twitter popularity also increased in the days that preceded the election. However, 
the former Egyptian president did not reach as much Twitter visibility as candidates Shafiq 
and Sabahy, presumably due to the fact that Morsi’s campaign did not primarily rely on 
social media and digital communication tools. Visualising the evolution of Google 
searches for the names of the candidates confirms this hypothesis, as Mohammed Morsi 
did not stimulate as many Google searches as Ahmad Shafiq. On the other hand, the 
sample of Egyptian news articles collected from my NexisLexis corpus included a large 
number of references to the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, the 
success of Mohammed Morsi’s campaign is more likely to be explained by his exposure in 
the press and in broadcast media.  
 
Alternatively, the significant visibility of Ahmad Shafiq and Hamdeen Sabahy on Twitter 
reveals the desire to interact with a specific demographic. Indeed, developing a Twitter 
campaigning strategy gave them access to a range of internet-affluent voters among the 
middle class, who were less likely to support conservative parties. Yet this audience – 
more specifically the younger generation - was also very concerned with the need to 
materialise the revolutionary discourse. It is precisely the reason why their tweets are 
formulated as an attempt to respond to the revolutionary claims.  
 
However, from an ideological perspective, Shafiq and Sabahy appear to be entirely 
different. Whereas Hamdeen Sabahy embraces revolutionary demands and presents 
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himself as an opportunity to institute them through his own political programme, Shafiq 
strategically distorts them to focus on the conflict between tradition and modernity. By 
doing so, he conveys the idea that military power remains the only way to prevent the 
success of the Muslim Brotherhood and capitalises on the fear of seeing the popularity of 
Islamists growing.  
 
7.10. Conclusion to empirical analysis 2: fluidity of the revolutionary 
vocabulary  
These findings illustrate how the tools as well as the ideological vocabulary of the 
revolution had been employed to serve different political agenda. Like most of the 
quantitative studies quoted above have shown, it is very unlikely that Twitter in itself, 
along with the entire social media sphere, played an important role in the outcome of the 
presidential campaign. The fact that the most visible and popular54 Twitter campaigners 
were among the top three candidates would rather suggest that they benefitted from a 
strong infrastructure and a successful campaigning strategy overall (online and offline). 
However, social media usage at the time of the campaign is revealing of the process of 
institutionalisation – hence alienation – of the revolution that operated in the entire 
political landscape.  
 
This phenomenon can also be observed when looking at the relationship between 
traditional and digital media. For instance, the analysis I computed on Google Trends 
suggested that Google searches were very likely to be determined by traditional mass 
media coverage. For example, I observed that most of the names of activists and 
opposition movements that had generated significant search peaks (cf. figure 2, page 4) 
had been mentioned in the press and on national TV channels.  
 
Among them was the famous satirist and TV host Bassem Youssef and the former head of 
the Middle Eastern branch of Google Wael Ghonim, who had become famous after being 
                                                54 By mentioning the popularity of the candidates I refer to Laila Shereen Sakr’s (2012) sentiment analysis of 
all the Arabic tweets produced over the course of the campaign and more specifically to the high level of 
positive sentiments associated to Mohammed Morsi. 
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interviewed on the Dream TV channel in the aftermath of the uprisings. Like many other 
activists, who progressively became involved in a more institutional form of politics, Wael 
Ghonim started to publically express his support to candidate Abu al Futuh, by actively 
taking part in the campaign. Parties and presidential candidates attempted to regain 
legitimacy and sought the support of those who had become prominent figures of the 
revolution. Yet in doing so, they inevitably operated a distortion of the revolution, as it was 
originally conceived by revolutionary leaders and the grassroots.   
  
  
 
 
169 
8. Third empirical analysis: the 2012 constitutional debate 
As argued in the first empirical analysis (chapter 6), analysing the revolutionary 
blogosphere between the 2011 uprisings and the 2013 coup outlined the fact that the 
opposition had become highly polarised. Left wing, liberals, secularists and Islamists 
would now compete for a different narrative of the revolution, which had made the entire 
revolutionary discourse fluid and inconsistent.  
 
This had been emphasised by the 2012 presidential election, as parties and political leaders 
incorporated the revolutionary discourse to label their political agenda as the legitimate 
answer to revolutionaries’ demands. This clearly stood out when analysing candidates’ 
Twitter campaigning strategy. Despite the fact that social media might have been primarily 
applied by the Islamist and left-wing opposition to circumvent the traditional media 
blackout, it was now used to serve the interests of the counter-revolution.  
 
With regards to my first research question, this demonstrated that the momentum of the 
revolution was highly likely to be hijacked by the leading political forces. Consequently, 
when it comes to visualising the cycle of discourse as it applies to the case of the Egyptian 
uprisings, it could easily be argued that the 2012 presidential race constituted the first stage 
of the process through which the revolution became institutionalised.  
 
Following the 2012 presidential election, the first constitutional referendum raised further 
concerns on how to implement the changes requested by revolutionaries and involve 
citizens in future policymaking. Yet despite the fact that the referendum was administrated 
by the first democratically elected government, it revealed deep conflicts of interests 
between the new elite and the judicial administration.  
 
Most importantly, the constitutional debate revealed a lack of consensus with regards to 
the way citizens had envisioned some of the revolutionary ideals and their applications. As 
it appeared from the ethnography I conducted in the field, a broader range of citizens 
among the middle class, who were initially not involved in politics, were now publically 
expressing their views via digital media. As the public debate progressively involved a 
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broader diversity of recently politicised actors, one could now see how different 
interpretations of the concepts - that had generated a high level of social cohesion during 
the revolution  - would take shape.  
 
Social equity, dignity and freedom would now be addressed on the basis of different 
ideological frameworks, which only highlighted the polarisation of the political 
environment. Simultaneously, the term “democracy” was to be redefined in relation with 
the Islamic concept of Shura, as the Egyptian people further debated on how to potentially 
reconcile tradition and modernity.    
 
In this chapter, I will set the context in which the 2012 constitutional referendum took 
place and demonstrate that this event announced a new stage in the cycle that led the 
revolution to the rise of the counter-revolution. For this purpose, I will rely on a thematic 
analysis I conducted on a sample of the Dostour Sharek e-deliberation platform as well as 
on interviews conducted with two key actors involved in the constitutional campaign. I 
will show that the constitutional debate occurred in a heavily polarised environment, which 
created further confusion with regards to the original meaning of the revolution.  
 
Additionally, on the basis of the Dostour Sharek case study, I will comment on the way 
Egyptian citizens have experienced online forms of deliberation. Whereas most of the 
literature has approached this question from the perspective of Habermas’ public sphere 
(Cardon, 2010; Flichy, 2010), I will focus on whether such deliberative practices can 
efficiently lead to a consensus. For this purpose, I will compare the level of interactivity - 
an indicator commonly applied in the literature on e-governance – with what I will define 
as the level of intertexuality of citizens’ comments. By doing so, I will argue that the 
Egyptian post-revolutionary debate is indicative of the fact that the 2011 uprisings might 
have relied on an illusion of consensus.  
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8.1. Setting the context of the 2012 constitutional debate 
Table 19: Events surrounding the 2012 constitutional debate 
 
  
Chronology of the Events surrounding the 2012 Egyptian constitutional referendum 
13th Feb 2011 2011 Parliament is dissolved  
19th March 2011 First referendum on constitutional amendments set by the military authorities 
Nov 2011-Jan 2012 2011 Parliamentary elections 
Jan 2012 
House of Representatives nominated 100 of its members to constitute the first 
Constituent Assembly 
10th Apr 2012 
First Constituent Assembly is dissolved by Supreme Administrative Court 
(SAC) under the pressure of liberal and non-Islamist groups 
7th June 2012 
Representatives of 22 parties and military council reach agreement: New 
Constituent Assembly is formed 
14th June 2012 
Dissolution of the House of Representatives by the SCAF, after court ruling 
decrees Parliamentary election are unconstitutional  
17th June 2012 
Military council issues a new decree to the provisional constitutional draft 
allowing the SCAF to dissolve the assembly in case it encounters difficulties and 
fail at completing its task 
26 June 2012 
First session of the Constituent Assembly: subcommittees are formed to address 
different chapters of the constitution  
Mid-July 2012 6 members of the Egyptian bloc parties (the liberal coalition) resigned 
11th Aug 2012 
Constitutional draft articles are posted on the “Dostour Sharek” e-consultation 
platform  
Sep 2012 
Left-wing and liberal members progressively withdraw from the Constituent 
Assembly and call for a boycott 
10th Oct 2012 Constituent assembly launches the “Know your constitution” campaign 
23rd Oct 2012 
Administrative court announces that a decision will be taken regarding the 
legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly within 45 days. Islamist parties celebrate 
the fact that this delay enables the Constituent Assembly to complete the 
constitutional draft and submit it to referendum.  
22nd Nov 2012 Mohammed Morsi issues controversial decree granting him unlimited powers 
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Chronology of the Events surrounding the 2012 Egyptian constitutional referendum 
29th Nov 2012 
Last meeting of the constituent Assembly (article 2 establishing the Sharia as the 
basis for Egyptian law with only 83 members being present and with most of 
liberal and Christian representatives being absent) 
1st Dec 2012 
Last changes incorporated into the constitutional draft: 803 draft articles have 
been produced over the drafting process. 
3rd Dec 2012 
Judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court announce that they will not oversee 
the referendum to protest against Mohammed Morsi controversial decree 
5th Dec 2012 
Violent clashes between members of the Muslim Brotherhood and opponents in 
front of presidential palace 
8th & 11th Dec 2012 Egyptians living abroad vote on the 2012 constitutional draft 
15th Dec 2012 
First round of the constitutional referendum. Constitution is accepted with 
63.96% of votes and 34% of election turnout 
 
The first constituent assembly was elected by the Parliament in March 2012 and dissolved 
in April 2012, after Civil parties’ members massively withdrew, calling for a boycott of the 
new constitution. Liberals, left-wing and secularist parties, that formed the opposition 
against the Islamist majority claimed that the panel was unconstitutional and failed at 
representing Egyptian youth and minorities55.  
 
Consequently, the first assembly was dissolved by court order, although Islamist parties 
argued that this decision did not conform to the SCAF’s original constitutional declaration 
(2011). Indeed, although the original set of regulations did not state how the constitutional 
assembly should be appointed, members of the military council argued that article 60 of 
the original constitutional declaration was too vague to guarantee a fair representation of 
the Egyptian population within the assembly and should be reviewed. A new constituent 
assembly was formed in June 2012, which included delegates from the armed forces, 
representatives from judiciary and trade unions as well as members of the Coptic Church. 
The new assembly was intended to include 50% of Islamist representatives for 50% of 
liberal and Civil parties’ members. However, the liberal opposition stated that 
                                                55 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18360403;  
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traditionalists still represented the majority of seats and parties such as Al-Masryeen Al-
Ahrar kept calling for a boycott of the constitution.  
 
8.2. The crowdsourcing process 
A first constitutional draft was issued on 10th October 2012, after which the constitutional 
assembly implemented a nationwide campaign promoting the constitution via mainstream 
media channels. Additionally, supporters of the constitution hosted consultation meetings 
and information centres in order to stimulate participation. The Freedom and Justice party 
launched its own campaign advertising, “yes” to the constitutional referendum.  In 
reaction, opposition groups, such as the 6th April movement and the now-defunct National 
Democratic Party group publically contested the fact that the new constitution maintained 
the privileges of the elite in power, while restraining the rights of religious minorities.  
 
Following the resignation of a few of the members of the Egyptian Bloc alliance56, liberal 
leaders, including former candidate Amru Mussa, requested that the seats should be 
replaced by representatives of the Christian community. Hamdeen Sabahy and Mohammed 
El Baradei called for the mobilisation of left wing and revolutionary organisations - such 
as the Kefaya movement – to boycott the Constituent Assembly.  
 
Strong criticism had been expressed regarding article number 2 of the constitutional draft, 
which established the sharia as the basis of Egyptian law. Opponents of the constitutional 
draft stated that the text did not fairly represent pluralism of opinion within the population 
and restricted the rights of the Coptic minority. They contested the fact that the new 
constitutional text remained extremely vague, which potentially enabled ruling elites to 
circumvent the law or promulgate new regulations that would serve their interest. Various 
protests and demonstrations took place over the course of the drafting process as well as 
when the final draft had been submitted to the referendum.  
                                                56 Political alliance formed by liberal, leftist, social democratic and other opponents to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The alliance was originally formed during the 2011 Parliamentary election and remained active 
after the election of president Morsi in 2012. 
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By the end of the drafting process, 236 articles had been produced for which 320 had been 
originally drafted. However, most of the changes made to the original draft did not 
substantially modify the meaning of the articles, and rather intended to slightly improve 
and review their formulations.  
8.3. Polemics and controversies 
New parliamentary elections were expected within three months after the referendum, if 
the constitutional draft was to be accepted. Alternatively, a new constituent assembly 
would have to be formed within the same period of time57. The polemic intensified in the 
days that preceded the referendum scheduled on 15th December, as opponents condemned 
Islamists for attempting to influence voters.  
 
Leaders of the opposition, who had previously been involved in the presidential debate, 
such as Mohammed El Baradei, Hamdeen Sabahy and Amru Mussa formed the National 
Salvation Front. The coalition intended to consolidate the opposition against the Islamist 
majority and called Egyptians to vote “no” to the constitutional referendum. Members of 
the “no campaign” contested the fact that the constitutional draft primarily reflected the 
interest and ideological vision of the Muslim Brotherhood and failed at preserving the 
rights of women and the Christian minorities.  
 
On the 22nd November, President Morsi issued a constitutional decree, in which he granted 
himself ultimate power over 58 the Parliamentary chambers, allowing him to promulgate 
new laws by decree and to annul on-going adjudication. In this constitutional declaration, 
the president assigned a new prosecutor and extended the period of time originally set for 
the activity of the constituent assembly, which was limited to 15 days between the issue of 
the final draft and the date of the referendum. The decree also prevented the Shura Council 
                                                57  http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/60092/Egypt/Politics-/Morsis-decree-cancelled,-
constitution-referendum-t.aspx; (Al Ahram Online, 09/12/2012) 
 58 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20829911; (BBC News, 23.12.2012) 
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from being dissolved by the judiciary and established the predominance of the presidential 
administration over the military council.  
 
Although president Morsi was celebrated for restricting military authorities, his decree was 
interpreted as an attempt to control legislative powers and stimulated a wave of protests. 
From that moment, the tension reached its heights outside as well as within the political 
circles represented in the new government.  
 
Judges in charge of supervising the polling stations went on strike to contest Morsi’s 
constitutional decree and manifest their discontent regarding the appointment of the new 
prosecutor59. The strike considerably affected the organisation of the referendum, making it 
impossible to administer the poll in one round. The suffrage would take place in two 
different rounds, which might have affected the outcome, given that citizens voting on the 
second round could have been influenced by preliminary results.  
 
Demonstrations, sometimes leading to violent confrontations took place across the country, 
contesting the fact that the new president might hold all executives and legislative powers. 
On 5th December, clashes occurred between members of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
protestors conducting peaceful demonstrations in front of the presidential palace. The 
event led to six deaths and 400 injuries. The constitutional decree was revoked on 
December 6th. On the 9th December 2012, after considering the possibility of postponing 
the suffrage60, Morsi confirmed his intention of submitting the referendum. By doing so, he 
conformed to SCAF’s original 2011 constitutional declaration, stipulating that a 
referendum should take place 15 days after the president received a final draft from the 
Constituent Assembly.61 Secretary general Zaghloul al-Bashy and vice president Mahmoud 
                                                59  http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/59693/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-expats-to-vote-on-
constitution--December--.aspx ; (Al Ahram Online, 03/12/2012) 
 60 http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/07/constitutional-referendum-postponed/;  
(Daily News Egypt, 07/12/2012) 
 61  http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/60092/Egypt/Politics-/Morsis-decree-cancelled,-
constitution-referendum-t.aspx; (Al Ahram Online, 09/12/2012) 
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Mekki both resigned in December62. On 15th December 2012, the referendum took place 
with a 32.9%63 (34% according to participants interviewed) turnout and with 63,8% of 
eligible voters voting in favour of the new constitution in Cairo.  
 
The first Constituent assembly, which was formed in January 2012, was composed of 
members of the House of Representatives who had been elected by the Egyptian people 
during the Parliamentary elections. The second Constituent Assembly included 39% of 
MPs, who had been elected by the people. During the process of drafting the constitution, 
the assembly was divided into five committees64 assigned to the five different chapters of 
the constitution. Additionally, a sixth committee – composed of members of the assembly - 
was in charge of ensuring participation and consultation.  
 
In the early stage of the deliberations, the committee in question hosted hearing sessions in 
different governorates’ city halls and public universities to collect feedbacks and inputs 
from citizens in different governorates. Supporting staff were in charge of collecting all 
forms of suggestions and enquires from citizens and reporting feedback to the assembly 
after analysing it. All meetings of the constituent assembly were broadcasted by national 
TV Channels.  
 
Over the weeks that preceded the 22nd November decree, the person in charge of 
supervising the work conducted to promote the drafting process and its transparency 
publically resigned. The interview conducted with two participants involved in the 
implementation of the project revealed that the participative dimension of the constitution 
draft reached a critical point at this stage. Due to the polemic of Morsi’s decree, Islamist 
                                                62 http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/elections-commission-secretary-general-resigns;  
(Egypt Independent, 19/12/2012) 
 63  http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-constitution-passes-638-percent-approval-rate ; (Egypt 
Independent, 25/12/2012) 64 “The Basic Principles of the State & the Egyptian Society Committee”, “The Rights, Freedoms, and Public 
Duties Committee”, “Regime and Public Authority Committee”, “Regulatory and Independent Bodies 
Committee”, and “Drafting and Research Committee” 
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parties regained control over the constitution and the company in charge of administering 
the Dostour Sharek platform did not have the opportunity to present an overview of 
participants’ inputs to the assembly.  
 
8.4. Interviewing the people behind the Dostour Sharek initiative 
The two participants interviewed for this chapter had been involved in the technological 
design and administrative implementation of the Dostour Sharek project. As such, they 
experienced different challenges, while collaborating closely with each other to administer 
and update the consultation platform between July and November 2012.  
 
The first participant interviewed, Nouredin65, had been working as a software developer for 
an external company mandated by the government. The company in question was in 
charge if creating a voters database in preparation of the first post-revolutionary 
referendum, in March 2011. The Middle Eastern branch of Google had initially introduced 
his software engineering team to the government and provided the financial support 
required to develop new applications intended to facilitate voters’ participation. After 
January 2011, the government appointed the company in question to create a functional 
voters database in order to handle voters’ registration and inform citizens of the location of 
poll stations. Due to the short notice, the public administration did not have the financial 
resources to pay for the work commissioned and Nouredin’s company accepted to provide 
the services requested by the state without remuneration. Afterwards, the work provided by 
his company for the Egyptian government was paid. Among the projects designed by the 
company in question, the Dostour Sharek initiative had been envisioned and suggested to 
the government by Nouredin and his team.  
 
The main aspect of the project that seduced the constituent assembly was the fact that the 
company would have conducted a computerised sentiment analysis, summarising 
participants’ views for every single article of the draft. The outcome of the analysis would 
have been presented to the assembly in the later stage of the drafting process. However, the 
                                                65 The name of the participant has been anonymised  
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precipitation with which Morsi’s administration submitted the constitutional draft in early 
December put an end to the final stage of the project. Nouredin noticed a conflict of 
interests between the members of the administration in charge of communicating the 
updates of the draft, which affected the original purpose of the project.  
 
His company handled the technical administration of the platform and was asked to create 
a code that would filter any comment, including inappropriate language. Additionally, 
administrators created a new code to filter any comments copied and pasted from previous 
contributions. The decision was taken after the Salafi leader and former presidential 
candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail had called all his supporters to copy and paste the same 
comment on article number 2 of the constitutional draft.  
 
The article in question was the most contested article of the draft, according to Dostour 
Sharek’s statistics, and one of the most controversial articles according to commentators as 
it stated that Islam was to be the main source of Egyptian law. Abu Ismail, had invited his 
followers to argue that Islam should be referred to as the one and only source for Egyptian 
law and this argument soon became the most recurrent topic addressed for this specific 
article. After the incident, the designers of the Dostour Sharek project ensured that the 
same comment would not be recurrently posted for a single article.  
 
The second participant interviewed for this study, Said66, worked within the government to 
run a campaign of information about the referendum. According to him, the first issue of 
the constitutional draft did not raise a lot of criticism among citizens and members of civil 
parties.  The constituent assembly also appeared to be very reluctant at delivering draft 
articles in the early stage of the drafting process, to the point that he sometimes had to 
“steal” them in order to make them public. Progressively, the assembly took consideration 
of the feedback reported from the committee and supporting staff in charge of analysing 
the comments. Some of the most common and unanimous views had been considered 
before redrafting the articles. Yet, the consultative infrastructure implemented to draft the 
                                                66 The identity of the participant has been anonymised 
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constitution was threatened in late November, due the struggles generated by the 
constitutional decree.  
 
Despite the conjunction of communication channels applied to involve citizens in the 
drafting process, the debate remained highly polarized and resulted in a relatively low 
turnout and in the opposition’s call to boycott the referendum. Therefore, whereas e-
governance research would commonly seek to assess to what extent citizens’ inputs have 
been incorporated into the outcome of a political project, this case study also brings us to 
reflect on how participation was intended to act as a means of legitimisation (Hart, 2003; 
Maboudi and Nadi, forthcoming67).   
 
8.5. Success of the Dostour Sharek e-consultation project in terms of 
interactivity 
The analysis conducted on the first set of comments posted on the Dostour Sharek website 
highlights some of the characteristics of the constitutional debate. A first observation can 
be formulated with regards to the level of interactivity. From the perspective of e-
governance studies, interactivity mainly refers to the level of interactions occurring 
between citizens and the public administration (Chatfield and Alhujran, 2009).  
 
In this particular case, one might argue that the constituent assembly essentially responded 
to citizens’ comments by reviewing the constitutional draft on a regular basis. Besides, 
interaction occurred offline thanks to the infrastructure implemented during the drafting 
process, such as the committees in charge of collecting citizens’ suggestions in local 
districts. However, the Dostour Sharek e-consultation platform did not lead to any direct 
interactions between citizens and policymakers.  
 
On the basis of Habermas’ public sphere, some may also interpret interactivity as the level 
of interplay between participants. When applying Habermas’ model, Cardon (2010) and 
Flichy (2010) would for instance argue that a successful debate relies on the process 
                                                67 https://www.american.edu/spa/gov/upload/democracry2013-nadi-maboudi.pdf  
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through which different perspectives oppose and challenge each other. This is precisely the 
reason why their work investigates whether digital technology users are likely to confront 
their views and critically respond to each other’s statements. In the case of the 2012 
Dostour Sharek initiative, this form of interaction is hardly noticeable, as users never 
directly refer to each other’s comments, nor directly address each other’s arguments.  
 
Rather, as I will demonstrate, we find a certain degree of interactivity in the way 
participants restate the same criticisms, and come, by all appearances to a consensus, when 
interpreting and discussing draft articles. Nevertheless, whether it comes to interactions 
among users or between policymakers and participants it clearly stands out that this lack of 
interactivity was due to the way the participation platform was originally designed. Unlike 
social media interface, the platform did not include subcomments, enabling participants to 
respond to each other’s remarks.   
 
Admittedly, participants’ accounts linked to their social media profile (Facebook), 
notifying their network that they had contributed to the Dostour Sharek project. However, 
no function was designed to address personalised messages to them. Unlike any discussion 
forum, the Dostour Sharek platform was not designed in a way that generates a flow of 
conversation between either of the actors involved. The input of the constituent assembly 
was limited to posting regular updates on the constitutional draft. Likewise, participants 
were only able to post personalised comments and rank the articles by using a like or 
dislike notification. 
 
To some extent this relays to a statement formulated by one of the participants I interacted 
with during the course of the fieldwork I conducted for this study. While reflecting on the 
evolution of social media usage, he compared Egyptians’ application of digital 
technologies to a therapy, suggesting that Egyptian people started to use participative 
media as a way to release and express themselves, instead of developing a bilateral debate. 
 
To some extent, the design of the Dostour Sharek platform enhanced this phenomenon, as 
it primarily intended to gather a collection of individual comments. For instance, some 
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participants successively posted the same comments for different articles, no matter the 
object of the articles in question. In most cases, these inputs addressed the entire 
constitutional draft calling for electors to vote yes or no to the referendum. Whilst some 
participants promoted the draft, others explicitly stated that it did not succeed in achieving 
the purpose of the revolution. However, none of these comments specifically addressed the 
content of the articles below which they had been posted.   
 
More specifically, the particularity of these comments lies in the fact that they did not 
develop any reflection on the content of the constitutional draft, nor on the criticism 
previously formulated by other participants. Admittedly, such messages are not entirely 
unilateral, because some of them are addressed to a specific audience. For instance, many 
comments included implicit as well as explicit addresses to the constituent assembly, 
complimenting them for the constitutional draft or asking them to improve specific articles. 
This suggests that citizens participated with the intention of contributing to the drafting 
process, beyond the satisfaction they might have got from publicly expressing their views. 
Yet this also indicates that what one might consider as a deliberative and interactive space 
has often been applied to assert pre-defined personal opinions. 
 
8.6. Hidden interactivity: the sense of consensus 
As mentioned above, no direct interactions occurred between any of the actors involved in 
the deliberative process. However, participants recurrently raised the same issues when 
commenting on the content of the articles. I was therefore able to identify several trends or 
topics for each set of comments analysed. Despite the fact that the platform did not allow 
any form of interactive deliberation, participants appeared to easily reach consensus, as 
they often formulated the same criticisms. In fact, what could be perceived as a form of 
consensus is not the outcome of a rational argumentation between different actors 
interacting with each other, in Cardon (2010) or Flichy’s (2010) terms. As such, it is not 
compatible with Habermas’ definition of the public sphere. Alternatively, although series 
of concurrent arguments can be found across the data set, no evidence allows me to think 
that the flow of early comments might have influenced the later ones. In other words, given 
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that this sense of consensus cannot be related (correlated) to any obvious form of 
interactivity, it is as if participants initially and individually produced a similar 
interpretation of the draft.  
 
Once again, this case study forces us to extend our understanding of interactivity. The 
analysis attests that a substantial number of later comments are in line with the comments 
that preceded and that a continuation of ideas takes place. This is precisely what brings me 
to postulate the formation – or pre-existence - of a consensus. Although this consensus is 
not the result of direct interactions, one can easily argue that it demonstrates a high level of 
intertextuality. Here I refer to intertextuality - as an implicit form of interactivity, since it 
consists in discursive rather than social interconnection. In other words, the cohesion of 
arguments across comments shows that users might have interacted indirectly, by 
conveying a common interpretation of the constitutional draft.  
 
This is particularly meaningful, when it comes to building theory around concepts such as 
e-democracy or connectivity, as it suggests that interactivity is not a prerequisite for 
consensus. On the contrary, the most common and predominant arguments might produce 
a stronger sense of consensus, when they are not challenged by any form of interactive 
deliberation. Therefore, without distinguishing interactivity and intertextuality, one can 
easily be mistaken, by considering dominant discourses as the result of a democratic and 
interactive deliberation. Indeed, intertextuality evidences the existence of a common 
ground and a shared set of beliefs, whereas interactivity often leads to the chaotic 
confrontation of diverging opinions.  
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Table 20: Distinguishing Interactivity and Intertextuality 
  
 
To a large extent, the most recurrent criticism, which was formulated on the Dostour 
Sharek platform pointed to the vagueness of the articles. Participants agreed on the fact 
that many of the concepts stated in constitutional laws should be clearly redefined. 
 
For this sample and according to the different arguments identified for this content 
analysis, the most consensual comments represented between 30% and 40% of the 
contributions posted for each of the 29 articles. For instance, among the 56 comments 
considered for article number 5 of the draft – which stated that national sovereignty 
belonged to the people - 34% of the comments requested clarifying how people’s 
sovereignty should be exercised.  
 
In some cases, contributors explicitly condemned the fact that the lack of clarity of the 
draft would give too much power to legislators, who will be in charge of introducing 
further regulations. This clearly stood out from the comments analyzed for articles number 
14 and 18 of the draft, which both included a final statement specifying that further 
regulations and potential exceptions would be applicable by law. 
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8.7. Preventing exceptions to the law: articles 14 and 18 
To some extent, article 14 resonated with some of the most fundamental demands that had 
been expressed by revolutionaries in the early stage of the uprisings. The article in question 
asserted that economical developments should support social justice and solidarity, by 
improving standards of living, preserving the rights of the working class and allowing a 
fair distribution of wealth. Additionally, it briefly addressed the question of minimum 
salaries, establishing that minimum wages and pensions should be sufficient to allow 
decent conditions of life. A final statement instituted that a maximum wage would be 
determined in the public sector, while permitting potential exceptions that would be 
justified by law.  
 
Most of the criticisms expressed in the comments underlined the fact that none of the 
concepts mentioned in the article had been appropriately defined. Among them, 21% of the 
contributions claimed that the amount or proportion of minimum wage should be specified 
in the article and that its value should be determined in relation to inflation. Another 
considerable number of comments – 37% - argued that the article should not include any 
potential exception that might enable policymakers to circumvent this regulation.  
 
Article 18, which established the responsibility of the State in preserving and managing 
public resources, generated a similar reaction. Indeed, this section of the constitutional 
draft specified that natural resources should be preserved and administered for the sake of 
public good and that no concession should be granted by the state to exploit these 
resources, unless it might be justified by law.  In this case again, 12 out of the 41 
comments analyzed contested the exception formulated in the article. To a large extent 
these reactions coincided with a first set of criticisms that condemned the lack of clarity of 
the new constitutional text. Vague articles would require further legislation before 
becoming fully applicable. This would inevitably limit citizens’ consultative power, while 
providing the parliamentary chambers with more room for manoeuvre. 
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8.8. Article 6: negotiating the meaning of Shura and democracy 
In many cases, contributors underlined the fact that some of the concepts addressed 
appeared to be too intangible and had to be clarified by including further regulations. This 
highlighted the fact that some of the notions through which the post-revolutionary debate 
had been framed remained fluid and easily distorted by the different political actors 
involved.  
 
In view of this, the draft of article 6, which defined the Egyptian political system as 
democratic stimulated a controversial discussion on the distinction between Shura and 
democracy. Just like article 5 was often interpreted as the negation of God’s sovereignty, 
the idea of a democratic state was perceived as in contradiction with the Islamic concept of 
Shura and the ideal of a society based on Islamic law. In fact, comments demonstrated that 
democracy, which the international community often perceived as the primary motive of 
the revolution, was still the object of an ongoing debate among the Egyptian people. 
Admittedly, middle class revolutionaries aspired at eradicating corruption and improving 
the representation of the youth and the working class in the future government. However, 
this claim was not received, nor was it upheld by the broader population as a pro-
democracy argument.  
 
Both the discursive analysis and interviews conducted for this chapter revealed that what 
commentators and international media might have interpreted as a struggle for democracy 
was only the sign of an overwhelming discontent (Jumet, 2014).  Indeed, the real motives 
of Egyptians’ mobilization, in early 2011, lied in people’s everyday economical struggles. 
Just as my ethnography was about to demonstrate, young revolutionaries failed at 
embodying the conceptual ideals and values of the revolution – such as human dignity or 
social justice – by referring to the practical needs of the lower class.  
 
A similar gap took shape between the way Western social scientists attempted to 
understand the uprisings and the reality of the ground. Indeed, whereas the Arab Spring 
became the ultimate case study to discuss democratisation in the age of informational 
capitalism, the event did not have very much to do about democratisation (Lopes de Souza 
  
 
 
186 
and Lipietz, 2011; Sarquis, 2012; Jumet, 2014). Beyond the fact that democracy per se was 
not considered as a priority, interviews revealed that the concept of democracy was 
commonly understood by the average population as a Western form of secularist state.  
 
As such it opposed itself to the model of Islamic Shura, according to which citizens and 
government representatives debate the legislation on the basis of Islamic law. This 
common belief, which appears to be very strong among the Egyptian population beyond 
Islamist parties official discourse – clearly reflected itself in the comments posted on 
article 6 of the constitutional draft.  
 
Yet, among many other examples identified in this sample, a large amount of comments 
intended to discuss the meaning of the term “ democracy” and to question its application in 
the constitutional text. More specifically, such comments demonstrated citizens’ urge to 
clarify and refine the broader concepts that had been addressed during the revolutionary 
phase and had progressively been incorporated into different – and sometimes conflicting – 
political discourses. This precisely explains some of the confusion, misunderstandings and 
sometimes-contradictory reactions I have observed, when analyzing how this set of 
constitutional articles was received.  
 
8.9. Negotiating the meaning of sufficiency, justice, equity and 
freedom  
The most recurrent response generated by article 6 of the draft regarded a statement of the 
article stipulating that no political party should be based on discriminatory criteria of 
distinctions between citizens, such as gender, origins or religion.  18 out of 87 comments 
considered for this article questioned whether Islamists parties would still conform to their 
ideology if they complied with this rule. While some of these comments came to question 
the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Noor party, others requested to remove 
this reservation in order to avoid any formulation that might discredit Islamist movements.  
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Here again, participants’ reactions revealed that the constitutional text relied on a fluid 
vocabulary, which could lead to very different interpretations. On one hand, the article 
failed at clarifying to what extend Islamist parties might conform to this particular 
definition of a discriminatory ideology. On the other hand, it did not provide any clear 
definition of what should be considered as democratic versus discriminatory, allowing 
every reader to interpret those terms from her ideological perspective. Participants’ 
comments therefore display diverging understandings of these concepts, which illustrates 
how future legislation could have easily restricted the application of this constitutional 
article. 
 
In this context, the terms “non-discriminatory” and “democratic” are often interpreted and 
understood as secular. This is precisely what brings up a misunderstanding when the 
constitution defines Islam as the main source of Egyptian law (article 2), while promoting 
democratic representation and non-discriminatory politics (article 6).   
 
A similar phenomenon has been observed for the set of comments extracted from article 8, 
according to which the State shall ensure social solidarity and aim at providing 
“sufficiency” for all citizens. In this case, 34% of comments requested to clearly define the 
notion of sufficiency as well as the conditions, according to which a sufficient level of life 
could be reached.  
 
Another 16% requested to specify how the state could commit to provide “sufficiency” for 
all Egyptians citizens and to clarify its engagement. Here again, the article undeniably 
alluded to some of the major revolutionary concepts, affirming that the state should 
provide the means to achieve “justice, equity and freedom”. In this regard, the 
constitutional draft re-affirmed the legitimacy of a broad – and therefore equivocal - set of 
values that had contributed to build social cohesion in the early stage of the uprisings.  
 
Nevertheless, although the terms “justice”, “equity” and “freedom” echoed the slogans of 
the revolution, they only acted as idiomatic expressions were not further conceptualised in 
the constitutional draft. Beyond the lyricism of terms such as “compassion” and “social 
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equity”, the article failed at defining how these conceptual ideals would materialize in 
future legislation and policymaking. This precisely brought participants to question the 
actual meaning of the term ‘sufficiency’ as well as to address the limitations of the state’s 
engagement in this matter.  
 
First, this highlights the fact that what was often reproached to revolutionaries themselves - 
to wit the failure at concretely addressing social issues from the perspective of the 
grassroots - also applies to the way the constituent assembly incorporated the revolutionary 
discourse.  
 
Secondly, the two types of comments identified indicated that Egyptian citizens expressed 
the need to discuss revolutionary demands with regards to their everyday life 
socioeconomic challenges. Although freedom, equality and social justice produced a sense 
of consensus, the indefinite meaning, hence flexibility of the terms would lead to 
confusion, by serving different political interests.  
 
On one hand, contributors’ comments revealed citizens’ attachment to the ideological 
vocabulary of the revolution– freedom, dignity, equality, justice - in the post-revolutionary 
debate. Yet on the other hand, participants explicitly requested from the constituent 
assembly to outline the procedures through which those concepts would be applied.  
 
In addition to the sample of comments extracted from article 14, contributions to article 7 
of the draft exemplify these two trends. The article in question, which calls for the 
preservation of national security and announces that military conscription will be 
mandatory, generated two recurrent reactions.  
 
25% of the comments analysed argued that the draft should include further regulations on 
military service. Within this set of comments, the most common criticism concerned the 
fact that no additional information was given about the duration of the conscription, the 
wage of recruits and the potential conditions for exemption. To some extent, these 
observations highlighted citizens’ desire to see pragmatic changes and discuss how 
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policymakers would enact the vocabulary of the revolution. Simultaneously, these 
comments demanded to include a statement intended to protect the rights and “dignity” of 
military recruits. Here again, participants spontaneously emphasised the importance of this 
term, which was part of the ideological vocabulary inherited from the 2011 uprisings. Yet 
just like the concept of democracy, this term only activated one’s personal ideological 
views on how dignity should be materialised in future legislation.  
 
Consequently, a proportion of comments posted on article 7 also stated that the draft 
should detail the rights of military recruits. In other words, participants enquired about the 
applicable measures that would ensure dignity in the particular case of military 
conscription. Additionally, another 7% of the comments sampled for this article argued 
that the constitutional text should enjoin young militaries to treat civilians with greater 
respect. This other category of contributions also reflected the will to be involved in a 
more engaging form of policymaking that would ensure the realization of the revolutionary 
demands.  
 
Similarly, participants reacted to the wording of article 26, which introduces tax 
regulations by referring to the concept of social justice: “Social justice is based on taxes 
and other expenditures of public finances.” Out of the 34 comments considered, one 
argued that social justice should not essentially depend on the administration of public 
finance, but on a broader set of laws. A second participant requested from the constituent 
assembly to elaborate on the relationship between taxes and social justice. Once again, 
these two examples manifested the desire to assess and improve the practicability of an 
important motive and leitmotiv of the revolution. But most importantly, examining the way 
the revolutionary vocabulary was received in the context of the first constitutional draft 
shows how critical citizens had become, with regard to the marketization of those 
concepts.  
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8.10. Clarifying vagueness and uncertainties 
Beyond the fact that participants proved to interpret the ideological vocabulary of the 
revolution differently, they repeatedly asked for the constitutional text to be clarified. 
Confusion often occurred, in comments related to articles that addressed potential conflict 
of interests between the state and private individuals. With regards to this, articles 24 and 
29 generated a discussion about the distinction between private and public good, 
suggesting that the limitations between those two concepts should be explicitly stated in 
the constitution.  
 
By analogy, comments extracted from article 22 of the draft, regulating the preservation of 
public finances, precisely illustrate this pattern: “Public funds are inviolable and it is a 
national duty of the state and society to ensure their preservation.” In this case, 34% of the 
comments archived argued that the article should state the sanctions applicable in case of 
frauds. This remark undeniably appeared as a way to decry the vagueness of the article. In 
addition, contributors challenged the fact that the wording itself did not emphasize the 
responsibility of the state in ensuring the preservation of public finances. Indeed, 11% of 
the posts sampled suggested that civil society per se could not be considered as responsible 
for the protection of public resources. The three occurrences showed that incoherence of 
the constitutional text was even more problematic68  when legislating the boundaries 
between public and private interests.   
 
In other cases, the lack of clarity directly affected citizens’ ability to understand the 
meaning of the article. In this regard, contributors to the article 26 mentioned above 
commonly requested the definition of the Egyptian fiscal framework to be clarified. The 
draft briefly enacted a progressive tax procedure, which induced great confusion, bringing 
some participants to question the entire meaning of the article. Besides the fact that the 
terminology of the constitutional text was misleading, its entire formulation also proved to 
be disconcerting.   
 
                                                68 That is to say this type of constitutional statements generated even more criticism among the members of 
the Dostour Sharek participative platform.  
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Apart from the ambiguity of the revolutionary concepts and the ambivalence of the 
constitutional text itself, the e-consultation platform’s users pointed that the draft applied a 
confusing vocabulary and failed at providing comprehensive measures. Along the inputs 
appended to article 22 cited above, reactions to articles 21 and 23 mainly related to the 
aspects of the law that were missing from the article. Paragraph 21 of the constitution 
stated the right and “legitimacy of any public cooperative or private organization”, 
administered in compliance with the law. 15% of comments argued that the law should 
explicitly prevent foreigners and foreign investors from owning such private cooperatives. 
7% of the comments sampled claimed that the article should include a definition and 
further regulation on intellectual property.  
 
Finally, 35% of the reactions to article 23 of the draft that ensured the support of the state 
to “all kinds of cooperatives” claimed that the cooperatives in question should be clearly 
defined. These reactions indicated that participants had been sensitive to the fact the 
constitutional draft did not only fail at defining the conditions for freedom, justice and 
equity, but also omitted the information required for their legal application.  
 
A comparable register of comments specifically raised the fact that some articles omitted 
to determine the procedure required to ensure that the law given would be applied. This 
stood out from the sample of posts extracted from both articles 18 and 22 quoted above, for 
which a small proportion of participants expressed this same demand.  
 
In comparison to the many comments intended to outline the incoherence or lack of clarity 
of the draft, only a small proportion of articles led participants to position themselves in 
relation to the object of the constitutional law. In fact, a very few discussions took place 
across the data set to debate the actual substance of the article.  
 
To some extent this suggests that contributors expressed more concern about the formal 
aspect of the draft, mostly focusing on its formulation, sporadically suggesting artificial 
improvements by notifying irrelevant and missing information. In fact, this would also 
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explain why the statistics delivered by the Dostour Sharek initiative indicated a 
significantly larger number of “likes” than “dislike”.  
 
However, acknowledging this phenomenon does not and should not put in doubt their 
ability to develop a substantial and rational critical deliberation, which would conform 
with Habermas’ definition of the public sphere. Quite the opposite, it shows that Egyptian 
citizens involved in this e-participation project pointed a highly problematic feature of the 
post-revolutionary debate, which resided in the confusing nature of the discourse that 
surrounded the revolution.  
 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, this emanated from the ambivalence of the terms, 
the misleading formulations and the lack of clarity with which policymakers – as well as 
all the political actors engaged in the debate69 – competed for different versions of the 
revolution.   
 
The ambiguity of the terms “democracy”, “sufficiency”70, “social equity”, “public good” 
and many other crucial concepts enumerated above constituted in themself the major 
obstacle to the development a potentially efficient public sphere. Therefore, the fact that 
participants primarily contested this aspect of the draft, which characterised the entire post-
revolutionary debate, should rather be interpreted as a sign of critical thinking and 
clairvoyance.  
 
As argued earlier, the constitution represented one of the major steps towards what 
different political groups expected to be the potential materialization of the revolutionary 
demands. Originally, the consultative process initiated by the Dostour Sharek project 
intended to assess to what extent the new constitution will ensure the realization of those 
                                                69 This has been confirmed by the findings of the ethnography as well as by the discourse analysis conducted 
on the sample of the activist blogosphere.  
 70“sufficiency” refers to the Arabic word Kifaya, which was addressed in article 8 of the constitutional draft 
and that can also be considered as one of the leitmotivs of the revolution. The word also relates to the activist 
movement Kifaya, which pioneered Egyptian cyber-activism and was among the first opposition movement 
that led to the revolution.  
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demands. However, the initiative was even more revealing, as it demonstrated that those 
demands themselves were not commonly understood, often hiding divergent visions of 
what the future Egyptian society should be. There was a consensus about acknowledging a 
lack of consensus and an agreement about the fact that most of the stakeholders involved in 
the deliberation disagreed.  
 
8.11. Conclusion to empirical analysis 3: Connectivity as an illusion of 
consensus 
In conclusion, instead of building a strong and unique consensus, participants’ comments 
confronted diverging understandings of the ideological vocabulary that had emerged in the 
context of the 2011 uprisings. In the continuation of the revolution, citizens were still 
commonly debating the concepts of justice, social equity and freedom as well as the 
application of Islamic law and the balance between civilian and military powers.  
 
In this regard, the debate manifests a high level of intertextuality: as I argued earlier, 
contributors show interest for the same topics and raise concern about similar issues. And 
yet their perspectives appear to be very different. This is the reason why intertextuality can 
be misleading, in bringing us to think that participants progressively reach consensus, 
whereas they express their own pre-existing interpretation of the same concepts. In other 
words, intertextuality shall not be mistaken with interactivity.  
 
To some extent, those two concepts both potentially apply to such form of participative 
debates, as they reveal some form of polyphony. However, whereas the participants of an 
interactive debate collaboratively shape a common understanding of the same object, 
intertextuality hides multiple and sometimes-diverging interpretations behind the same 
term.  
 
According to this terminology, the samples of comments extracted from the Dostour 
Sharek project suggest that the 2012 constitutional debate was rather intertextual than 
interactive. Yet, this study also demonstrates that the most recurrent and vivid criticism 
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expressed with regards to the constitutional draft precisely lied in the fact that it generated 
such a high level of intertextuality.  
 
Indeed, by requesting further definitions of these concepts, citizens manifested the desire 
to overcome the confusion that jeopardised the quality of the post-revolutionary debate. 
While confronting diverging visions of Shura and democracy, they manifested the need to 
rely on a clear and very specific description of these terms. After the different political 
groups had been competing in the context of the elections, citizens requested redefining the 
ideological vocabulary of the revolution, in order to ensure sustainable political change.  
 
The ambiguous vocabulary of the revolution had benefitted all the political groups 
competing for power and was to some extent the result of revolutionaries’ connective 
action, in Bennett and Segerberg’s terms (2012). It had been designed to consolidate the 
diversified community of people that composed the opposition and was therefore likely to 
resonate differently depending on its audience. Connective action – in Bennett and 
Segerberg’s terms – was entirely based on intertextuality, hence on an illusion of 
consensus. Consequently, it had supposedly contributed to divide the revolutionary 
opposition in periods of election, and was now affecting the consultative process of the 
referendum.  
 
This opens up a crucial reflection about the correlation between connectivity and political 
instability. As this case study suggests, certain forms of connective action lead to 
intertextuality, which is nothing less than an illusion of consensus in a very heteroclite and 
polarised environment. Yet in the age of semantic web, where pop-culture and political 
slogans are marketed via search keywords, tags and hashtags, social cohesion is very much 
relying on intertextuality.  
 
This could also explain why – as mentioned in my methodological chapter – the statistics 
released by the Dostour Sharek platform inventoried a majority of positive rates (“likes” or 
“thumb up” as opposed to “thumb down”), despite the fact that many comments 
formulated constructive criticisms. This figure was not representative of the fact that the 
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constitutional draft had been received as highly controversial and motivated the Egyptian 
people to protest again for the removal of Morsi’s administration in 2013. However, it 
illustrates the fact that computerised deliberations can sometimes lead to a rather artificial 
and less substantial consensus.  
 
With today’s semantic web-based communication, the same word or idiom circulates 
across cultures and political contexts, while hiding different perceptions of reality. This 
may certainly contribute to build the success of a campaign on the short term, as political 
actors are more likely to see their legitimacy increase rapidly, by applying an all-inclusive 
yet extremely vague ideological vocabulary. However, this may also involve a rapid 
decrease in popularity for the same political actors over time.  
 
At the time of the 2012 constitutional referendum, Mohammed Morsi’s government and 
the Muslim Brotherhood were about to be the victims of their own success in these exact 
circumstances. Similarly, the removal of Mubarak’s administration in January 2011 
constituted a short-lived success for left-wing and liberal revolutionaries, who would soon 
witness substantial conflicts of interests within the revolutionary community.  
 
On these grounds, one could easily argue that participative communication tools had 
contributed to produce the fluid discursive environment thanks to which the revolution was 
progressively hijacked. This assumption should however be discussed in relation with the 
ethnography I conducted in the field, as it enables to set digital media usage in a broader 
context of sociopolitical practices.  
 
Accordingly, the next chapter will outline the findings of the 15 qualitative interviews I 
conducted with activists, journalists and political officials during ten weeks fieldwork in 
Cairo. Unlike the data samples I collected online, this methodological approach expanded 
my perspective, drawing my attention on the relationship between online and offline forms 
of deliberation. However critical one may be with regards to the technological aspects, this 
chapter will address the question of its significance and further determine its influence on 
the evolution of the revolutionary discourse.  
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9. Fourth empirical analysis: fieldwork ethnography 
Among the four empirical analyses that compose this research, the ethnography allowed 
me to assess whether my online data set was representative of the deliberations occurring 
outside from the social media sphere. By interacting face-to-face with participants, I was 
now able to interpret my preliminary findings in relation to the way political activists had 
experienced the evolution of the revolutionary discourse on the field. Participants’ 
perspective also led me to understand digital activism in relation to a broader range of 
media and political practices, as well as to re-evaluate its impact on Egyptians’ everyday 
life and political environment. 
As I will argue in this chapter, all participants interviewed - regardless of the degree of 
support to the left wing or liberal opposition - had witnessed the fact that the revolution 
had endorsed different meanings and narratives, over the course of the 2011-2013 political 
crisis. This phenomenon manifested itself in different aspects of the political debate. For 
instance, many participants had evidenced the dispersion of the revolutionary discourse in 
the way political leaders as well as both state-owned and privately owned media reported 
the presidential and constitutional debates. In that sense, despite the fact that it reached a 
limited audience, social media appeared to be representative of the tensions occurring 
offline, in the broader media and political landscape. Admittedly, this also suggested that 
the alienation of the revolution operated beyond and independently from social media.  
Nevertheless, many participants agreed that digital media intensified this phenomenon. 
Similarly to what I had observed when analysing the activist blogosphere, interviews 
highlighted the fact that digital media contributed to make the revolution less ideologically 
consistent, by accelerating its diffusion. For instance, social platforms such as Twitter 
hardly enabled one to formulate a substantial argument, given the limited amount of 
characters allowed in a tweet. In their views, digital media had also led to many 
controversies, by allowing every political stakeholder to spread rumours or release 
controversial statements, which would only increase the polarisation of the debate.  
In addition, many participants considered such form of deliberations as problematic, in that 
it had produced an illusion of consensus. Social media had indeed led many web activists 
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to believe that they would easily find support among the majority of the working class in 
the aftermath of the revolution. However, their audience was often limited to a minority of 
supporters, amongst Internet users, whose perspective did not reflect that of the grassroots.  
Those arguments corroborate most of the observations made in my virtual ethnography. 
Moreover, as I will show, interviews further illustrated the fact that left wing and liberal 
revolutionaries felt progressively deprived of intellectual leadership when attempting to 
consolidate the opposition. They also confirmed the idea that this was due to the process 
through which online-based deliberations had reached the mainstream.  
Besides, participants exemplified my discursive cycle model, by reflecting on the history 
of web activism in Egypt. As discussed in my theoretical chapter, visualising the 
circulation of discourse helps in understanding whether connectivity alters the 
transformation of counter-power into institutional power. In that respect, this research 
mainly focuses on the lower pole of the discursive cycle. Yet interviews also outlined the 
fact that some of the policies implemented by Mubarak’s former administration had 
encouraged the emergence of web-activism, over the years that preceded the uprisings. In 
doing so, they show how institutional powers often create the conditions for the emergence 
of a counter discourse, in a way that conforms with Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere. 
The ethnography also highlighted how the leading political institutions had been involved 
in the earlier development of web activism, as per the upper pole of the discursive cycle.  
In this chapter, I will show how journalists and political activists evidenced the fluidity of 
the revolutionary discourse in Egypt and how they relate this to social media activism. 
Like in the context of the activist blogosphere, I will argue that what the left wing and 
liberal opposition experienced as the alienation of the revolution could be explained by two 
phenomena.  
On one hand, this was due to the sudden involvement of a broader range of citizens on 
social media as well as in the political sphere in general. This coincided with what I had 
identified earlier as the mainstreaming of the revolution. On the other hand, the alienation 
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of the revolution resulted from the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood’s deliberate 
attempts to reframe the ideological vocabulary of the revolution.  
As I will elaborate on this argument, I will demonstrate that pro-revolutionaries manifest 
nostalgia for the earlier stage of the revolution. To some extent, this reveals that they had 
experienced a greater feeling of empowerment when the revolutionary ideals were debated 
within a limited circle of individuals and aside from the sphere of institutional politics. As 
they progressively witness the fact that the revolutionary discourse grows beyond their 
control, they exhibit a certain attachment to the idea of intellectual leadership.  
When reflecting on the failures of the revolution, many participants suggested that activists 
had missed the opportunity to reinforce the ideological foundation of the opposition. In this 
regard, they also formulate the idea that digital media might have accelerated - and 
affected - the process through which the opposition could have consolidated a strong 
ideological alternative. Furthermore, the technology had created an illusion of social 
cohesion, which had wrongly led them to believe that lower classes will embrace the 
liberal and left-wing revolutionary movement.  
Therefore, most of my participants suggested that both the mainstreaming and 
institutionalisation of the revolution were partly induced by digital media. And in order to 
regain legitimacy in all these aspects of the discursive cycle, they expressed the need to 
interact directly with the lower classes and the rural population while, at the same time, 
returning to the traditional form of institutional politics.  
9.1. Evidencing the success of the counter-revolution on the field 
Despite that the fieldwork involved considerable ethical challenges, my prior concern 
regarded the fact that the ethnography would take place long after the events of the January 
25th revolution. And yet my work adds on great insights and not least, thanks to the fact 
that the interviews were conducted more than three years after the 2011 uprisings. 
Although participants would recall the 2011 events from an entirely different perspective, 
they were precisely able to reflect one the way the narratives surrounding the revolution 
had evolved over time. With the aim of performing a nexus analysis, such approach 
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appeared to be much more pertinent. In fact, I believe that the time separating the 
ethnography from the 2011 incidents led participants to reflect on the transition from 
emerging to institutional discourse in a more critical way.  
 
Interviewees commented on how the revolutionary opposition had progressively gained 
legitimacy in early 2011, while having experienced the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
followed by the hasty return of the SCAF in power. They provided a very reflexive 
overview of this succession of events, which contributed to outline the transition of 
discourses over time. Nevertheless the memory of the revolutionary uprisings as well as 
the way the struggles between the elites and the opposition was expressed remained 
extremely vivid and topical during the entire fieldwork.  
 
This phenomenon, on the other hand, was due the fact that the repression intensified over 
the months that followed the coup and president Sissi’s election. Between September and 
November 2014, students’ unions and youth organisations, whose had remained partly 
politically active within universities had been weakened under the pressure of Falcon, a 
private security agency mandated by the state71. Many students involved in peaceful 
demonstrations, petitions and associative projects had been expelled or personally 
threatened.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood was disabled, as most of its leaders were imprisoned or had fled 
the country. As a result, the sample of participants recruited on the field did not include 
any member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Whenever I came to ask some of my informants 
if they knew any member of the former leading party, who would be likely to be 
interviewed, I was faced with this exact same answer: “Well..., let me think about anyone 
from the Muslim Brotherhood, who is not in jail…”  I witnessed this reaction three or four 
times before being provided with two names of potential participants, who never 
responded to my invitations, most probably by fear of being investigated by the 
intelligence services.  
                                                71  http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/10/13/lists-barred-universities-falcon-executive-director/; (Daily 
News Egypt, 13/10/2014) 
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During my fieldwork, human rights activists72, such as Yara Sallam and Sanaa Seif73 had 
been sentenced for taking part to peaceful demonstrations. Some of the left-wing activists 
interviewed for this research proved to be personally affected by the incident. In reaction, 
many participants expressed the frustration of losing the freedom of expression gained 
from the 18 days that followed the 2011 protests.  
 
In addition to the threat of the regime, the very few people remaining active within the 
opposition had lost the support of the population, as a result of what they called the 
conspiracy theory instigated by Sissi’s administration. Progressively, the iconic 25th 
January revolution, to which both the intellectual youth and the Islamist opposition took 
part was depicted as the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood’s success. The propaganda 
spread by the new military regime had convinced the people that the 25th January had 
affected internal security and led the country in a deeper economic crisis, affecting tourism 
and power supply. Since its institution, Sissi’s administration had announced that the 
intermittent power cuts were due to “300 attacks on electricity pylons nationwide, which 
had deepened the crisis leading to a drop in production by up to 15 percent”.74 On 2nd 
November 2014, the Middle East Eye news website reported the issue stating that: 
State television and private pro-government media have regularly reported 
such attacks, usually referring to the assailants as supporters and members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood group of ousted President Mohammed Morsi. (Middle 
East Eye, 05/09/2014)75 
Opponents to the military regime, who once were celebrated as the heroes of the revolution 
were now considered responsible for the intermittent electricity cuts and gas shortages 
                                                72 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/26/egypt-23-sentenced-over-anti-protest-law;  
(Human Rights Watch, 26/10/2014) 
 73 http://freeyara-freesanaa.net/ 
 74 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypts-power-outages-compound-559103879; 
(Middle East Eye, 05/09/2014) 
 75 Idem 
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suffered by the Egyptian population. As for young revolutionaries, they had already been 
portrayed by Mohammed Morsi’s former government as dangerous radical anarchists.  
 
Once in power, the military regime maintained this narrative while implementing new laws 
that would restrict their visibility in the public and political spheres. Among the legislative 
reforms implemented by president Abdel Fatah as-Sissi that restrained opposition groups 
was the controversial amendment to article 78 of the penal code, which prevented any 
organisation from acting against the state’s interests: 
Anyone who asks for himself, or for others, or accepts, or takes – even through 
an intermediary – from a foreign state, or those who work for its interests, or a 
legal person, or a local or an international organisation, or any other entity that 
is not affiliated with a foreign state and does not work for its interest, cash, or 
transferred money, or equipment, or machines, or weapons, or ammunition, or 
items like it or other things, or was promised of any of that (…) With the 
intention of committing acts harmful to national interest, or acts like it, or acts 
that breach the country's independence, or unity, or territorial integrity, or 
committing attacks that disrupt public security and safety, shall be punished. 
(Al Ahram Online, 23/09/2014)76 
In addition to the anti-protest law promulgated in November 201377 - which prevented any 
protests from taking place without formal consent of the authorities - such amendments 
would considerably limit the room for manoeuvre of any opposition movement.  
 
But most importantly, this contributed to the shaping of the narrative according to which 
protestors and Islamists groups had been threatening national security and should be 
considered as public enemies. With the emergence of such narratives, the romantic ideals 
that surrounded the revolutionary mobilisation in early 2011, as well as the sympathy of 
the crowd for protestors progressively vanished. Simultaneously, the June 30th coup d’état 
substituted itself to the January 25th revolution as the ultimate achievement of the 2011-
2013 political transition and the so-called fortunate victory over the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
                                                76 http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/111488.aspx; (Al Ahram Online; 23/09/2014) 
 77 http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/87375.aspx; (Al Ahram Online; 25/11/2013) 
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The new military elite was shaping a new memory of the revolution, according to which 
the beneficial political change emanated from the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
summer 2013. This phenomenon was expressed to me several times during the course of 
the fieldwork and was explicitly formulated by one of the participants:  
They cannot say that the 25th revolution was bad. But I think now they are 
starting to focus more on the 30th of June revolution. It’s somehow, they are 
trying to push the stream to neglect the 25th January revolution and they are 
definitely focusing more on the 30th June revolution. This is how they hear the 
revolution now. It’s not the same revolution that we are talking about. They are 
changing the revolution. (…) So, as I said, it’s another way of addressing it, 
now they address something that is completely different. So they don’t really 
bad mouth it but still they ignore it. So it’s kind like it didn’t exist. Or it was 
the way for a better revolution, which is the 30th June, like “ok there was the 
25th January, but now there’s the 30th June revolution” which is like better in 
their own eyes. (Tariq, cf. Interview Transcripts:18) 
Admittedly, commentators questioned the assumption according to which these two events 
should be interpreted as revolutions, sometimes suggesting that they both could be 
regarded as military coups (Stein, 2011; Phillips, 2011). In fact, as I demonstrated earlier, 
the notion of revolution itself - as well as many other crucial concepts that characterised 
the post-revolutionary debate – had endorsed different meanings, due to the complex 
interplay of political actors competing for the leadership of discourse.  
 
The competition of discourses or substitution of narratives, even if it had potentially 
reached its final stage, was still on going at the time of the fieldwork. As it was expressed 
by one of the participants interviewed in this study, “(…) the narrations about the past is 
not unified so we are fighting about to whom the revolution over history will be 
successful” (Mukhtar, cf. Interview Transcript: 60). Therefore, although interviews were 
conducted three years after the first revolutionary protests and despite the fact that 
participants reflected on the events in a rather reflexive way, the phenomenon observed 
was still taking place at the time of the fieldwork. Until November 2014, participants had 
experienced different shifts in terms of discursive leadership and were still witnessing the 
revival of the military discourse.  
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9.2. Commenting on the post-revolutionary debate three years after 
the 2011 events 
After conducting informal conversations over the first week of the fieldwork, I soon 
became more confident about the relevance of this research and discovered that 
participants’ testimony tended to confirm my hypothesis. Indeed, the large majority of the 
participants I interacted with expressed the idea that the discursive tools78 of the revolution 
had been reused to serve the purpose of the counter-revolution.  
 
As they described the evolution of social media usage between 2012 and 2014, most 
interviewees attested that a broader and more diversified audience became active online 
and on social media after the 2011 revolution. Additionally they agreed to say that political 
elites and institutions, as well as the privately owned and public mainstream media 
channels started actively using digital media to reach this new audience.  
 
Most participants described a phenomenon similar to what I had identified as the 
mainstreaming of the revolution, when analysing the activist blogosphere. In their views, 
the revolution had generated a liberalisation of the political debate, thanks to which all 
social classes and demographics were able to deliberate. However, this had made public 
deliberations more chaotic and likely to be manipulated when the revolutionary movement 
precisely needed to rely on strong ideological grounds.  
 
Although most interviewees had witnessed this phenomenon, they did not always 
explicitly attribute it to digital media usage. Whereas some participants interpreted this a 
consequence of the constant increase in Internet penetration, others saw it as a dispersion 
of the revolution per se – whether technological or ideological. In the first case, it was 
assumed that Internet in general, had indirectly made the interplay of political voices more 
complex. Yet this could hardly have been anticipated nor prevented by the major political 
actors.  
 
                                                78 In this case I refer to the slogans and symbolic features of the revolutionary discourse as well as to the 
technological tools applied to spread the revolutionary message. 
  
 
 
204 
Alternatively, the second interpretation supposed that pro-revolutionary activists had 
considerably contributed to accelerate the liberalization of the debate. The 2011 uprisings 
had demonstrated how participative communication technologies could be efficient in 
sharing one’s political views and mobilising a critical mass of citizens for a common 
cause. In this regard, the revolutionary movement was also partly responsible for rendering 
public opinion less predictable and likely to be manipulated.  
 
That being said, whether they related this phenomenon to the 2011 revolution or not, all 
participants expressed the idea the social media sphere became representative of the highly 
polarised political environment between 2011 and 2014. Moreover, they asserted that 
leading political groups – most often identified as the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood 
– had progressively become as proactive and visible on social media as revolutionary 
activists, reversing the bottom-up stream into a rather top-down communication flow. This 
most certainly illustrates the model according to which digital media contributed to the 
cycle, through which emerging counter-discourses turn into power institution after gaining 
recognition.  
 
Symmetrically, as mentioned earlier, interviews also exemplified the upper pole of the 
discursive cycle. Whereas I had essentially considered the transition from counter-
discourse to discourse, I was reminded that the former military elite had encouraged social 
media consumption, paving the way to emergent forms of activism. This confirmed the 
idea that digital activism, in its early stage, relied on some form of intellectual leadership.  
 
Indeed, interviewees described the process through which the military regime may have 
indirectly inspired new forms of political engagements and contributed to the formation of 
a critical intelligentsia. Among the leading figures of the opposition, many had been 
introduced to politics within the NDP administration and benefited from the same social 
and economic privileges as the former elite. As the young left-wing activist Elias79 pointed, 
Gamal Mubarak – who was considered to be the most likely successor to Hosni Mubarak - 
                                                79 The name of the participant has been anonymised 
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had been very active in promoting new communication technologies among young 
university graduates looking for new economic and entrepreneurial perspectives 
(Sobelman, 2001). Prior to the revolution, his initiatives encouraged the young middle 
class to interact via participative media and share their opinion in a way that was favorable 
to the development of a counter-discourse.  
 
Therefore, while I had been focusing on the transition from revolution to counter-
revolution, participants drew my attention on the fact that the political discourse had been 
constantly evolving in Egypt. Counter-power originated from the previous institutional 
power just like the new dominant discourse emanated from the revolution. This further 
exemplified the discursive cycle, while suggesting that political and ideological identities 
along with their discursive framework, in Egypt, had always been flexible. In view of this, 
one could hardly argue that this was exclusively the result of connective action – in 
Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) term. Digital technologies may however have amplified or 
accelerated this phenomenon.  
 
As for the transition that occurred in the lower pole of the discursive cycle, the great 
majority of the participants interviewed confirmed the idea that both the ideological and 
technological tools of the revolution had ultimately served the interests of the counter-
revolution.  
9.3. Hijacking the revolution 
When asked to what extent, in their opinion, the tools, arguments or slogans of the 
revolution had been used by the counter-revolution, only three out of the twelve 
participants formally interviewed answered negatively. Nabil, a 30-something candidate to 
the forthcoming parliamentary elections whom I quoted above argued that while pro-
revolutionary activists had been very active online, long-established political institutions 
regained legitimacy by bringing the debate back to the streets. In his views, besides media 
campaigning, political leaders had, for instance, developed what he referred to as a form of 
retail politics.  
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During the course of the 2012 presidential election, candidates were particularly inclined to 
interact directly with their electorate on the field, which allowed them to reach the rural 
areas and proportion of the working that was not present on digital media. This was still 
the case as Nabil was campaigning for the forthcoming parliamentary election:  
(…) if I’m talking about, an actual political campaign, so let’s take an example, 
I’m running for Parliament. And one of my arsenal of communication tools is 
social media, so I have a social media call center, I have on ground campaign, 
all that good stuff, so social media as a tool (…) I mean if I wanted to 
appropriate a certain amount of votes to it, I’d say 10%. And it depends on 
where I am, I mean I am running anywhere in the greater Cairo, now this is 
gone be very diminished as I go to Delta or as I go to Upper Egypt, this 
percentage will diminish, really. (…) Are you familiar with the term political 
retailing80? – yea. Nothing beats political retailing. Shake the hand, kiss the 
baby, all that good stuff, you know, public rara speeches, that kind of stuff. 
Having people, having a well-oiled machine of campaigners…(Nabil, cf. 
Interview Transcripts: 48) 
Such argument suggested that online campaigning was certainly not the main strategy that 
had been applied by the leading political forces to hijack the revolutionary mobilisation. 
Yet it was revealing of the fact that political officials were now competing on the same 
territory as revolutionaries. While protestors had reclaimed ownership of the street and the 
social media sphere to develop a sense of citizenship during the revolution, political 
institutions intended to benefit from these alternative communication channels to reach the 
same audience. In other words, it indicated the institutionalisation process operated beyond 
and independently from social media. This phenomenon had manifested itself online as 
well as in many other aspects of the post-revolutionary debate.  
 
Amir, a 40-something liberal, who deplored the outcome of the revolutionary uprisings, 
contested the idea that the ideological vocabulary of the revolution had been incorporated 
by the counter-revolution. However, in this particular case, the participant essentially 
argued that such idea did not, in his views, justify revolutionaries’ failure: “the appearance 
                                                80 The expression retail politics refers to a campaigning strategy, which consists in building the public image 
of a candidate, by representing him or her interacting with voters (shaking hands, kissing babies, waving at 
the audience) 
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of the counter-revolution discourse on social media is only a manifestation that the 
revolutionary discourse does not really serve its purpose anymore.” (Amir, Cf. Interview 
transcripts: 108). Other interviewees answered by the affirmative, confirming the idea 
according to which the features of the revolutionary counter-discourse came to serve the 
leading political forces (the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood).  
 
The January 25th uprisings had unleashed a desire to be more involved and engaged in the 
political debate, across social classes. Yet those who ultimately benefitted from this 
phenomenon were the politics, who were better represented in traditional mass media, such 
as the militaries, as well as in the local communities and rural regions, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. As for the broader range of the middle class that had become active on social 
media after the uprisings, it had now access to all the different political agendas that were 
now equally represented online. 
 
In relation to this, my ethnography contributed to answer the first of my research 
questions, in corroborating the findings of my virtual ethnography. This aspect of the 
interview also led me to further explore the relationship between the ideological and 
technological revolution and to identify whether social media prevented the success of the 
revolution in the long run.  
9.4. Identifying turning points in the circulation of discourse 
In order to determine whether the institutionalisation of the revolution operated beyond 
and independently from social media, participants were asked to comment on the way 
political institutions and mainstream media relayed the post-revolutionary debate. This 
aspect of the questionnaire demonstrated once again that many political activists had 
evidenced this phenomenon. Indeed, they agreed that the very meaning of the revolution 
had become highly flexible due to fact that different political groups capitalised on this 
concept.  
 
Yet as much as it characterised the entire media and political environment, the 
institutionalisation process was not interpreted as a consequence of social media activism. 
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Rather, this resulted from the fact that the Egyptian political landscape was heavily 
polarised and that traditional mass media reflected the interests of the leading political 
forces.  
 
For this reason, participants were hardly able to determine when social media started being 
used in the sphere of institutional politics. To some extent, political elites always had a 
certain degree of involvement in the emergence of digital activism, and this was not 
specific to the post-revolutionary phase. In fact, one could as well consider the upper pole 
of the discursive cycle to illustrate the fact that the Internet had served conflicting political 
agendas: 
-  (…) you described how progressively mainstream media became involved 
and official political leaders became involved and so on, but when was the shift 
approximately? 
- Which shift? There was three or four shifts. 
- Yes I mean after 2011, after the uprisings, when would you say that the 
mainstream mass media as well as the political elites started to get interested 
in what was happening online? 
- (…) They did not begin on the 25th January; they began the moment we 
began. I mean on the 6th April, when Wael Abbas and Alaa Abdel Fatah81 
began blogging, at the same time, they developed their own Legan electrony82. 
(Elias, cf. Interview Transcripts: 102) 
Indeed, from Elias’ perspective, digital media already benefitted the elites in power in the 
early stage of digital activism. When recalling the beginning of digital activism in Egypt, 
Elias emphasises the fact that first Internet users gravitated in a similar environment as the 
elite in power. The opposition had become visible online, while some of the members of 
the former NDP considered investigating in digital media to stimulate the economy and 
reinforce national security. The confrontation between power and counter-power – or 
                                                81 Famous Egyptian blogger active on the activist blogosphere prior to 2011. 
 82 Arabic term used to designate agents hired by political leaders and different stakeholders to act like 
random social media users online and promote their political message. 
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discourse and counter-discourse – was therefore much harder to situate over time than 
what my original model suggested. 
 
In fact, my research originally relied on the assumption, according to which the circulation 
of discourse was divided between the spheres of political activism and institutional 
politics. The ethnography however suggested that some political actors happened to 
navigate between those two spheres of powers and that the boundary between discourse 
and counter-discourse was often hardly noticeable. Even when analysing the 
transformation of a counter-discourse in a specific historical context, one could hardly 
identify the exact moment of the transition from counter-power to power. This was 
precisely representative of the fact that, as argued earlier, discourse is ambivalent by 
nature, as it operates a cyclic evolution.  
 
9.5. The Upper Pole of the discursive cycle: from power to counter-power 
To further illustrate this phenomenon, Elias drew my attention on the fact that many of the 
pioneers of online activism in Egypt had been directly involved or closely interacting with 
the political spheres. Young revolutionaries – such as Amr Hamzawy83 - had gravitated in 
social environments or families, whose members were sometimes part of the military 
elites, or had common interests with the former National Party. Alternatively, other 
revolutionaries, like the famous Alaa Abdel Fatah and Wael Ghonim, who were 
independent from any political party in 2011, were originally affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Admittedly, before the revolution, Islamists movements were part of the 
repressed opposition. However, the organization consisted in an institutionalized and 
politically driven structure, which had already gained legitimacy as the leading opposition 
movement. In this regard, many of the leading figures of the left wing and liberal activism 
in Egypt, who promoted an alternative form of political engagement on the eve of the 
revolution, had previously been affiliated with well-established political groups. This 
precisely outlines the transition that progressively occurred on the upper pole of the 
                                                83 Egyptian political scientists and human right activist elected in the 2012 Parliamentary elections, 
prominent figure of the 2011 revolution and founding member of the liberal Freedom Egypt Party. 
  
 
 
210 
discursive cycle, as it shows how institutional powers indirectly contributed to the 
emergence of a new form of political activism. 
 
More specifically, this aspect of digital activism shows how those, who may be more likely 
to develop and disseminate a critical theory within the opposition share many 
characteristics of the elites in power, which puts them in a position of intellectual 
leadership. According to Mukhtar, a 40-something journalist and web activist, social 
media, amongst other kinds of political actions, was particularly representative of this form 
of bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1962):  
Social media doesn’t have a unique role by itself. Social media, by the end of 
the day is a reflection of the people, who are on social media. See the 
revolutionary camp wasn’t – themselves - they weren’t capable to address 
these slogans into a serious vision. (…) Most of the revolutionary camp, or the 
main figures of the revolutionary camp came somehow from middle class, (…) 
so while they want reform, they are part of the class that may be affected by the 
reform itself. So there was a moral contradiction. I realise that in April 2011. I 
told some people, “if you want to stop the revolution it’s ok, but if you want to 
continue, you should know that your personal life will change,(…)” People 
weren’t ready for this. (…) they were able to sacrifice they life, while they 
were not able to sacrifice their... [laugh] (Mukhtar, cf. Interview Transcripts: 
63) 
Admittedly, it should be said that, like many of the statements reported in this chapter, this 
quote is mostly representative of the views shared by the left-wing opposition. In this case 
the participant embraces a typically Marxist perspective as he claims that the left-wing 
intelligentsia was unable to be fully committed to the revolution. According to Mukhtar, 
digital activism essentially relayed the voices of pro-revolutionaries originating from the 
bourgeoisie. As such, it reflected the views of a privileged minority, within the opposition, 
that was somehow disconnected from the lower classes. In this quote, Mukhtar suggests 
that whereas many revolutionary thinkers or activists were ready to sacrifice their life for 
the revolutionary cause, - by facing the police, protesting in the streets and openly sharing 
their views on the military regime - they were however not ready to sacrifice their lifestyle.  
To some extent, his comment was revealing of the fact that after January 2011 the middle 
class had often failed at interacting with the working class.  
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Many middle class left-wing activists among the participants interviewed expressed their 
concerned about the fact that they had failed at communicating their political message to 
the lower social classes. In spite of their desire to implement an alternative political 
programme for those in needs, they felt the need to gain credit among the lower class.. 
Although they had benefitted from some form of intellectual leadership within the middle 
class, they could hardly communicate directly with the working poor and offer practical 
answers to people’s everyday needs.  
 
To a large extent, these observations further illustrate the intricacy of the relationship 
between political groups. The fact that young activists had been raised within or gravitated 
among the pro-military elite would constitute an obstacle to the revolution, in spite of their 
commitment. Just like an ideological and technological tools of the revolution, some of the 
individuals, who consolidated the opposition had operated a transition from the sphere of 
power to counter-power and vice versa.  
 
To illustrate this idea, young left-wing activist Elias recalls the policy implemented by 
Gamal Mubarak in the early 2000s to improve the technological infrastructure of the public 
administration. In his opinion, many of Gamal Mubarak’s projects led by the Gil al 
Mustaqbal84 foundation had contributed to encourage citizen-led initiatives designed on 
participative media. Although such projects initially intended to improve public services, 
stimulate the economy and serve the interests of the regime, this had progressively 
provided the revolutionary opposition with technology savvy individuals willing to achieve 
efficient political reforms:  
This kind of activities they were not intentionally political, but by time they 
attracted the youth and they became added value to this kind of new youth. 
And this new youth, who are creating a new strata in Egypt, like 20% at least 
escaped from it. You can imagine that this 20% from Gamal Mubarak project 
cooperated with what was left from the political sphere here in Egypt, to form a 
                                                84 The Future Generation  
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new phenomena and new social and political phenomena, starting 2005. They 
were not the leaders but they provided us with right calibers. Because actually 
our main problem, for whoever worked in politics in early 2005, is that there 
were really a huge gap between us and the [Watanya]85 people, he trained the 
[Watanya] people to be closer to us86. (Elias, cf. Interview transcripts: 102) 
What hypothetically constituted the intellectual elite of the online public sphere should not 
be regarded as entirely disconnected from the former regime. This is partly due to the fact 
that discourses remain, to a certain extent, fluid by nature, as they unfold in a cycle. As a 
result the distinction between power and counter-power – as well as the divisions between 
institutional politics and political activism – may sometimes be hardly noticeable.  
 
9.6. Fluidity of the revolutionary discourse 
With regards to the way the ideological vocabulary of the revolution had been applied in 
the post-revolutionary debate, interviews corroborated the findings of my blogosphere 
analysis. Participants commonly agreed on the fact that the revolutionary ideals had no 
consistent meaning, since they had been employed in different ideological contexts over 
the 2011-2013 political crisis.  
 
For instance, some of the slogans that had been chanted by protestors in January 2011 
became proper labels for specific political groups. Among others was the famous “Aish, al 
Hourya, Adla Ijtima’ya”87  slogan which had found an echo in the Freedom and Justice 
party founded by the Muslim Brotherhood. Another example can be found in the claim for 
human dignity (Warkotsch, 2012: 44). This concept activated a different ideological 
repertoire as it resonated with the name of the party88 founded by Hamdeen Sabahy in the 
1990s. Therefore, although it participated to bring together different political groups as one 
of the leitmotivs of the revolution, it was also likely to speak to the left wing opposition in 
particular. In a similar way to what Bennett and Segerberg have described in their theory 
                                                85 National/nationalist, as a reference of the Mubarak’s former National Democratic Party (NDP)  
 86 By “us”, the participant refers to the opposition.  87 Bread, freedom, social justice 88  The Karama Party (Dignity party)  
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of connective action (2012), every individual was able to personalise and interpret this 
vocabulary in a way that would reflect his ideological perspective.   
 
In order to discuss this phenomenon, participants were asked to comment on the way this 
vocabulary had been applied in the post-revolutionary debate. This aspect of the interviews 
substantiated the observations I had made when analysing the constitutional debate. 
Indeed, many participants argued that the concepts of freedom, social justice or dignity 
were too vague to support a substantial political debate. Furthermore, in the context of the 
Egyptian uprisings, these terms did not relate to one specific political discourse: 
I believe that a lot of the concepts and ideals used, because they were so vague 
– and that’s why they were popular, because they are vague and everyone can 
see something of themselves in it. You know if you say “freedom”, you know 
“freedom” is such a broad term, everyone can say “ I’m for freedom”. So of 
course, you can use those terms and you will be popular, you will get a 
following, but you have to realise that it’s only popular because it’s vague. And 
the more you go into details, the more you have a very specific program of 
what you want. (…) you know you can’t just say “freedom” what does it 
mean? You have to have a different policy, you have to advocate freedom in a 
certain way. So you can be still in charge of your political message, but then 
you have to realise that you’re paying for that in numbers. You’re paying for 
that and people won’t be behind you anymore, once they know exactly what 
you are advocating. (Samira, cf. Interview transcripts: 29) 
It is worth mentioning that, this criticism was mainly formulated by 30 to 40 year old 
liberals, who, among the different participants interviewed, appeared to be particularly 
critical with regards to leftist pro-revolutionaries’ strategy. In their views, the vagueness or 
flexibility of this counter-discourse demonstrated revolutionaries’ failure to consolidate 
their followers around a consistent political program in the long run:  
That’s where I draw a line between a revolution and a political campaign. 
Because those are very very broad aspects. You can’t really start to cut through 
those and start bring into planet earth, into actual laws and regulations that 
would actually make those something worthwhile. And that’s the biggest 
difference between what it takes to be a politician and what it takes to be a 
revolutionary. And I’id quote – his on and off my favourite writer every now 
and then depending on what he writes – Ibrahim ‘Issa, the writer. The 
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revolution “tuhalaq fy sama a-thawra wa tamshy as-syassya ‘ala-l-ard” so it’s 
basically the revolution is hanging in the sky, while politics actually walks on 
the ground. That’s the biggest difference, because those slogans can never be 
translated into anything. (Nabil, cf. Interview transcripts: 46)  
This phenomenon had also contributed to the success of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
the participants in question interpreted as the most problematic outcome of the 25th January 
uprisings. Most certainly, this observation involved underlining the weaknesses of the 
youth opposition. But first and foremost, it partly explains why political leadership had 
been so versatile in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 and why the debate remained highly 
polarised.  
 
Over the course of the ethnography, I came to experience how the fluidity of the 
revolutionary discourse had sometimes affected my own understanding of the terminology 
commonly used in the literature to refer to the 2011 uprisings. Although the interviews 
were designed with the intent to bring participants to formulate their own definition of 
such concepts, their definition sometimes came to reveal and challenge my own 
assumptions. By the end of the fieldwork, I realised that the literature had affected my 
understating of the terms “revolutionaries”, “grassroots” or “liberals” as they were 
commonly used in the context of the Arab Spring.  
 
Like my analysis of the 2012 constitutional debate, the ethnography revealed that the 
literature did not refer to the terms “democracy”, “civil” or “secular” in the way most 
Egyptians would commonly understand those concepts. Most of the literature published 
between 2011 and 2013 would often use the term “liberal” to refer to the opposition 
against the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet this terminology denied the divisions 
between the Marxist, left wing and economic liberal members of the opposition. Worst of 
all, it suggested that the so-called “liberals” had been entirely disconnected from Islamist 
movements in the early stage of the revolutionary mobilisation.  
 
However, as it was very well expressed by participant Elias (Elias, cf. Interview 
transcripts: 97), many pioneers of the Egyptian revolutionary activism were originally 
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affiliated to Islamist movements. Unlike what the literature suggested by using this 
terminology, the opposition had never been homogenously secular. As argued earlier, the 
terms “secular” and “democratic”, were most commonly considered as very pejorative 
among the Egyptian population and could hardly be used as a political label in Egyptian 
politics. In fact, despite the fact that literature about the Arab Spring assumed that a secular 
democracy was the ultimate aspiration of the revolutionary youth, the opposition was not 
primarily concerned with the issue of democratisation (Lopes de Souza and Lipietz, 2011; 
Jumet, 2014).  
 
Consequently, parties and political actors that constituted the alternative against Islamists 
and supporters of the SCAF, such as the Egyptian Bloc coalition and the National 
Salvation Front, were often qualified as “civil” parties. In this case, the term “civil” 
substituted itself to “secular” to designate opponents to the military regime and Muslim 
Brotherhood. Just like the literature had failed at expressing the nuances in the meaning of 
these terms, it had wrongly led me to believe, in the early stage of my research, that the 
political stance of young technologically literate revolutionaries was similar to that of the 
grassroots. 
 
Participants however stressed the fact that, although international media and foreign 
commentators had paid particular attention to young middle class activists, their views was 
to be distinguished from that of the lower classes. Among the opposition, young urban 
activists were more likely to convey a vision of the revolution that would resonate with the 
way the international community envisioned the democratisation process. However, 
despite the fact that social media activists had made the opposition visible online on behalf 
of the grassroots and with the aim of relying their political demands, their ideological 
perspective remained significantly different. This was precisely the reason why, according 
to many participants, leftist revolutionaries failed at anticipating and preventing the 
success of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
This further confirmed the argument, according to which intellectual leadership did not 
operate successfully over the months that followed the uprisings, preventing political 
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action from enacting a substantial critical theory. Similarly to the Habermasian model, it 
failed at producing a political program grounded on the practical needs of the working 
class, and only generated a new form of top-down communication flow. Not only was this 
criticism formulated against and within the activist community, but it was also raised to 
question the benefits of social media usage in the context of the revolutionary mobilisation.  
 
As I will show, participants suggested that social media had constrained each political 
agenda within its own circle and precluded interactions between middle class 
revolutionaries and the lower class. Paradoxically, those who considered themselves as the 
voices of the people had contributed to the development of a new elitist communication 
framework.  
 
9.7. The mainstreaming process: the bubble effect 
In addition to the issues mentioned above, participants identified another consequence of 
digital activism, which specifically related to the process through which social media had 
evolved towards the mainstream. Like my sample from the blogosphere interviewees 
pointed that Internet had reached a critical mass of users within the middle class, who 
emerged in the debate without previous knowledge nor experience of politics. 
Consequently, their contributions indirectly affected the quality of this debate by erasing 
any form of intellectual leadership: 
 (…) there is a big phenomena happening on say virtual world and in fact, I 
can tell you that, it seems like most of Egyptians middle class, if I may classify 
them, just wake up one day and discover there is another life happening, so 
they jump in, trying to participate without any background of whatever. And 
we are in a time when people who don’t speak at all start to speak all the time. 
People who have not been involved in political idea or any political activity or 
whatever, starting to jump in trying to whatever. And in fact they also have 
external players, who have discovered that there is a huge tool we may be 
benefit from it, so everybody is trying to make it from their own benefit. So 
there is a big big big and huge in fact debate and talk and speaking mostly 
about politics and through the social media these days. (…) I guess after the 
whole mess start to settle down a little, we have to try to sit and put some rules 
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about how can we use this content, how can we deal with it.  (Khalil, Interview 
Transcripts: 78) 
Participants also criticised the fact that the increasing popularity of social media had 
contributed to compartmentalise the debate online. Despite the fact that a broader diversity 
of citizens became involved in this particular form of deliberation, they constituted 
distinctive audiences that hardly interacted with each other. In their opinion, this had 
emphasised the polarisation of the debate, preventing the opposition from reaching a 
consensus on the purpose of the revolution.  
 
Those different interpretations of the revolution had been evolving separately, after digital 
media provided the platforms and communicative framework required to enable large-
scale deliberation. The liberalisation of the debate online had created a bubble effect, 
increasing divisions and confusion among the Egyptian society. This phenomenon was 
perfectly illustrated by the story related by Khalil as he described to what extent the 
deliberations surrounding the presidential elections generated conflicts within family 
circles: 
We have several cases of divorcing women [laugh] during the last three years 
over political arguments with their husbands. (….) Which is not a common 
practice in Egypt in fact. (…) because they have their own opinion about 
subjects, for the first time. And this is, got through the media. Mostly social 
media. So, ok, this lady is having her own closed group, which concentrates 
about the relatives, you know, the friends she knows in real life or here on 
Facebook. (…) so, she’s having her own opinion and she’s suddenly becoming 
a more and more believer of (…) Morsi. And her husband was sitting at a café 
with his friends and his seeking about the man of the army who will return the 
country to his feet and when he returns home, he finds his wife defending 
Morsi. (…) At the voting station he’s telling her that she will go and give to 
Sissi the vote, and at the polling station she told him no “I will give to…” 
blablabla [laugh] and he’s divorcing her in the polling station, you know. 
[laugh] (Khalil, cf. Interview transcripts: 85) 
Comparatively, the early days of digital activism, during which revolutionaries benefitted 
from intellectual leadership had proved to be more efficient when consolidating a unified 
opposition. Indeed, when remembering the beginning of digital activism in the early 2000s, 
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participants described the first community of web activists as ideologically diversified yet 
very united:  
 (…) Abdel Fatah, he was a Muslim Brotherhood member and Amr Eizzat 
was a Salafist, Wael Abbas89 was a radical liberal but this, I mean, although 
these kind of differences between them, they were close to each other even 
more than their origins, I mean, Amr Eizzat was closer to Wael Abbas more 
than being close to the Salafists. And this introduced this kind of collective 
power that is not controllable. They are not a political party, they don’t need a 
kind of political permission from the government to work, they had this kind of 
connectivity that was more advanced that what the governmental used to trace 
them. (Elias, cf. Interview Transcripts: 97)     
This sense of belonging to a united opposition was however shattered as soon as each of 
these different opinion leaders found their own specific audience on social media. Most 
participants spontaneously described the evolution of digital media activism by 
distinguishing the initial phase of the blogosphere, from a later stage characterised by the 
emergence of Facebook and Twitter.  
 
Though only a very few bloggers were part of the activist community in 2007, they 
provided a sophisticated set of robust arguments supported by sources, evidences and 
quality journalistic investigations. Progressively, with the emergence of social media 
platforms, a lot of bloggers stopped writing blog posts to instead use Facebook and Twitter 
exclusively. This was confirmed to me by the press officer of a foreign embassy based in 
Cairo, who I met during the course of my fieldwork and who had been interacting with 
bloggers and activists on a regular basis (Cf. Interview Transcripts: 116).  
 
With the emergence of social media, a more superficial form of discourse arose. This new 
form of communication was characterised by keywords and hashtag trends, which most 
probably facilitated sporadic campaigns but prevented users from developing a deep 
argumentation. For many participants this contributed to make the features of the 
revolutionary counter-discourse meaningless, as it was now relying on short statements, 
                                                89 Egyptian bloggers, famous among the activist community. 
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which would be easily disseminated but could hardly be embedded in a well-defined 
ideological argument:  
Twitter for example, because Twitter is so limited, the amount of words you 
can write in one tweet, so you’re, I mean for example, after January 2011 there 
were so many conversations on Twitter between people that were generally 
interested in politics blablabla, but the platform, you know does not allow you 
to go in depth in those issues (…) It’s intended, or it’s only use can be for very 
vague discussions that are very all for freedom, blablabla, you can’t really go 
in that detailed policies or discussion about very specific issues that require 
numbers, you know, that require statistics, require, blablabla, (…) you can take 
one tweet out of context and it means something different. You don’t have the 
space to literally; literally you don’t have the space to write something that is 
comprehensive that is deep enough to be concrete. It’s mostly vague. Also 
because you have so many people get into the discussions, so you’re talking to 
one person, at a point, and then someone else joins the discussion and adds 
another point, and it becomes, really, really difficult to maintain a decent 
discussion, going on everything in it, because they are so many parties 
involved. (Samira, cf. Interview transcripts: 30) 
In addition to the fact that social media had extended the debate to include a mainstream 
audience, it was designed in a way that hardly enabled any participant to set the context in 
which they conceptualised freedom or social equity. By simplifying the message, Twitter, 
for instance, had undeniably participated to make this ideological vocabulary more fluid, 
which might partly explain why Morsi’s government attempt to actualise these concepts in 
constitutional law had failed.  
 
9.8. Monitoring and self-censorship: reconsidering the benefits of 
social media 
Finally and most importantly, participants pointed that the social media sphere was put 
under surveillance, which confirms the idea that the digital networks had progressively 
become an asset for the ruling elite. Two months prior to the fieldwork, the Interior 
Minister had announced his plan to apply mass surveillance over the most popular social 
media platforms and mobile phone applications, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube 
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and WhatsApp90. This had been mentioned several times by interviewees as one of the 
most problematic outcomes of increasing social media usage.  
 
In their views, this indicated that cyberspace had reached the end of its mainstreaming as 
well as its institutionalisation process, as it was now comparable to traditional mass media. 
As much as broadcast media and the press, the Internet was now censored and used by 
leading political groups as well as the national security to spread rumours and discredit the 
opposition. Simultaneously, participants referred to another phenomenon, which had made 
any form of social media statement very likely to be manipulated in Egypt. This consisted 
in private agents - most commonly hired by the government, the army or any other 
political or corporate stakeholder – who would create fake accounts, incorporate a platform 
or join an online debate with the intent of promoting or distorting a specific narrative.  
 
Such agents, referred to as “legan electrony” 91among the activist community, affected the 
audience’s perception of the public opinion and spread groundless rumours that equally 
affected the credibility of social media as an alternative communication tool. Agenda 
setting was now controlled by whoever benefitted from the resources and the infrastructure 
necessary to reverse a trend or change the dominant narrative. Additionally, the Interior 
Minister’s decision to monitor all social platform would lead to self-censorship.  
 
Consequently, what had been initially used to circumvent censorship and provide an 
alternative source of information stimulated as much scepticism and criticism as the 
traditional mass media: 
(…) now social media has been so corrupted, I could say, also because of the 
surveillance, I mean they have been getting like this, I don’t know like a 
multimillion contract with an American company to start surveying Facebook. 
So [activists] are aware of that and they wouldn’t start sharing their ideas or 
their fresh ideas on the revolution just like that on Facebook you know. (…) So 
                                                90  http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-s-attack-internet-privacy-tightens-noose-freedom-expression-
2014-06-04 (Amnesty.org, 04/06/2014) 91 Electronic committees  
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I think right now, everything changes. The activists wouldn’t use it as naively 
as they did before. (Tariq, cf. Interview Transcripts: 20) 
Over the course of the interviews, participants came to express their views on the benefits 
and the downfalls of social media activism in relation to the evolution of the political 
debate between 2011 and 2013. This aspect of the questionnaire confirmed the argument, 
according to which connective action partly explained the short-term success and long-
term failure of the revolution. Similarly to what had already been stated in previous studies 
(Breuer, 2012), participants argued that the media had essentially contributed to stimulate 
public deliberations, by facilitating access to information. It constituted a considerable 
asset for people who did not benefit from the technological infrastructure but could 
connect to the Internet via internet cafes (Samira, cf. Interview transcripts: 31). The speed 
and immediacy of the communication was also mentioned as a considerable advantage of 
digital media, along with the fact that it enabled any user to connect with an international 
audience.  
 
Among the participants recruited, Muna and Khalil, who respectively worked for a private 
television channel and for the online edition of a private newspaper, raised two different 
benefits of social media. According to Khalil, although this new communication channel 
might sometimes fail at producing a rational debate and raised polemics, it generated 
considerable social change and contributed to disseminate some form of knowledge: 
Now if you look at regular (…) bus moving in Cairo streets you will find 
people who are opening they own mobile phone and read. Ok, they are read 
jokes, they are read rubbish, they are read whatever but they are read (…) and 
this is knowledge, regardless of how shallow it is (…) (Khalil, cf. Interview 
transcripts: 86) 
Muna, on the other hand, argued that, from a journalistic point of view, participative media 
extended the amount of information available in the public space. However this advantage 
was considerably diminished by the fact that the overwhelming quantity of information 
now available online somehow affected its quality, as it made it extremely hard to filter 
and verify. This idea was also expressed by Nadim, a political activists, publishing articles 
for independent news websites and newspapers: 
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I think we cannot completely flip the table and work with direct democracy, I 
think in the end you always turn into representative democracy one way or 
another. Until you…Until maybe, I don’t know. I don’t know how direct 
democracy can address the problem of quantity versus quality, I don’t know 
how. They say “ more quantity brings quality” I don’t know about that. 
(Nadim, cf. Interview Transcripts: 40) 
Participant Mukhtar pointed that what could be regarded as an advantage of social media 
activism in some cases would turn out to be a downfall in other cases (Mukhtar). In 
particular, informants suggested that, due to the fact that digital media remained a free and 
unregulated space, nothing could be hidden. All kind of arguments and assumptions could 
easily gain legitimacy. Thanks to the convergence of the private and the public spheres, 
personal conflicts of interests would easily seep in public deliberations affecting people’s 
judgement:  
(…) lot’s of followers for example, they can say things that are untrue and it 
spreads like wild fire they can ruin reputations, (…) whenever you have 
activists and political players, you have big egos, you have interpersonal 
discussions and problems, that are not necessarily political, but personal 
purely, and this makes it a tool, which can be abused very easily, once you 
have a twitter account, you have like a hundred thousand followers, you know 
you can start a campaign against someone, you can almost blackmail (…) 
people believe you because you are an activist who has a name, who’s very 
popular, and people believe you, regardless of evidence, so it might actually 
weaken the critical thinking of people, because it’s so accessible, it’s so easy 
and a lot of people, it’s much easier for example for people to learn the news 
via twitter than to actually go and research themselves, so you know they take 
the easy way, so it’s easy and it’s a good thing, but t’s also a bad thing, in that 
sense. (Samira, cf. Interview transcripts: 31) 
Finally, another recurrent disadvantage was described as “the bubble effect” (Farid, cf. 
Interview transcripts: 89; Samira, cf. Interview transcripts: 31), the fact that social media 
activism had indirectly stopped the activist community from interacting with the lower 
class. As mentioned earlier, the activist community had failed at efficiently communicating 
with the grassroots, due to the fact that the debate had progressively been 
compartmentalised on social media. Admittedly, digital devices gave the opportunity to a 
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broader spectrum of perspectives to be expressed, but each of these perspectives had only 
been debated with its own social and ideological bubble.  
 
Overall, the fact that participants spontaneously drew a relationship between the 
advantages and disadvantages of the media confirms the hypothesis, according to which 
the Egyptian online public sphere followed a cyclical evolutionary path. But most 
importantly, these findings indicate that middle class activists were surprisingly critical 
about its liberalisation. Although most of them advocated freedom of speech and the rights 
of the working class, they regarded the liberalisation of the debate – and the mainstreaming 
of the revolution - as problematic phenomenon, most certainly because this meant 
compromising intellectual leadership.  
 
They recalled the earlier stage of digital activism as the environment, which had been the 
most appropriate to the development of a critical theory and the most favourable to the 
confrontation of different ideological perspectives.  
 
Yet when considering alternative forms of political expression, most participants argued 
that the activist community would now need to practically interact with the grassroots. 
Since its creation, the revolutionary agenda always meant to relay the demands of the 
working class. Yet although participative media had provided a few middle class 
revolutionaries with the opportunity to publically share critical opinion, it had deviated 
them from their initial purpose.  
 
To a large extent, this category of the middle class genuinely intended to raise awareness 
about the needs of the working class. Yet paradoxically, they had only felt empowered to 
do so, when revolutionary activism was in its early stage and as they benefitted from 
intellectual leadership. Now that digital media had visibly become similar to mainstream 
media, pro-revolutionary activists started considering alternative forms of political 
engagement. In light of the experience of the 2011 revolution, efficient political action 
could only be achieved by interacting directly with the working class or restoring the 
conditions for intellectual leadership. Evidence of that was found, as participants were 
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asked their views on what potential alternative form of communication could be more 
successful in promoting one’s political message.  
 
9.9. Returning to institutional politics or grass-roots political action 
When asked about what kind of alternative communication channel could be used to 
develop a successful and consistent political agenda, interviewees proposed two different 
approaches. These alternative political strategies resonated well with the division I 
suggested between anarchist and political revolutionaries. Overall, four participants 
responded that it was hardly possible for the opposition to develop any other 
communication strategy. Yasmeen, an NGO activist using social media campaigning, and 
Khalil, the editor of an online news portal, claimed that no alternative communication 
channel could be used to compete with the dominant political actors now represented on 
the cyberspace. Two other interviewees affirmed that whether on social media or 
elsewhere, no alternative political discourse could ever be expressed in the repressive 
environment that Egypt was currently facing.   
 
Yet apart from the four reactions mentioned above, a first group argued that no consistent 
political discourse could ever be successful without an institutional form of politics. The 
traditional form of political organisation should substitute itself to fluid sporadic 
campaigns and to what Bennett and Segerberg conceptualised as connective action (2012):  
Me, personally, I think people should engage in more institutional form of 
political parties. That’s one form of engagement that I think people should 
stress on a little bit. (…) I don’t think they can immediately do that but I think 
on the long run, the best form to support direct democracy or support 
institutions is to have a backbones of institutional bodies, political parties or 
syndicates, or unions, if you have such a backbone, then social movements, I 
think, would be benefitted a lot. (Nadim, cf. Interview transcripts: 41) 
Surprisingly, this can also be interpreted as an attempt to recover the intellectual leadership 
that opposition activists benefitted from, when participative media were only used by a 
small community of critical thinkers. In participants’ terms, producing a new institutional 
discourse would potentially enable revolutionaries to regain the legitimacy and credibility 
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they had progressively lost, as social media became part of the mainstream. Furthermore, 
although this was only implicitly suggested by the interviewees, one can assume that 
institutional politics was now considered as a way to produce a consistent ideological 
framework for the opposition.  
 
In the second case, interviewees answered that a successful alternative to participative 
media could be found in face-to-face interactions with citizens. Yet this responded to 
another concern of the activist community: understanding and relaying the needs and 
perspective of the lower classes by using a real and effective bottom-up communication 
strategy:  
I think we need to go much more toward the hardware, we were to much with 
the software but these ideas, these debates, these initiatives needed to go down 
on the streets, they needed to be more engaging to the general grass-roots, who 
are mainly not internet users, or even if they are internet users that not entirely 
engaged in the design process of these initiatives, so we needed this hardware 
engagement and we did not have it. Political organisation if you can say. 
Political social organisation to be clear actually (Zakaria, cf. Interview 
transcripts: 7) 
Similar views were expressed, as interviewees were asked to what extent social media 
enabled to remain in control of one’s political message. When answering to this question, 
most participants reemphasised the high likelihood of seeing one’s comment distorted and 
misinterpreted. As it was formulated by Mukhtar, a social media activist, participative 
media consisted in a “free space” (Interview with Mukhtar, cf. Interview transcripts: 66). 
As such it enabled him to write more creatively, with no self-censorship nor concern about 
the politically correct stance. In other words, the benefit of the digital activism was 
precisely to remain out of control. His perspective, in that sense, reflected that of those 
revolutionaries, who had remained ontologically anarchists and would rather keep 
producing a counter-discourse rather than elaborating a new institutional framework.  
 
Alternatively, the majority of interviewees manifested scepticism and argued, once again, 
that only a strong institutional identity would help in ensuring a sustainable political 
message on social media. Amir, a 40-something liberal editorials writer, drew an 
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interesting distinction between individuals and institutional users, implying that individuals 
had not as much control over the debate as institutions: 
- Do you think its is possible to remain in control of your political message 
when using something like social media? 
- It depends, if you talk about individuals then no. Unless you are very 
responsible and then you wouldn’t need to show…If you are an institution and 
you are running it the same way that traditional media is done, maybe, but then 
it wouldn’t be social media as you know. It would be just another medium for a 
similar process so…(Amir, cf. Interview transcripts: 111) 
Younger interviewees regularly applying social media to promote their own activities 
asserted that one’s political message could be controlled through participative media as 
individuals are always free to rectify misunderstandings. By doing so, they implied that it 
was activists’ responsibility to anticipate and prevent the almost inevitable distortion of 
their statements.  
 
For instance, cyber-activist Yasmeen had developed a technique intended to refute any 
statement posted on her behalf on social media and context any inaccurate quotations of 
her work (Yasmeen, cf. Interview transcripts: 12). This involved tracking all allegations 
and responding by uploading print-screens of her former posts. Such example highlighted 
to what extent this new era of cyber-activism would require foresight and long-term vision, 
as well as an awareness of the different political agenda competing online. As such, it 
constituted one step forward towards a more strategic and less spontaneous form of 
politics.   
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9.10. Connectivity, artificial counter-discourse and the sustainability 
issue 
Overall, when analysing the evolution of the post-revolutionary debate in relation with 
social media usage, participants implied that connective action – in Bennett and 
Segerberg’s terms (2012) - could not lead to any substantial political change. Though it 
had proved to consolidate diffuse mobilisations in the past, its impact was considerably 
diminished by the current polarisation of the political environment. In this case again, 
participants claimed that the experience had led them to consider a rather traditional form 
of representation. They expressed the urge of finding entirely new tools (Nadim, cf. 
Interview transcripts: 39) or developing new trends and practices for the future generation 
of cyber-activism (Yasmeen, cf. Interview transcripts: 12).  
 
But most importantly, the immediacy of the communication had made revolutionaries 
victims of their own success. This had led them to overestimate the popularity of their 
political message among the broader population and created an illusion of social cohesion. 
By doing so, it had stopped them from anticipating the return of leading political groups on 
the political scene.  As a result, they had become aware of the need to constantly ensure the 
consistency (sustainability) of their discourse and invest in the content rather than the 
medium of their political message:  
I think that the most important thing that [revolutionaries] should have learned, 
was basically to make a distinction, between an impression and an opinion and 
the communication’s message, these are three different things. And the fact 
that the immediacy of social media has mixed this up together (…) And this is 
why I say that they haven’t learned anything. It’s because they still believe that 
the real problem that they are facing is censorship. That they are not allowed to 
speak directly to the people. But that’s not the case, I mean, if you are a 
revolutionary activist, today, and if we decided to have a person, that we give 
them revolutionary items, we put him on Tahrir Square, and hold a public 
referendum on whether this person should be executed, I assure you that the 
majority of Egyptians would vote for that [laugh]. Just for the sake of seeing 
someone being executed that is involved with the revolution. That’s a failure 
and that’s primarily a failure of communication. (Amir, cf. Interview transcript: 
101) 
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In other words, the artificial features of the discourse - the labels and slogans – had been 
disseminated before its actual meaning and its ideological framework could take shape. 
The form of discourses was now circulating faster than its content and before the critical 
theory and ideology that could have consolidated this movement had even emerged. This 
was the reason why these labels and slogans appeared to have no meaning and to have 
served different agendas.  
 
Left wing and liberal Egyptian activists were facing a phenomenon, which was comparable 
to the economic bubble that the pioneers of the digital industry had experienced in the 
1990s. Yet in their case, it was the success of the political debate, which had been growing 
too fast to be sustained and beneficial to its first investors.  
 
Consequently, young revolutionaries like Mehdi, who was the most radical opponent to the 
regime that I met during my fieldwork and most probably the less likely to compromise, 
were now considering negotiation: 
I’ld change the way we did politics, we didn’t want to make any compromises, 
we wanted all our galls to be true in just a matter of one year, I think there’s 
two main mistakes that we made. The first one was, after Mohammed 
Mahmoud92, we were powerful, much powerful, we could just call who ever 
we wanted prime minister and he would come. But we didn’t, this is one big 
mistake. The other one 30th June, cause we went on the street with the counter-
revolution. We must have gone in the streets alone, not with the counter-
revolution. [Laugh] (Mehdi, cf. Interview transcripts: 72) 
When referring to “the way we did politics” Mehdi described a political agenda designed 
on a day-to-day basis, with no long-term vision. The revolutionary community was acting 
with the immediacy of digital media and had proved to be unprepared for the opportunities 
that the fall of Mubarak’s regime had unleashed. As a result it had failed at developing the 
strong ideological foundations that previous revolutionary movements over history had to 
rely on, before introducing a new range of power institutions.  
                                                92 Reference to the clashes that took place in November 2011 between young revolutionaries and the police 
in the Mohammed Mahmoud street, which leads to Tahrir Square.  
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This was precisely the reason why many thinkers come to question whether or not the 2011 
uprisings should be referred to as a revolution (Farah, 2012; Stein, 2012). Not only had 
they failed in establishing a new regime after the 30th June 2013 coup d’état, but it had also 
failed in spreading one unique and unifying revolutionary ideology. In fact, as opposed to 
the way the discursive cycle had always operated over history, the 2011 uprisings had not 
really substituted one dominant discourse for another.  
 
Instead of developing a new institutional power on the basis of the revolutionary ideology 
per se, the uprisings had indirectly reinforced the military regime. Yet unlike other forms 
of post-revolutionary states such as the Jacobin or communist dictatorships, the counter-
revolution had gained legitimacy from the artificial features rather than from the 
substantial essence of the revolution. Indeed, it would essentially rely on the distortion of 
the revolutionary vocabulary as well as on a transposition of the symbols that helped in 
consolidating the 2011 protests.  
 
This process was however by most participants as a direct consequence of connectivity. 
Indeed, the fact that the revolution had remain superficial and did not manage to substitute 
one ideological framework for another was partly due to the immediacy and chaotic nature 
of participative media. Connectivity, in that sense, had not specifically emphasised the 
process, through which discourse, power and identities would be renegotiated according to 
the natural circulation of discourse. Rather, it had made this process less efficient by 
accelerating it, rendering counter-discourse artificial. As a result, intuitional powers and 
dominant discourses were less likely to be challenged, despite the fact that emergent 
practices would spread more rapidly.  
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9.11. Conclusion to empirical analysis 4: a superficial revolution  
In conclusion, although it intended to contextualise digital media activism in the offline 
socio-political environment, the ethnography confirmed the analyses I had conducted on 
the online data sets. As it appeared, most participants commonly agreed with the idea that 
both the symbolic and technological tools originally applied to spread the revolutionary 
message had been hijacked. Furthermore, similarly to what the blogosphere indicated, 
participants distinguished two phenomena that might have contributed to the failure of the 
revolution in the long run. Those were comparable to what I had identified earlier as the 
mainstreaming and institutionalisation of the revolution.  
 
In addition, all participants, regardless of their age or political background, appeared to be 
rather critical with regards to the way social media had opened access to the political 
debate shortly after the 2011 uprisings. This particular communication strategy was indeed 
revealing of the reasons why the left-wing and liberal opposition had failed. 
Revolutionaries had been mistaken in thinking that their audience had embraced the 
revolutionary message and had not achieved to consolidate a substantial ideological 
message. Yet this was partly due to the fact that social media had become increasingly 
popular and contributed to democratise the debate before revolutionaries had established 
strong ideological foundations for their cause.  
 
In participants’ terms and in spite of what the bias of technological determinism had led 
many social scientists to believe, connectivity had not participated to the success but to the 
failure of the revolution. 
 
To some extent, like in every revolution, the 2011 uprisings was meant to initiate a debate 
on the meaning of freedom, social equity, dignity and democracy, while confronting 
different ideological perspectives. Discussing and renegotiating the meaning of those 
concepts was necessary to stimulate a critical public sphere and generate a sense of 
citizenship. Indeed, one could easily argue revolutions, by nature, intend to make discourse 
more fluid in order to successfully complete a transition of power and substitute one 
institutional discourse for another. This is precisely the reason why one may easily be 
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mistaken in thinking that a fluid discourse systematically creates favourable conditions for 
democratisation. In fact, the circulation of power - only requires discourse to be fluid up to 
a certain extent.   
 
Likewise, periods of revolution and political transition have always made political debate 
more polarised. On one hand, those generate intense tensions between the institutions in 
power and the emerging ideology. On the other hand, revolutions may also lead to a 
division between those, who remain primarily driven by critical theory (anarchists) and 
those, who enter into the sphere of institutional politics, enacting theory into practice 
(political revolutionaries). Each of these political actors comes to reconsider his perception 
of the revolutionary discourse as soon as it is being debated in the sphere of institutional 
politics, so as to evolve towards a new form of institutional power. In this regard, the 
conflicts that occurred both within and without the left wing and liberal opposition are 
similar to what revolutionaries have experienced in other cases of political crisis over 
history.  
 
However, one of the particularities of the Egyptian uprisings lies in the fact that 
connectivity emphasised the fluidity of discourse, to the point that it jeopardised the 
transition of power. Indeed, connectivity had accelerated the evolution of counter-
discourse – as described in my model of discursive cycle. In doing so, it had deprived the 
opposition of intellectual leadership too soon for it to produce a consistent critical theory. 
When revolutionaries drew the attention of the masses in 2011, this critical theory was still 
under construction. It was being elaborated by those, among the middle class, who 
navigated between different social and political circles and benefitted from the intellectual 
and material recourses needed to potentially produce a reliable ideological framework for 
the opposition. Connectivity contributed to interrupt this process, by accelerating the 
passage from critical theory to revolutionary action. However, this revolutionary action 
could only rely on a range of superficial concepts that would be easily be distorted by the 
leading political forces.  
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Meanwhile, many revolutionary activists desperately attempted to reproduce the conditions 
for intellectual leadership on social media. Yet this led to confine different audiences, 
while generating an illusion of consensus. Whereas they benefitted from a position of 
mediator between the working and the middle class, revolutionaries expressed the feeling 
of being progressively disconnected from the grassroots and losing control over the 
narrative of the revolution.  
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10. Conclusion: the doping metaphor 
When thinking about connectivity in terms of the way different ideologies succeed one 
another, one may describe this phenomenon as doping. Thanks to digital media, emerging 
counter-discourses are more likely to reach the mainstream and to ultimately be debated in 
the sphere of institutional politics. Under the connectivity paradigm, counter-discourses are 
almost enacted in political practice as soon as they emerge. In the short term, this 
phenomenon may be interpreted as the sign of a more democratic debate, given that more 
individuals become involved in the consolidation of a counter-discourse in its early stage. 
Furthermore, one may regard counter-discourses, in the connective age, as more efficient, 
because they easily stimulate visible forms of political engagement, while gathering a 
broader range of supporters (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). 
 
In this regard, connectivity acts like a kind of performance enhancing drug for counter-
power. By making discourse more fluid, it accelerates the transition from emergent to 
mainstream, making counter-power more successful in the short run. However like any 
performance-enhancing drug, connectivity leads to critical side effects, which alter the 
success of counter-power in the long run.  
 
Connective action, indeed, relies on a highly fluid, hence superficial, ideological 
vocabulary, which can be easily adapted to serve any political argument. Admittedly, as 
Bennett and Segerberg (2012) demonstrated earlier, such forms of political engagement are 
more inclusive than traditional institutional structures. They allow every single individual 
to project herself in the political message of the network, as well as to reframe and 
personalise it in a way that reflects her particular perspective.  
 
In a highly polarised political environment, this becomes problematic, since every political 
camp – including the institutions already in power – is likely to claim ownership of this 
emerging discourse. A fortiori, on the scale of a revolution, connectivity tends to dissolve 
and dismantle counter-power by enhancing the polarisation that comes along the 
revolutionary process. At first, it creates an illusion of consensus, which misleads the 
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opposition in thinking that its political message has been fully understood and absorbed by 
the grassroots.  
 
This illusion of consensus is detrimental, all the more so as it raises the legitimacy of those 
who will ultimately claim ownership of the counter-discourse. Secondly, it prevents 
members of the opposition – and those who may have consolidated a critical theory – from 
recovering intellectual leadership. That is to say that, leaders of the opposition and critical 
thinkers, who would be the first to witness the distortion of counter-discourse, are no 
longer able to act as a mediator between the grassroots and the political elites. Moreover, 
they are no longer able to clarify and rectify the primary meaning of their political 
message.  
 
10.1. Connectivity: the case of the 2011 Arab uprisings 
As this research demonstrates, the case of 2011 Egyptian uprisings and some aspects of the 
2011 Tunisian revolution perfectly illustrates this phenomenon. In its early stage, digital 
activism certainly contributed to spread the revolutionary message. On one hand, it 
consolidated a community of critical thinkers from different ideological perspectives (left 
wing, liberal, conservative) and helped them formulate a counter-discourse that would 
reflect the demands of the working class. On the other hand, it enabled to relay this 
alternative political voice to the middle class and the international community.  
 
In the initial phase, digital activism also contributed to put revolutionary activists in a 
position of intellectual leadership, since they were a minority to be using the Internet as a 
means for political deliberation. This partly explains why social media has been initially 
interpreted as a significant factor of democratisation, as foreign governments and 
international media commented on the events in early 2011.  
 
The other reason, on which I will expand later in this chapter, lies in the fact that today’s 
prevailing conception of democracy, which is conveyed by Western neoliberal 
governments, is often technologically determined. In line with what Adorno and 
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Horkheimer (2002) anticipated in their Dialectic of the Enlightenment, technological 
development – as much as scientific progress in general – is regarded as a source of 
empowerment, especially when it benefits economic neoliberalism.  
 
However, the Egyptian case shows that digital activism also contributed to prevent 
substantial political change to occur. Paradoxically, by liberalising access to political 
debate, social media eliminated the conditions for intellectual leadership, while allowing 
anyone to reshape the narrative of the revolution. Simultaneously, it propelled the 
revolutionary counter-power into the sphere of institutional politics before it could rely on 
a sustainable critical theory.  
 
Ultimately, digital activism had become a visible threat to the political elites. Due to its 
unexpected success in mobilising protestors in January 2011, it would now be monitored 
and incorporated as a tool for political propaganda, while being actively used to discredit 
the revolutionary opposition.  
 
Those were precisely the side effects of digital activism and the reasons why pro-
revolutionaries were now seeking alternative forms of political engagement that would 
enable them to recover intellectual leadership. Three years after the revolution, they felt the 
need to return to a more traditional type of political communication.  
 
10.2. Answering the question of sustainability 
Studying the effects of connective action over the months that followed the 2011 Egyptian 
uprisings provides answers to what Bennett and Segerberg formulated as the question of 
“sustainability and effect” (2012). In order to outline those answers, I will now refer back 
to my discursive cycle model. As I suggested in my theoretical framework, discourses have 
historically undertaken a cyclical evolution. In order to successfully challenge the 
dominant ideology, counter-discourses emerge both within the public sphere (Habermas, 
1962) and in the margins of civil society, such as in the private sphere (Fraser, 1990). This 
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evolution occurs in the first half of the discursive cycle, which outlines the transition from 
critical theory to political practice. 
 
Over time, these counter-discourses gain recognition and potentially consolidate a critical 
opposition, progressively evolving into another form of institutional discourse. Admittedly, 
this implies that counter-discourses are meant to establish another dominant ideology, 
which engenders new relationships of domination. Nevertheless, this cycle ensures the 
renewal of the ideological framework, on which societies are structured and according to 
which all sorts of power institutions assure their legitimacy over history. In this regard, the 
circulation of discourse also ensures the renewal of the elites in power. On the basis of this 
model, every new institutional discourse is instituted by a new generation of political 
actors. As soon as this transition becomes effective, visible and sustainable, one may 
describe it as a successful revolution.  
 
Yet under the connectivity paradigm, the circulation of discourse in the first half of the 
discursive cycle is precipitated. Counter-discourses easily reach a mass – or mainstream – 
audience and are rapidly enacted into political practice. This is mainly due to the fact that 
counter-discourses become more fluid, which means they hardly evolve into a sustainable 
ideological power. Alternatively, they can be distorted or incorporated by the pre-
established institutional discourse to serve the elites that are already in power.    
 
Because of the fact that counter-discourses are no longer sustainable under the connectivity 
paradigm, they prevent the renewal of power that is meant to happen at the lower pole of 
the discursive cycle. In order to further exemplify this phenomenon, I will now answer to 
my three research questions. 
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Each of my four empirical chapters demonstrate that both the symbolic and technological 
tools originally used by pro-revolutionaries benefitted the counter-revolution.  
 
In fact, the analysis conducted on a sample from the blogosphere and the fieldwork 
ethnography provide similar findings, since they approach this question from the 
perspective of revolutionary activists. Both data sets revealed that pro-revolutionaries 
witnessed an evolution in the way most of the issues raised by the opposition had been 
relayed by the military elite and the Muslim Brotherhood. In Tunisia, bloggers saw other 
long-established political parties and organisations, such as the Tunisian General Labour 
Union (UGTT) and Ennahdha, apply the same communication strategies as those 
developed by the youth opposition in 2011. Like the participants interviewed in Egypt, 
Tunisian bloggers also observed the fact that institutional political players and campaigners 
had become visible in the social media sphere. In Egypt, social media was not only used as 
tool for campaigning, but could now be applied to track and discredit members of the 
opposition or as a form of propaganda, thanks to private agents working for different 
political camp (“legan electrony”).   
 
As for the symbolic tools of the revolution, both Tunisian and Egyptian web activists 
agreed that the terms that consolidated the opposition – such as “revolution”, “freedom”, 
“dignity”, or “equity” – had been incorporated into the discourse of the leading political 
organisations. By joining the debate on social media, official political players articulated 
different interpretations of those concepts, which relied on their specific political 
programme.  
  
1. Did the symbolic and technological tools designed by pro-revolutionaries benefit 
the leading political forces over the months that followed the 2011 uprisings in 
Tunisia and Egypt?  
 
This particular research question intends to reconsider the assumption, according 
to which digital technologies acted as a factor of democratisation. Further, it 
brings us to consider the hypothesis that the political crisis following the 2011 
events reveals a vulnerability intrinsic to emergent forms of political activism.  
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Evidence of this was found when analysing presidential candidates’ usage of social media 
Twitter during the 2012 election, as outlined in my second empirical chapter. Combining 
data visualisation and qualitative discourse analysis revealed that, despite its low 
penetration rate, this digital media had, indeed, been as beneficial to the military elite as to 
the left-wing opposition. When comparing candidates Ahmad Shafiq’s and Hamdeen 
Sabahy’s Twitter campaign, one may identify the transition that Internet operated from 
emerging to mainstream media, and understand how those two aspects coexisted during 
the presidential race.  
 
Although the two candidates proved to be significantly active and visible on Twitter, 
Ahmad Shafiq’s tweets intended to relay his official statements and appearances on 
mainstream media. As such, they were part of a large and institutional campaigning 
infrastructure. Alternatively, Hamdeen Sabahy applied Twitter in a way that was more 
revealing of pro-revolutionaries’ social media usage, to deliver a more personalised 
political message. This illustrates to what extent Twitter was simultaneously applied as an 
emerging and rather institutionalised form of political communication at the time of 2012 
presidential race. At this stage of the political crisis, the technological tools originally 
applied by the revolutionary opposition were just as profitable to those, who remained in 
control of traditional mass media and enjoyed a high level of exposure.  
 
Besides, as argued in my second empirical chapter, incorporating the social media sphere 
enabled pro-militaries to promote a perspective of the notion of freedom and social equity, 
which was opposed to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamdeen Sabahy, on the other 
hand, conveyed a vision of freedom that resonated with pro-revolutionaries’ concern for 
freedom of speech. In that sense, my Twitter data set also demonstrated how the symbolic 
tools of the revolution served the elite in power. My third empirical chapter corroborated 
these findings by showing how the concepts that had supported the revolutionary discourse 
still conveyed conflicting political arguments in the context of the 2012 constitutional 
debate. 
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2. To what extent was the 2011-2013 post-revolutionary debate representative of the 
way emerging counter-discourses progressively gain legitimacy in periods of 
revolution?  
 
Exploring this question actually requires assessing to what extent the Tunisian 
and Egyptian case studies relate to the model of a discursive cycle, through which 
counter-discourse turns into the new institutional discourse. In other words, it 
introduces a reflection on the way connectivity affects the balance between power 
and counter-power. 
 
As argued above, my research establishes that the debates surrounding the 2011-2013 
political transition in Tunisia, and most particularly in Egypt, did not entirely conform to 
the discursive cycle.  
 
Admittedly, both the blogosphere and the ethnography showed that, cyber-activists 
benefitted from a position of intellectual leadership prior to the 2011 uprisings. Yet these 
empirical analyses also suggest that, with the decrease of digital divide and the fact that 
social media reached a more diversified audience, Internet was no longer different from 
mainstream media. Its public was indeed more representative of the mass media audience, 
which was more exposed to dominant narratives and more receptive to the arguments of 
the leading political forces.  
 
In the absence of intellectual leadership, bloggers and political activists in general felt 
deprived of intellectual leadership, which led them to keep interacting within restricted 
circles of followers. Yet this generated what interview participants and bloggers described 
as a bubble effect (cf. Interview transcripts: 31, 89; cf. blogosphere data set, Ref. 70) by 
isolating them while disconnecting them from the grassroots.  
 
Therefore, in the long run, digital activism contributed to dissolve intellectual leadership 
and to separate critical theory from political practice. In that respect, it defeated the natural 
circulation of discourse and did not provide the conditions for a successful revolution to 
occur. Indeed, my model of discursive cycle proposes that critical theory, which I relate to 
Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere, and political practice that can be understood in 
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relation to Fraser’s critique, come together to produce a powerful counter-discourse. This 
was precisely not the case in the context of the Egyptian and Tunisian post-revolutionary 
debates.  
 
My second and third empirical chapters also answer to this research question by 
exemplifying the process through which the ideological vocabulary of the revolution 
became institutionalised (institutionalisation of the revolution). Both my Twitter analysis 
and the data set extracted from the Dostour Sharek platform show how the issues raised by 
the opposition have been incorporated by the institutions in power – both the military elite 
and the Muslim Brotherhood – to restore their legitimacy.  
 
This proves that the transition of power that should have occurred in the lower pole of the 
discursive cycle did not operate and that counter-discourse was only used to reinforce pre-
established institutional discourse.  
 
3. What was the role of social media and digital activism in enhancing the fluidity of 
the revolutionary discourse over the months that followed the 2011 revolutions?  
 
The third of my research questions shall bring me to address the sustainability issue 
and determine whether fluid counter-discourse can be as successful over time as on 
the long run.  
 
Like participant Samira suggested when referring to Twitter in particular, social media 
contributed to compress and label the political message. This originally facilitated the 
spread of the revolution, making it appealing to a broader public. However, in Samira’s 
terms, this ultimately contributed to make the vocabulary that surrounded the revolution 
vague and hardly applicable on the basis of a specific political programme.  
 
My third empirical analysis is particularly revealing of this phenomenon. The sample of 
comments extracted from the Dostour Sharek platform shows that the concepts inherited 
from the revolution were still highly misleading in the context of the 2012 constitutional 
referendum. This partly explains why Morsi’s constitutional draft failed at materialising 
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those concepts in the legislation process and generated the tensions that led to the 2013 
coup d’état.  
 
Initially, because these concepts allowed different interpretations and could be adapted 
according to one’s ideological perspective, they initially helped in conferring a sense of 
consensus. This partly explains why the statistics computed by the Dostour Sharek 
platform indicated a majority of “likes” and the draft constitution was approved with over 
60% of votes. However, as argued in my third empirical chapter, the constitutional debate 
was more intertextual than it was interactive. As such, it concealed divergences of 
opinions instead of confronting them, which only emphasised polarisation, creating the 
conditions for 2013 military coup. As a result, Morsi’s government had followed a similar 
evolution to that of the left-wing and liberal opposition in the aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings.  
 
Fluid discourses may also be explained by the way public deliberations are designed on 
such social platforms. For instance, analysing the comments posted on the Dostour Sharek 
portal qualitatively revealed that citizens were more critical of the constitutional draft than 
what the number of “likes” suggested. The project was designed to be consultative rather 
than deliberative. As such, it did not stimulate a high level of interaction between 
participants. Therefore, overall, this research clearly indicates that social media 
significantly enhanced the fluidity of discourse, which partly explains the failure of the 
revolution.  
 
10.3. Rethinking the relationship between democracy and technology 
Overall, my research demystifies the assumption, according to which digital activism 
unleashed or facilitated the democratisation process. In fact, similarly to what Jodi Dean 
suggested in her critique of communicative capitalism (2003), it suggests that social media 
provided an illusion of critical deliberation, which only reinforced the legitimacy of the 
leading political forces over time.  
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And yet the 2011 uprisings were often interpreted by the media and across the literature 
(Breuer 2011; Castells, 2012) as evidence of how technology might improve freedom of 
expression and create the conditions for a more democratic political environment.  This 
can be explained by the fact that democratisation – as it was shaped by the historical 
experience of the Enlightenment and as it is conceptualised today in neoliberal 
democracies - is often regarded as driven by scientific and technological progress. Yet as 
this research leads us to think, this perspective on democratisation is biased and misleading 
for two reasons. 
 
First, it relies on a very Eurocentric conception of the democratic debate, according to 
which any attempt to liberalise the political debate systematically produces a more 
egalitarian society, by providing every citizen with the chance to shape public opinion. 
Such perception is most likely to be determined by the legacy of Enlightenment (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 2002) and the way industrialised and neoliberal societies framed the 
memory of the Enlightenment over time.  
 
Second, a vision of democracy, which partly relies on technological determinism, 
contributes to build what Jodi Dean referred to as a sort of neodemocracy (2003). Such an 
approach conveys the assumption that technological progress stimulates political change 
for the best, by ensuring individuals’ empowerment. To some extent, Habermas’ public 
sphere (1962) formulates a similar hypothesis, since it argues that the liberalisation of 
discourse that occurred in the context of the Enlightenment paved the way for a more 
critical and democratic debate. Accordingly, both technology and democracy are 
understood as a progression and the signs of a positive and on-going evolution, although 
they stimulate complex interplays between power and counter-power, which can be 
interpreted in very different ways. By liberalising discourse and opening access to public 
debate, democracy and technology trigger delicate tensions between discourse and counter-
discourse that directly impact on the renewal of power as well as of the ideology that 
sustains it. In view of this, conceptualising the bourgeois public sphere in a more holistic 
model – such as the cycle of discourse - shows how the equilibrium between discourse and 
counter-discourse can easily be disturbed, so as to legitimise well-established powers.  
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 Similarly to what Jodi Dean argues when considering the public sphere in the age of 
communicative capitalism (2003) my research shows that connectivity contributes to 
generate an illusion of consensus, which does not comply with the Habermasian definition 
of a critical deliberation. For this reason, I believe that building theory on connectivity and 
exploring how this paradigm affects the sustainability of counter-discourses shall help to 
rethink both technology and democracy as part of a cyclical rather than a linear evolution. 
Inevitably, this also requires reconsidering one’s expectations with regards to the 
democratisation as well as the technological modernisation of the MENA region. 
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